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Abstract 
In our study we explore and analyze 6 627 insider trades made on the NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm between 2010 and 2014. We ask if publicly available information on insider 
trading can give insight into where stock prices will head in the future and if outside 
investors can earn abnormal returns by creating portfolios based on such information. We 
conduct our research using the event-study methodology as described by MacKinlay (1997) 
and show that insiders are better informed about the overall future performance of their 
company, indicating a violation of the semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis. We 
show that different firm characteristics such as market capitalization, financial leverage and 
industry, together with individual characteristics such as insider type and traded volume, can 
emphasize differences in abnormal returns following insider trades. Based on our findings 
we create three rule-based insider portfolios. We show that we are able to gain risk-adjusted 
returns above the market, but when controlling for transaction costs the risk-adjusted return 
vanish. Our study has implications for market efficiency and offers important insights for 
those who seek to earn higher returns by following strategies based on the publication of 
insider trades. 
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1. Introduction 
In our study we seek to explore and analyze 6 627 insider trades made on the NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm1 between 2010 and 2014. The purpose is to address the following: 
Can publicly available information on insider trading give insight into where stock prices 
will head in the future? 
and 
Can investors (“outsiders”) earn abnormal returns by creating portfolios based on such 
information? 
What is Insider Trading? 
Insider trading is a term that most people associate with illegal conduct. This is a common 
misconception as the term includes both legal and illegal conduct. Insider trading is simply 
the trading of stocks, bonds, stock options or other financial securities of a public company 
by individuals within the firm. These individuals are, when meeting certain criteria, called 
insiders.  
An insider is legally permitted to trade shares and other securities of his own company when 
not based on inside information and when the trading activity is properly reported to the 
respective financial supervisory authority. Inside information, or private information, can be 
defined as non-public and material information. It is precise information that can affect stock 
price movements significantly and that when traded upon can mitigate investment risk and 
provide returns above what a typical investor could achieve. Both insiders and outsiders of 
the company can hold inside information and trading on such information for profit is illegal. 
Insiders may have several motives for trading their company’s securities when not holding 
inside information. One can assume that the company board of directors, its management 
and employees have more knowledge of future prospects and projects in their company and 
the industry it operates within, and trade based on the assumption that the company’s value 
is different from the current consensus of the market (profit motive). It is also recognized in 
literature (e.g. Huddart and Ke, 2007; Ke et al., 2003; Seyhun, 1998) that insiders trade for 
                                                 
1 Also referred to as the Stockholm Stock Exchange or Stockholmsbörsen 
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other reasons than profit, such as the need for liquidity (liquidity motive) or to better 
diversify their holdings and re-balance their portfolio (diversification motive). Tax motives 
may also explain some of the insider trading behavior, for example by realizing losses by the 
end of year to gain from tax benefits. Stock awards and the granting of options by the 
company to its insiders are examples of compensation that will be reported as insider trades 
(external motive). Lastly, insiders might be motivated to illegally exploit inside information 
by trading on this information or to manipulate market prices for personal gains 
(manipulation motive). 
We find it reasonable to believe that insider trading activity can signal where a company’s 
stock will head in the future and therefore potentially lead to superior returns. We do not 
consider if the insider trade is legally or illegally conducted, nor if the insider herself profits 
from the trade. We want to know if one, as outsiders, can profit from the signal the 
publication of an insider trade sends to the market and if this signal is handled in an efficient 
and unbiased way by the market participants. Findings corroborative of our research 
questions will indicate a violation of the semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis. 
Motivation and Structure 
Our motivation to study reported insider trades originated from the insider portfolio and 
weekly insider article in the Norwegian financial newspaper, Finansavisen, as well as an 
interest in the investment strategy of the asset management firm, Dovre Forvaltning. We 
chose the Swedish stock market over the Norwegian stock market as there are approximately 
four times more reported insider trades in the first market during the period of interest, 
providing more data to analyze. 
We will look into the role of information in financial markets and introduce theory on 
market efficiency in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, existing literature on insider trading will be 
introduced together with our proposed hypotheses. In Chapter 4, we will introduce the 
Swedish stock market and give the reader a description of the data analyzed. In Chapter 5 we 
will discuss and decide how to perform the analysis, before presenting and discussing the 
results in Chapter 6. Based on our findings, we will create three rule-based insider portfolios 
to see if outsiders can make risk-adjusted profit by following such strategies in real life. 
These portfolios, the method for testing them and their results, are presented in Chapter 7. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 we will present our conclusions.  
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2. Market Efficiency 
2.1 Information 
The overall purpose of a financial market is to facilitate the transfer of funds between 
investors and borrowers. A well-functioning financial market acts as a lubricant for the 
economy and enables efficiency in terms of consumption smoothing and optimal allocation 
through time. To determine to which extent a financial market is well functioning, three 
criteria’s must be met. First, the financial market is said to be a complete market if all the 
assets or contracts needed to fulfill the demand of its participants exists. Secondly, when the 
costs of conducting these trades are reasonably low, the market is operationally efficient. 
Thirdly, if all available information concerning fundamental values are present, the financial 
market is informationally efficient. 
In an efficient market, all past and present information is reflected in asset prices and prices 
become non-predictable (random). This “random walk” of the prices results in the failure of 
any investment strategy that aims to beat the marked consistently over time. The concept of 
gaining from trading on the information extracted from the publication of insider trades 
relies on the foundation that not all information is present in the markets. This implies that 
the financial market is not informationally efficient and that insiders hold information or 
knowledge concerning fundamental values, future prospects or the general state of a 
company that affect security prices. To further elaborate on the concept of informational 
efficient markets, we will present the renowned Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) as 
presented by Eugene Fama in his ground-breaking article «Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work», in May 1970. 
2.1.1 Market Efficiency 
«An efficient capital market is a market that is efficient in processing information» 
(Fama, 1976, p. 133) 
Fama developed a framework for describing to which degree markets are efficient. The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that markets are efficient when prices reflect all 
relevant information at any point in time. The concepts of information and time required 
further detailing and thus Fama defined three forms of information efficiency: weak, semi-
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strong and strong form market efficiency. Each form of efficiency is defined with respect to 
the information that is reflected in prices. The EMH is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 - Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Weak Form 
The first form of market efficiency Fama described is weak form efficiency. If all past 
market data is reflected in the security prices, the market is weak form efficient. This means 
that one cannot make abnormal risk-adjusted returns by using historical price and volume 
data to predict future price changes. Technical analysts do not think the stock market is weak 
form efficient, but believes that investors are emotionally driven and predictable. They 
believe this predictability is exploitable and shows in past prices and volume data. 
To determine whether markets are weak form efficient one can study patterns in historical 
prices. Statistical studies can reveal serial correlation in security returns and thereby reveal 
patterns. Poterba and Summers (1987) presented evidence that stock returns exhibit positive 
serial correlation in the short term and negative serial correlation in the long run, known as 
mean reversion. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) created “winner” and “loser” portfolios based 
on 36 months performance and tracked the portfolios performance against a benchmark for 
three years. They showed that the “losers” consistently beat the benchmark and the 
“winners” underperformed – indicating that “winners” would become “losers” and vica 
versa. Much like De Bondt and Thaler, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documents that 
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have performed poorly the past 6-months, generate significant positive returns over holding 
periods of three to twelve month, providing evidence against weak-form market efficiency. 
Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) demonstrates that a simple set of technical trading 
rules over a sample period shows significant forecast power for changes in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. 
Although these studies present evidence against weak-form market efficiency, most studies 
indicate that investors cannot consistently earn abnormal profits using historical price 
information, nor using technical analysis, in developed financial markets (e.g. Bessembinder 
and Chan, 1998; Jensen and Benington, 1970; Fama and Blume, 1966). Bessembinder and 
Chan (1998) shows that with the inclusion of trading costs, technical strategies does not 
show evidence indicative of market inefficiencies. 
Semi-Strong Form 
When all publicly known and available information is reflected in the security prices, the 
market is semi-strong efficient. Publicly available information includes for example financial 
statements (e.g. firm’s interim reports), announcements (e.g. contract signings, interest rate 
decisions and insider trades) and market data (e.g. stock prices, currency rates and 
employment numbers). The implication of semi-strong efficiency is that analysis of publicly 
available information has no value.  
Neither technical nor fundamental analysis can be used to achieve abnormal returns as all 
information is reflected in the security prices  If a market is semi-strong efficient, it must 
also be weak form efficient. Information in reported insider trades has no value if the market 
is semi-strong form efficient. 
Fundamental analysts believe that publicly available information can be used to identify 
firms that deviate from their true and fair value to achieve abnormal risk-adjusted returns. 
The common methods for testing if markets are semi-strong efficient is to perform an event 
study of investors’ reactions to information releases, to do long-run abnormal return studies 
or to look for market anomalies. Most studies do not conclude that there are profit 
opportunities. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) identified 194 firms that were take-over targets 
in a merger and looked for abnormal returns following the takeover announcement. No 
excess returns were found. Other studies that support the semi-strong form of the EMH 
includes studies related to corporate reorganizations and stock splits (Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll, 1969). 
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Although most violations of the semi-strong form market efficiency are found to be more 
subtle and temporary, there are some exceptions. Bernard and Thomas (1989) looked at 
quarterly earnings surprises. They defined a surprise as the difference between the actual 
quarterly earnings announcement and the forecasted earnings and found that large surprises 
lead to higher positive abnormal return. They also found “drift” in the returns, as the upward 
trend (drift) in the stock price following a positive earnings surprise continues for a couple of 
months after the earning announcement. The same goes for negative earnings surprises. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that returns following IPOs and seasoned equity offerings 
underperform over moderately long time periods. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1995) show evidence of positive long-run abnormal risk-adjusted returns following share 
repurchases; Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) find the same for dividend initiations. 
Dividend omissions have the opposite effect (negative long-run abnormal risk-adjusted 
returns). 
Also some “anomalies” are found as evidence against semi-strong (and weak form) EMH. 
Banz (1981) show that small cap stocks have positive alphas, and that most of the abnormal 
returns occur in January2. Fama and French (1992) find that value companies (stocks with 
high book-to-market ratios) have higher CAPM adjusted returns than portfolios of growth 
stocks (low book-to-market ratios)3. 
Strong Form 
In a strong form efficient market also private information is reflected in security prices. If the 
market is strong form efficient, it must also be weak and semi-strong form efficient.  
In the case of a strong-form efficient market, what is classified illegal insider trading would 
not yield abnormal returns. Neither would any other trading done by individuals with private 
information. An example of this might be company managers trading on information related 
to their company’s financial condition, before these conditions are publicly released4. 
To test whether a market is strong form efficient, we have to test if an investor can earn an 
abnormal return by trading on private information. Many studies have found that strong-
                                                 
2 Chen and Singal (2004) indicate that the most obvious reason for this effect is tax-loss selling. 
3 Fama and French (1993) introduces their 3-factor model, including size and book-to-market factors. 
4 Trading on private information is illegal in most countries. 
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form efficiency does not hold and that trading on private information is profitable, including 
Jaffe (1974) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988). 
Further Implications 
The EMH has been tested on numerous occasions throughout the years in relation to insider 
trading, most prominently by Jaffe (1974) and Eckbo (1998), with diverging conclusions. 
The fact that different studies provide different conclusions may be an indication that the 
market may be exploitable and not entirely efficient. In Chapter 3, we will elaborate further 
on previous research on insider trading. 
Using publicly announced information from Finansinspektionen, the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority, our hypotheses will put the semi-strong form market efficiency to 
the test. Findings suggesting that investors can consistently earn abnormal returns by trading 
based on reported insider trades may be evidence contrary to semi-strong form market 
efficiency and will test the capability of the market to incorporate the reporting of insider 
trades in the security prices. 
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2.1.2 Asymmetric Information 
An informationally efficient market as presented by Fama depends on an even distribution of 
information among the market participants. If insiders, or any other market participant, hold 
“superior” information that can lead to the gain of abnormal returns; information is in fact 
not evenly distributed. We have asymmetric information. 
It is common to refer to two types of asymmetric information: Adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
Adverse Selection 
Taking advantage of asymmetric information before a transaction takes place is known as 
adverse selection. A situation where buyers have more information than sellers (or vica 
versa) about some aspect of a trade is an example of adverse selection.  
The expression originated in the insurance business as a consequence of high-risk 
individuals (dangerous jobs, high-risk lifestyle, history of illness) buying life insurance. The 
high-risk individuals demand for insurance were found to be positively correlated with the 
individual’s risk of loss, likely caused by the private information only known to the 
individuals (Polborn, Hoy, Sadanand, 2006). Another example is the lemons problem5, 
popularized by George Akerlof in 1970. Akerlof demonstrates adverse selection through the 
example of dealing used cars, were the seller has more information than the buyer about the 
used car’s condition. 
In the financial markets, adverse selection relates to insider trading. An insider holding 
inside information has superior information compared to other market participants and 
adverse selection arises if the insider takes advantage of this information. 
Moral Hazard 
Taking advantage of asymmetric information after a transaction has taken place is known as 
moral hazard. Moral hazard arises when a risk-taking party to a transaction knows more 
about her intentions than the party paying the consequences of the risk. 
                                                 
5 Defective cars were known as lemons in the marketplace 
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An example may be a large shareholder and manager in a financial distressed company 
taking on additional risk to boost earnings on the expense of debt holders (has exposure to 
the downside). An insider that holds stock options in the company can enter into risky 
ventures to increase share price on the expense of debt holders. 
The theory of asymmetric information is crucial to support our hypothesis that portfolios 
based on insider trades can earn abnormal profits. In the introduction, we state that it is 
reasonable to assume that the company board of directors, its management and employees 
have more knowledge about future prospects and projects in their company and the industry 
it operates within, and that insider trading activity can signal where a company’s stock is 
heading. When disregarding what moral grounds the insiders may have to perform the 
trades, and whether or not the information is legal, that insiders can possess superior 
information may suggest the finding of abnormal returns following insider trades.  
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2.2 Regulation 
To ensure an even distribution of information and prevent the problems associated with 
asymmetric information, markets are regulated. In the following, we will discuss existing 
regulation on insider trading. This will give important background information for the rest of 
the thesis and enhance our understanding of who company insiders are, what inside 
information is and how it is regulated. 
Do we need Insider Trading Laws and Regulation? 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) did a study of 103 countries with an active stock market, 
and found that insider laws exist in 87 of them, but enforcement by prosecutions has taken 
place in only 38 of them. Before 1990, insider laws existed in only 34 countries, and 
enforcement was found in 9 of them. To prove the presence of illegal insider trading is 
difficult. Trading securities as an insider is a legal activity and is prohibited only if the trader 
possesses inside information. Physical evidence is rare and evidence must build on the 
examination of innocuous events such as trading patterns and relationship and meetings 
between people. This makes it difficult to conclude that illegal insider trading has occurred. 
Most successful prosecutions build on rare cases of cooperating witness testimony or direct 
confession. 
There are many arguments not to regulate and prohibit insider trading: It is extremely hard to 
monitor asymmetrical information – What people know and do not know – and one should 
therefore not spend resources on enforcing insider trading laws and regulation as it is not 
cost effective. When comparing insider trading to other economic crimes there are no “real” 
victims, with the possible exception of other shareholders. It does not harm the society in the 
same manner as other crime such as embezzlement, tax fraud, client fraud or corruption. 
Others see insider trading as a form of compensation and benefit for corporate employees 
that can permit lower salaries, which in turn benefit investors. Manne (1968) argues that 
insider trading does not injure the shareholders and that insider trading is the only practical 
and appropriate method available for compensating innovators, by promising huge rewards. 
These arguments are countered by the fact that it leads to an incentive for corporate insiders 
to enter into risky ventures for short-term personal gains and that gains are captured at the 
expense of other shareholders. Allowing insider trading will weaken investor’s confidence in 
the capital markets, and make capital less available. One need investors to trust the markets 
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to be fair. Researchers also seem to find evidence that insider trading laws matter to stock 
market development. Beny (2005) find that countries with stricter and more developed 
insider trading laws tend to have more diverse equity ownership, more accurate stock prices 
and more liquid markets. Bainbridge (2000) argues that firms should be the ones profiting 
from information value, and not the firm’s insiders. Illegal insider trading can therefore be 
thought of as theft of property rights. 
Global Insider Laws 
Laws and regulation on insider trading vary significantly from country to country and 
enforcement is mixed. In the United States, illegal insider trading refers to  
buying or selling a security in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust 
and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the 
security. Insider trading violations may also include "tipping" such information, 
securities trading by the person "tipped," and securities trading by those who 
misappropriate such information 6 
Corporate insiders and beneficial owners of more than 10 % of a class of the company’s 
equity securities were first regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Most of the 
development in the law prohibiting insider trades are based on court rulings were the courts 
have exercised authority based on the contents from section 16(b) and section 10(b) in this 
Act7. In August 2002, the SEC implemented the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) of 2002, accelerating the deadline for filing most insider ownership reports8. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley act was passed by the US Congress to improve corporations’ financial 
disclosure and prevent accounting fraud after seeing the need for an overhaul of regulatory 
standards after the Enron, WorldCom and Tycon scandals in the early 2000s. 
Together with the rest of the world, Europe was having virtually unregulated markets for 
insider trading until the European Community Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider 
                                                 
6 U.S Securities and Exchange Commission | Insider Trading. 2015. Available at: http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. 
Accessed 01 April 2015. 
7 After the US stock market crash of 1929, the Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 to control the abuses believed to have caused the crash. 
8 U.S Securities and Exchange Commission | Insider Trading. 2015. Available at: http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. 
Accessed 01 April 2015. 
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Trading (The EC Directive) was adopted on November 13th 1989. The EC Directive defines 
inside information in article 1 as information of «a precise nature» about a security or issuer 
which has not been made public and which if made public «would likely have a significant 
effect on the price» of the security. In articles 2 and 3, the directive prohibits insiders from 
taking advantage of inside information, also by tipping or using others. The EC directive is 
today part of the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) between the EU member 
states and Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway. In 2003, after the implementation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US in 2002, the European Parliament adopted the stricter Market 
Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC). This was done to increase investor confidence through 
preventing market abuse such as insider trading and preserving a smooth functioning of 
European Financial Markets. The countries in the EEA agreement are obliged to abide by the 
law, but are allowed through article 6 in the EC Directive to adopt stricter regulations. The 
Scandinavian countries generally have stricter regulation than those imposed by the EU. 
Norway is known as a country with especially strict regulation and consequences of 
breaching the rules. 
In sum, there are substantial differences in regulations on insider trading. These differences 
relates to the definition of an insider, how insider trading is regulated and how it is enforced.  
Swedish Insider Laws 
In Sweden, Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) supervises 
insider trading. It was established in 1991 as part of the Swedish Ministry of Finance with 
the aim of creating a single integrated regulator covering the Swedish financial industry. 
Finansinspektionen authorize, supervise and monitor all companies within the Swedish 
financial markets. 
Swedish limited companies listed on an exchange or authorized marketplace are obligated to 
report the identity of persons in the company and its subsidiaries that hold insider positions. 
In «The Act concerning Reporting Obligations for Certain Holdings of Financial 
Instruments (2000:1087)» people that hold insider positions are defined as: 
1. A member or alternate member of the company's or its parent company's board of 
directors 
2. A managing director or deputy managing director of the company or its parent 
company 
3. An auditor or deputy auditor of the company or its parent company 
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4. A partner in a partnership that is the company's parent company, though not a 
limited partner 
5. A holder of an other senior executive post or qualified function of a permanent 
nature at the company or its parent company, if the post or function can normally be 
considered to have access to non-public information on circumstances that may 
affect the company's share price 
6. A holder of a senior executive post or a service provider in accordance with points 
1-3 and 5 above in a subsidiary if they may normally be considered to have access to 
non-public information which may affect the company’s share price 
7. Larger shareholders who themselves, together with one or more natural or legal 
persons in concert or through a company, own at least ten per cent of the share 
capital or number of votes for all shares in the company 
Closely related parties of persons with an insider position, both physical persons and legal 
entities, are covered by the reporting obligations too. This includes spouses, cohabitees, 
children, other closely related parties and legal persons whose activities are significantly 
influence by the person with an insider position.  
Insiders regulated by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority must report their holdings 
of shares and changes in their holdings within five trading days of the trade taking place 
(Norway: no later than the start of trading on the following day). There is also a general ban 
on trading in the 30 days prior to the publishing of interim reports, including the day of 
publication (Norway: 1 month prior to interim reports, 2 months prior to annual report). This 
is examples of Swedish (Norwegian) regulations that are more stringent than imposed by the 
EEA Agreement. The difference in the speed of reporting is likely to have an effect on the 
size of the abnormal returns measured around the reporting date, as we expect insider trades 
with stricter reporting (closer to the trade) to be more informative. The Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority updates its public insider register, insynsregisteret, every day after the 
stock market opening hours, normally at 5:30pm. 
The regulations mentioned above are regulations as of June 2015. The last changes to these 
regulations were made July 1, 2005. Pre 2005, insiders could not sell any position in 
securities within three months from the purchase date. Since our analysis starts in 2010, this 
will not affect the signal of the insider trade. 
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3. Existing Literature and Hypotheses 
With a good understanding of asymmetric information, insider trading and insider 
regulation, relevant existing literature were studied, and we found numerous cases that 
provided important insights on the theoretical and practical aspects of insider trading. These 
studies, although often diverging in their conclusions, offers noteworthy inferences on the 
significance of insider returns. In this section, we will present our hypotheses and compare 
with previous published literature.  
We have defined three levels to classify the applicable literature and test our hypotheses on: 
(1) Market level, (2) Firm level and (3) Individual level, starting on the market level. 
Determining if there exist abnormal returns resulting from reported insider trading on a 
market level sets the premise for more detailed testing on the firm and individual level.  
The hypotheses are constructed as alternative statements that will assist us in capturing the 
essence of abnormal returns following the publication of insider trades. The testing 
framework will be presented in Chapter 5, and the null hypotheses will be tested and 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
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3.1 Market level 
The market’s reaction to new information is dependent upon the ability of the market to 
process and reflect the information efficiently, as described in Chapter 2. As we believe that 
insider trades may serve as indicators for abnormal returns, we assume that insiders have an 
informational advantage. However, previous literature on the presence of abnormal returns 
from insider trades has mixed conclusions. 
 
All Trades 
In one of the earliest relatable studies, Glass (1966) found it reasonable to assume that 
insider trades serve as a useful indicator of short-term stock performance. Givoly and 
Palmon (1985) show that the abnormal returns subsequent to insider trades in fact are 
separable and substantially higher than normal return for other events such as firm specific 
news or events. Seyhun (1992) find that insiders purchase stocks prior to an abnormal price 
increases and sell stocks prior to an abnormal decline in prices. Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski 
(2012) find evidence of a rise in abnormal returns following the first six months after an 
insider trade, followed by stagnation with no sign of reversion. They propose that this 
stagnation is a sign that the emerged information has a permanent effect on the company´s 
value. Others suggest that the rapid rise in the initial months indicates that insiders is better 
to predict values in the near future and not necessarily in the long run (Jaffe, 1974; Rogoff, 
1964). Omsted and Olsen (2014) document in their dissertation on insider trades on the 
Norwegian Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs) a strong initial market reaction to insider trades and 
evidence of long-term market outperformance for some data subsets. Husøy and Jentoft 
(2013) find the same. These studies serve to indicate abnormal returns subsequent insider 
trades, and thereby reject the EMH in a semi-strong form. 
 
Performing similar analysis on the Oslo Stock Exchange, Engevik and Helleren (2009) and 
Holen (2008) found evidence that insiders gain abnormal returns, but are careful suggesting 
that outsiders can profit from these trades. Eckbo et al (1998) applied three different 
measures of performance9 on the Oslo Stock Exchange. They find zero or negative abnormal 
                                                 
9 (1) Using portfolio aggregation - Aggregating insider stock holdings each month, akin to an insider fund, and 
track the performance of “the fund”. (2) A conditional portfolio benchmark return approach. (3) A conditional 
portfolio weight measure 
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performance by insiders. They suggest this may come from very strict regulations on insider 
trades in the Norwegian market, or that the results may be a special case for small and 
concentrated markets, characterized by high variance in returns and strong correlation across 
securities. These studies serve to prove the EMH in a semi-strong form. 
 
In the Swedish market, Sjöholm and Skoog (2006) performed an analysis on insider trades 
during 1990-2004 and found that both buy and sell transactions provided abnormal returns 
for both short and long horizons. Sjöholm and Skoog (2006, pp. 11-12) write that the same 
was found by Hjertstedt et al (2000) for the period 1996-1999. Further, they write that 
Hjemgård et al (2002), performing similar studies between 1998-2002, did not find evidence 
on insiders earning abnormal profits. This was also the conclusion of the studies performed 
by Heinonen et al (2002). 
 
Postulating that abnormal returns subsequent the publication of insider trades exist, we will 
try to determine to which extent and over which period. As the Swedish insider trades are 
published after the stock market opening hours, the stock price should, in a perfectly 
efficient market, adjust before the stock market opens the following day. The return the 
following day is our 1-day (1D) return measure. In addition to testing for 1-day, we will test 
for holding periods of 20, 40, 60 and 120 trading days following the insider trade10. Based on 
previous literature, we expect to observe a mean reversion tendency preceded by an early 
peak in abnormal returns. 
 
 
 Hypothesis 1.1 - Insiders on the Stockholm Stock Exchange earn abnormal returns 
on all trades after 1 day and 1, 2, 3 and 6 months following the publication of insider 
trades 
 
 
  
                                                 
10 Our analysis will measure abnormal returns for every trading day between 1 and 120 trading days following 
the event. 1-day, 1-month (20 trading days), 2-months (40 trading days), 3-months (60 trading days) and 6-
months (120 trading days) is chosen for illustrational purposes only. 
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Purchases and Sales11 
Investigating the distinction between returns from insider purchases and insider sales can 
highlight the predictive powers of insider trades towards both positive and negative 
development in stock returns. Previous research indicates that purchases provide higher 
abnormal returns than sales (Johansson et al, 2005; Jeng et al, 2003; Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001).  The simple explanation is that sale of capital is more related to a liquidity motive 
than a profit motive. There may also be a moral dilemma associated with selling/short-
selling your company’s stock.  
 
To examine the market’s ability to absorb information on insider purchases and insider sales, 
we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
 
 Hypothesis 1.2 - Insiders on the Stockholm Stock Exchange earn abnormal returns 
on purchases after 1 day and 1, 2, 3 and 6 months following the publication of 
insider trades 
 
 
 Hypothesis 1.3 - Insiders on the Stockholm Stock Exchange earn abnormal returns 
on sales after 1 day and 1, 2, 3 and 6 months following the publication of insider 
trades  
                                                 
11 Sales include both reducing current stock holding and short-selling a stock 
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3.2 Firm level 
The process of segregating securities into categories by capitalization, industry, leverage and 
growth prospects is a common approach for any investor to facilitate informed and 
diversified investments. Applying several firm level criteria, we will investigate whether we 
find variations in abnormal returns. 
Market Capitalization 
Former research indicates that insider trading in small cap firms earn significantly higher 
abnormal returns than insider trading in other firms. Seyhun (1986) regresses insiders’ 
abnormal profits on firm size and shows that there is a negative correlation between insiders’ 
abnormal return and firm size. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) support this conclusion. When 
investigating the usefulness of insiders’ activities in timing the market, they point out that 
insiders in small cap companies have a relative advantage in timing over insiders in large cap 
companies, resulting in higher abnormal returns. Hjertstedt et al (2000), referred to by 
Sjöholm and Skoog (2006, p. 12), shows that insider transactions done in smaller firms are 
more profitable than those in larger firms for the Swedish market. Johansson et al (2005) 
supports this, finding that abnormal returns following insider purchases were more 
significant for smaller companies. 
Small cap companies usually have fewer employees, less shareholders and less analyst 
coverage than large companies, suggesting that information is less distributed. This can in 
turn create potential advantages for more informed insiders. We believe that this information 
asymmetry can provide higher abnormal returns for small cap firms12 and propose to 
examine this through assessment of the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 2.1 – Insider trades in small cap companies provide a stronger signal 
of abnormal returns than mid and large cap companies 
 
  
                                                 
12 Firm size (small, medium or large) is given by NASDAQ OMX Stockholm’s designation. 
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Growth vs Value Firms 
The P/E (Price-Earnings) ratio quantifies the relationship between the stock price and the 
earnings of a company and is used in our study to identify companies with growth 
opportunities. As stock prices reflect what investors believe a company is worth, P/E can be 
seen as a reflection of the markets expectation on the firm’s growth prospects. Growth 
companies usually have high P/E values due to a large present value of growth opportunities 
implicit in the price (increasing price) combined with low earnings (expected to rise in the 
future). Value companies tend to have lower P/E because these companies tend to have less 
growth prospects and pay dividends (suppressing price). This leads to higher (and more 
stable) earnings relative to price. 
In an efficient market, the present value of growth opportunities should be reflected in asset 
prices. Jeng et al (2003) tested a hypothesis that the highest insider profits occur for firms 
with low book-to-market (BM) ratios. Although not significant, their results suggest that 
insiders in low-BM (growth) firms earn higher profits than insiders in high-BM firms 
(value). Similarly, Aboody and Lev (2000) find that insider gains are higher in high-R&D 
firms (growth) than those in low-R&D firms (value). The intuition is that high-R&D serves 
as a signal of asymmetrical information and potential for an informational advantage by 
insiders. Omsted and Olsen (2014) found, contrary to the other literature, that insiders in 
value firms earn highly significant abnormal returns 1 to 3 months following the insider 
trade, before the returns seem to stabilize. For growth firms, they do not find any significant 
results for any horizon. 
We postulate that growth opportunities are first and best signaled by insiders and 
hypothesize that insiders possess more knowledge of the value of their company’s growth 
opportunities, and are able to gain abnormal returns on this informational advantage. 
 
 Hypothesis 2.2 – Growth companies earn a significant higher abnormal return 
than value companies following the publication of insider trades 
 
Growth companies will be classified as companies in our dataset with high P/E ratios (4th 
quartile) and value companies as those with low P/E (1st quartile). 
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Firm Leverage 
In their renowned paper, Miller and Modigliani (1958) presented pioneering theories on 
capital structure. They proposed that in a perfect capital market, the total value of a firm is 
not affected by its choice of capital structure. We believe that testing for differences in 
capital structure is interesting as high leverage can create potential opportunities and 
incentives for moral hazard (excessive risk-taking) or adverse selection (sensitive 
information is worth more in highly leveraged and more volatile stocks).  
The debt-equity (D/E) ratio is our chosen measurement of financial leverage. This is a 
common and easily interpreted ratio used to assess a firm’s extent of debt as a source of 
financing. A higher ratio means higher debt financing. Fidrmuc et al (2006) found that 
purchases in financially distressed firms provide a stronger signal of abnormal returns than 
purchases in firms that are not in financial distress. Even though firms with high leverage not 
necessarily are in financial distress, we expect that when an insider trades in a leveraged 
company the abnormal returns will be magnified relative to when an insider trades in a 
company with low financial leverage. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 2.3 – Insider trades in companies with high financial leverage earn 
significant higher abnormal returns than companies with low financial leverage 
following the publication of insider trades 
 
Companies with D/E ratios in the 4th quartile will be classified as highly leveraged firms, and 
companies in the 1st quartile as firms with low leverage. 
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Firm Industry 
It is well known that different industries exhibit different characteristics. This can be 
differences in ownership structure, financial structure, growth opportunities, sensitivity to 
economic conditions or consumer behavior. Employees may possess expertise and first hand 
knowledge about the industry they work in, but lack expertise in a different industry. In 
addition, there may exist natural or regulatory barriers between industries and the outside, 
potentially leading to difficulties for outside investors to fully comprehend the mechanisms 
and volatility of that industry. This may cause one industry to be more exposed to 
asymmetric information than another. 
Seyhun (1998) tested for correlation between insider trading in companies in the same 
industry. In his example, he finds evidence of strong positive correlation between insider 
trading in the automobile industry. He finds that by aggregating insider trading across 
companies in the same industry, other motives (such as liquidity motives) may be 
eliminated. An insider aggregation thus serves to reinforce the information and signal of 
insider trades, resulting in higher profitability. This study sets the foundation for our 
hypothesis that there are informational differences between industries. In a relatable study on 
the Norwegian stock market, Husøy and Jentoft (2013) found evidence of abnormal returns 
following the publication of insider trades in the Oil & Gas, Consumer Goods, Health Care, 
Industrials and ICT sector. Although using a slightly different industry classification13, the 
abnormal returns are highest within the health care industry. This is interesting, as it makes 
sense to assume that information from complex and heavily regulated industries such as 
health care may be difficult for outside investors to fully comprehend. 
 
 Hypothesis 2.4 – There is a difference in abnormal returns across industries14 
 
  
                                                 
13 Using the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), developed by MSCI and Standard & Poor’s. 
14 We divided firms into ten industries using the ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) by the FTSE group 
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Firm Reporting 
As quarterly firm reports contain a considerable amount of information, one can assume that 
outsiders gain information and strengthen their knowledge of a company’s business when 
these reports are published. Due to a narrower informational gap between insiders and 
outsiders close to the reporting date, we believe that insider trades made adjacent to quarterly 
reports gives a weaker signal for abnormal returns following the trade than transactions 
made not adjacent to the quarterly reports. 
Kallunki et al (2009) analyses insider trading around quarterly and annual reporting during 
changing legislative environments in Sweden from 1980 to 2003 (legislation getting stricter). 
They conclude that as insider legislation becomes tighter, insiders trade more carefully, 
especially before the earnings announcements. They also find some opportunistic behavior 
among insiders, showing that they are reluctant to sell stocks before positive earnings 
announcement. Kolasinski and Li (2010) found that insiders are buying (selling) after good 
(bad) earnings announcements, when the price reaction to the quarterly reported earnings is 
low (high). They further demonstrated that insiders trading in response to quarterly reporting 
and the price reaction to the publishing of these reports generate abnormal returns. 
We believe that after the publication of a quarterly report, returns from insider trades will be 
weaker as the informational gap between insiders and outsiders are narrower. We want to put 
this to the test by proposing the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 2.5 – Insider trades adjacent to quarterly reports provide a weaker 
signal of abnormal returns than trades not adjacent to quarterly reports 
 
Trades adjacent to quarterly reports are all trades performed in the months following the 
quarterly reporting months, i.e. May (Q1), August (Q2), November (Q3) and February (Q4). 
Trades not adjacent to quarterly reports are the other eight months. 
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Momentum 
Momentum can be defined as the rate of acceleration of a stock’s price (or other factor, such 
as volume). A momentum strategy is based on the premise that a stock which has performed 
good (poor) in the past will continue to perform good (poor) in the future. 
Although a momentum strategy does not rely on any fundamental values and is considered a 
technical strategy, it has some statistical foundations. Poterba and Summers (1987) found 
evidence that stock returns are positively serially correlated over short horizons (momentum) 
and negatively auto-correlated over long horizons (mean reversion). Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) document that strategies of buying stocks that have performed well the past 6-months 
and selling stocks that have performed poorly the past 6-months generate significant positive 
returns over holding periods of three to twelve month. Seyhun (1998) shows that stock prices 
exhibit positive momentum at horizons up to one year; that winners outperform the market 
index and losers continue to underperform. 
In the case of insiders, Seyhun (1998) found that they tend to sell past winners and buy past 
losers. This suggests that insiders are not motivated by momentum strategies, but exhibit 
rather contrarian behavior when investing. These findings hold for both short horizons, up to 
one year, as well as for long horizons, up to five years. That insiders are contrarian is 
supported by Lakonishok and Lee (2001). 
In this hypothesis, we want to investigate all reported insider trades regardless of whether the 
trade is a purchase or a sale. By including all trades, we account for all possible investment 
strategies of an insider. We believe that there may exist a synergy effect when an insider 
trade is reported in a company with momentum. When a stock has a positive (negative) 
momentum, an insider purchase may act as a continuation of this momentum providing 
additional positive (negative) returns. On the other hand, we also believe that an insider trade 
can signal a reversal of the momentum, i.e. a purchase (sale) might signal the termination of 
a negative (positive) momentum. It is therefore in our belief that insider trades performed in 
companies with a momentum signals stronger abnormal returns following the event. 
 
 Hypothesis 2.6 – Insider trades in companies with momentum earn a significant 
higher abnormal return following the trade than insider trades in companies 
without momentum 
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To segregate insider trades with and without momentum, we had to examine the returns of 
the traded stock prior to the insider trade taking place. We ranked all the stocks by their 
return 120 trading days prior to the trade, and classified insider trades with momentum as 
insider trades done in the 4th quartile of returns (highest returns; positive momentum) and 
insider trades in the 1st quartile (lowest return; negative momentum). All other trades were 
classified as trades without momentum (2nd and 3rd quartile).  
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3.3 Individual level 
This third and final section of the chapter is discussing the characteristics of reported insider 
trades on an individual level. By taking advantage of the information in the reported insider 
trades data from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, we are able to look at factors 
such as the insider’s position and trade volume. 
Insider Position 
The first and most evident individual characteristic from the reporting is the position of the 
insider. Numerous sources explore the characteristics of the insider’s position in the 
company. While Jaffe (1974) analyzed the number and quantities of different insider types, 
other studies provide statistical evidence that different insider types possess more valuable 
information (Seyhun, 1986; Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski, 2012). The consensus indicates 
that mid-level officers earn the largest returns. Omsted and Olsen (2014) concluded that 
different insiders on the Oslo Stock Exchange earn different abnormal returns. They found 
that managers15 and board members earned the highest abnormal returns. 
We suggest that because top management (board members and managing directors) are 
under scrutiny from regulators and media, they will choose their insiders trades with caution. 
To comply with political considerations these trades will be more of a routine character, and 
motivated by diversification rather than chasing abnormal profits. This may not be the case 
for low profile insiders. In addition, as different insider positions are exposed to different 
parts of the company's operations, informational asymmetry may arise. Based on evidence 
from previous research and our reasoning we propose that insiders with different position 
earn different returns, and we expect to find that low profile insiders earn larger abnormal 
returns than high profile insiders do. 
 
 Hypothesis 3.1 – There is a difference in abnormal returns across insiders with 
different firm positions 
 
                                                 
15 All managers that are not CEO or CFO 
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Trade Volume 
Another interesting characteristics of the reported data is the traded volume. In this 
hypothesis we will investigate if the reported insider trade volume, in both absolute and 
relative terms, can predict abnormal returns. 
Rationally, a large volume transaction would indicate a strong belief in the stock purchased. 
This is supported by Seyhun (1986), who finds that insiders will increase their trade volume 
when they have more valuable information. Contrary to this conclusion, Jaffe (1974) fails to 
find a relationship between trade size and information value. Also, Barclay and Warner 
(1993) find that the largest abnormal returns results from medium sized trades. Their 
estimations indicates that 82.9% of the cumulative price change stems from medium sized 
insider trades. Omsted and Olsen (2014) find that higher trade volumes seem to yield higher 
subsequent abnormal returns than lower volume trades. Looking at relative trade volumes, 
they find significant differences in all models. This is not the case for absolute trade 
volumes, were they do not find any significant differences in abnormal returns. 
As mentioned under insider type, we expect that low profile insiders earn larger abnormal 
returns than high profile insiders. Similarly, we believe that large absolute volume trades are 
under higher scrutiny and therefore will include other motives than pure profit. 
As our data does not enable us to correct for wealth when looking at trade volumes, it is 
important to stress the fact that only looking at absolute volumes would discriminate low 
profile insiders16. We therefore also look relative trade volumes. We believe that insiders’ 
willingness to invest correlates with their confidence in the company and that the confidence 
can be measured by the relative size of their trade. Higher confidence, and therefore higher 
relative trade volume, should result in higher abnormal return following the trade. We 
propose to evaluate the following hypotheses: 
 
 Hypothesis 3.2 – Small absolute volume insider trades provide a stronger signal 
of abnormal returns than large absolute volume insider trades 
 
                                                 
16 We find it reasonable to assume that these insiders have less disposable income and wealth than high profiled 
insiders such as managing directors and parent firm board members. 
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 Hypothesis 3.3 – Large relative volume insider trades provide a stronger signal 
of abnormal returns than small relative volume insider trades 
 
We have categorized small absolute volume insider trades as trades with an absolute volume 
in the 1st  quartile of all traded volumes. Large absolute volume insider trades are those in the 
4th quartile. Similarly, we have classified small relative volume insider trades with a relative 
volume in the 1st quartile of all traded relative volumes. Large relative volume insider trades 
are those in the 4th quartile. 
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4. Data Description 
In this chapter, we describe our data in detail before turning to the method for testing the 
postulated hypotheses in Chapter 5.  
We start by introducing the Swedish Stock Market as a background for understanding the 
data. Then we describe our raw data and how we cleaned it, before performing a descriptive 
data analysis. 
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4.1 The Swedish Stock Market 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm (The Stockholm Stock Exchange or Stockholmsbörsen) was 
founded in 1863 and has been a part of the Nasdaq OMX Group since 2008. It is the primary 
marketplace for securities in Sweden as well as in the Nordic region. Entering 2015, Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm consisted of 307 companies with an average daily turnover of about 10 
billion SEK. 
Alternative market places like Nasdaq OMX First North, Aktietorget, Alternativa 
Aktiemarknaden and NGM (Nordic Growth Markets) are also present in Sweden, but these 
are primarily exchanges for small growth companies. 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm contains a diversified assembly of industries. Whereas the Oslo 
Stock Exchange is heavily weighted towards oil and shipping companies, Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm is more weighted towards industrials which accounts for 27% of the companies 
on the exchange (Figure 2). Industrials is followed by financials (18%) and health care 
(13%). 
 
Figure 2 - Industry weight, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Source: Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority 
What primarily differentiates Nasdaq OMX Stockholm from the other Nordic exchanges is 
its ownership structure. The exchange is largely dominated by family owned corporations 
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and holding companies. An article from the Swedish weekly business magazine 
Affärsvärlden claims that fifteen families effectively controls 70 % of the stock exchange17. 
This ownership structure has a certain effect on the shares offered on the exchange, resulting 
in several companies with both common and preferred stocks. This can be seen in contrast to 
the Oslo Stock Exchange, were most shares are common. 
Other large stakeholders on the exchange are foreign owners (improving the competitiveness 
of the exchange), financial corporations, mutual funds and households. A large foreign 
investor is the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global. The fund controls 
approximately 2% of the shares on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and has ownership interests in 
almost 50% of the stocks listed18. 
 
Figure 3 - Ownership structure, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Source: Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority 
Note that the family owned share of the exchange is dispersed among the different categories.“Others” include 
central and local governments, banks and credit institutions, non-profit institutions and social security funds.  
                                                 
17 E24.no | Sveriges mektigste familier. 2015. Available at: http://bit.ly/1FsWGP5. Accessed 13 May 2015 
18 NBIM.no | Holdings. 2015. Available at: http://bit.ly/1NtHIgw. Accessed 13 May 2015 
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4.2 Raw data 
We obtained the raw data from Dovre Forvaltning, and it consists of two datasets. The first 
dataset consist of all insider trades reported to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Finansinspektionen) within the mentioned period, and the data is extracted from their 
register (Insynsregisteret). The number of trades in the raw dataset are 12 127, and includes 
all trades obliged to be reported according to Swedish insider laws and regulation. The 
dataset provides information on the date of the insider trade, the date the trade was 
published, the name of the company traded and it’s ticker, the name of the insider and the 
insider’s position within the company, if the trade was a purchase or a sale, what kind of 
share was traded (Common or preferred share), how many shares were traded, the insiders 
total holding in the company traded, the price paid and the insider’s relative change in the 
total holding following the trade. A segment of the raw dataset can be found in Appendix A. 
The second dataset consist of total return data19 of all Swedish stocks listed on the OMX 
Stockholm from 1986 until the end of September 2014. The data is extracted from 
Macrobond and a segment of the total return data can be found in Appendix B.  
                                                 
19 Total return includes interest, capital gains, dividends and distributions realized over the period and gives a measurement 
of the actual rate of return for a given security. 
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4.3 Data Cleaning and treatment 
We have chosen to use all companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm for our analysis. 
Swedish companies listed on other stock exchanges such as Nasdaq OMX First North, 
Aktietorget, Alternativa Aktiemarknaden and NGM (Nordic Growth Markets) have been 
removed from our dataset. We have excluded the securities from the other stock exchanges, 
as some of them are not supervised by Finansinspektionen, due to varying degree of liquidity 
and the need for another benchmark. 
Insider trades in equity other than A (Voting shares) and B shares (Non-voting shares) have 
been removed. This includes trades in firm options, warrants or other derivatives and firm 
bonds, convertible debt and other debt securities. 
Insider trades made on the same day by the same insiders have been aggregated. E.g. if an 
insider buys 15 000 shares and then 5 000 shares on the same day, this is seen as one trade of 
20 000 shares. If an insider buys and sells the same amount of shares on the same day, this 
will be seen as a trade of 0 shares (the trade is disregarded). 
Insider trades done by the company itself (share repurchase) and by relatives of the insider, 
such as spouses and children, were excluded as our goal is to look at the signal sent by the 
publication of insider trades made by individuals within the firm.  
After cleaning the data, 6 699 insider trades were left for analysis. 
When we calculated normal returns using our chosen asset pricing models20, data was 
missing during the 120 trading days prior to the event (the insider trade) taking place 
(estimation window) or in the 120 trading days following the event taking place (event 
window) for a few events. This can be due to bankruptcy, liquidation, mergers or 
acquisitions of the companies. Because of this, another 72 trades were removed, resulting in 
a final number of 6 627 insider trades to analyze in 238 different companies; an average of 
~33 trades per company. 
An excerpt from the cleaned and treated data can be found in Appendix C.  
                                                 
20 More on this in Chapter 5 – Method. 
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4.4 Descriptive Data Analysis 
   
Transaction value 
Transaction # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % Min Max (mSEK) 
Purchase  4 479  68 %  236 013   16 487 851     74 866   1 149 942              172               4 339  
Sale  2 148  32 %  683 708   24 056 316   180 253   2 845 780               34               6 708  
All transactions  6 627  100 %  337 297   18 939 870     94 605   1 752 749      
Table 1 - Distribution of insider trades by transaction type and traded value 
As shown by Table 1, 4 479 (68%) of the insider trades were purchases and 2 148 (32%) 
were sales. The mean transaction value among all transaction was 18 939 870 SEK. The 
distribution is positively skewed by a number of extreme outliers, and we can observe a 
much lower median of 337 297 SEK. Also the 3rd quartile numbers, with transaction values 
≥ 1 752 749 SEK, is way lower than the mean. The maximum transaction value in our 
dataset is 6 708 million SEK, and the lowest is 34 SEK. 
In general, sales have a higher transaction value than purchases. We believe this can be 
explained by different motives when selling as opposed to purchasing. Many insiders’ 
purchases both opportunistically and by routine over time in smaller blocks, before selling it 
all off in one large block to realize gains, meet tax claims or for other liquidity needs. 
 
Figure 4 - Distribution of insider trades by transaction type and month 
When looking at the distribution of insider trades over the different months for the years 
2010-2014, we observe one clear tendency. Most companies file their quarterly earnings 
report in January (Q4, year before), April (Q1), July (Q2) and October (Q3) and the number 
of insider trades are at their lowest in these months. Remembering from Swedish insider 
laws and regulation, Swedish insiders are banned from trading 30 days prior to the 
publishing of interim reports, including the day of the publication. From the monthly 
distribution, we observe that the total number of both purchases and sales is highest in May, 
with 19% of all purchases and 17% of all sales. 
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Insider Position 
Different types of insiders exist. Based on the available data, we have divided insiders into 
three categories. (1) Primary insiders - Individuals that have a direct legal relationship with 
the company traded, such as executives, board members, alternate board members, large 
shareholders and partners. (2) Secondary insiders - Individuals in an indirect relationship 
with the company traded, for example children or spouses. (3) Insiders that are not 
individuals, e.g. the company itself, the parent company or any company subsidiary. As 
mentioned, our objective is to look at the signal sent by the publication of insider trades 
made by individuals within the firm, therefore only primary insiders are of interest in this 
analysis. 
We have categorized our primary insiders into the following six categories: (1) Managing 
Director, (2) Board member parent firm, (3) Alternate and/or subsidiary board member, (4) 
Large shareholder, (5) Other executive and (6) Other position. The number indicates the 
priority of which category the insider is put in. Many of our insiders have more than one 
role, e.g. the insider might be both managing director (MD), board member in the parent 
company and a large shareholder. This particular insider will be classified as (1) Managing 
Director. Another insider, which is both a large shareholder and has another executive role, 
will be classified as (4) Large shareholder. The logic behind the classification is the 
expectancy of the insider’s knowledge of the company and the probability of having 
asymmetric information. Please consult Appendix D for details. 
   
Transaction value 
Primary Insider # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % Max (mSEK) 
Managing Director     662  10 %          501 118       17 013 270       137 004        3 186 937               2 894  
Board member parent firm  2 008  30 %          504 680       28 927 538       128 036        3 056 592               4 339  
Alternate/subsidiary BM     148  2 %          187 504           751 389        58 791           555 153                   10  
Large shareholder     798  12 %       2 653 903       66 758 979       415 563       12 941 147               6 708  
Other executive     475  7 %          254 482        1 250 084        99 954        1 014 445                   31  
Other position  2 536  38 %          167 301           859 287        61 066           563 377                   59  
All transactions  6 627  100 %          337 297       18 939 870        94 605        1 752 749    
Table 2 - Distribution of insider trades by insider type and traded value 
Apart from Other positions, most trades are done by Board members of the parent firm (30% 
of all trades), followed by Large shareholders (12%) and Managing Directors (10%). Large 
shareholders are the ones with the largest transaction value (Median: 2 653 903 SEK), 
followed by Board members of the parent firm (504 680 SEK) and Managing Directors 
(501 118 SEK). This seems reasonable from a wealth perspective. 
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Firm Size 
In addition to the data in the raw dataset obtained from Dovre Forvaltning, we have added 
data on firm size, firm industry, debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio and price-earnings (P/E) ratio. 
This data has been downloaded from Macrobond and Bloomberg. 
Firm size are divided into small cap, mid cap and large cap based on their market 
capitalization (stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding). Using NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm’s designation, we define small cap as companies with a market 
capitalization below 150 million euro, mid cap as companies with a market capitalization 
between 150 million and 1 billion euro and large cap as companies with a market 
capitalization over 1 billion euro. 
   
Transaction value 
Firm Size # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % Min (SEK) Max (mSEK) 
Small cap  2 275  34 %  192 572     3 880 234     59 481      1 086 997                   68                  469  
Mid cap  2 284  34 %  330 809     8 791 251   101 804      2 084 151                   34               2 324  
Large cap  2 068  31 %  532 118   46 101 220   158 125      2 372 190               1 146               6 708  
All transactions  6 627  100 %  337 297   18 939 870     94 605      1 752 749      
Table 3 - Distribution of insider trades by firm size and traded value 
Using NASDAQ OMX Stockholm’s designation, we obtain a fairly even distribution of firm 
sizes. We can see the transaction value increase as the size of the firm increases in Table 3.  
Firm Industry 
Firms are divided into ten industries using the ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) 
maintained by the FTSE group. The ten industries are: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, 
Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Telecommunications, 
Utilities, Financials, and Technology. 
   
Transaction value 
Firm Industry # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % Min (SEK) Max (mSEK) 
Oil & Gas       28  0 %    512 325   19 649 217     307 375      8 666 875            32 480                  173  
Basic Materials     352  5 %    324 170   35 726 700     100 447      1 580 500              1 005               6 708  
Industrials  1 922  29 %    340 504   30 806 782      98 848      2 049 322                 193               2 490  
Consumer Goods     651  10 %    422 677   11 202 258     129 718      1 382 850                 472               2 346  
Consumer Services     789  12 %    307 716   19 587 006     103 359      1 975 800                  34               2 536  
Health Care     556  8 %    115 360     2 925 383      48 353         479 765                 260                  607  
Telecommunications     257  4 %    159 545       960 503      77 869         623 761              2 606               29.15  
Utilities       19  0 %    505 500     1 036 450      50 241         954 445                  68                 8.35  
Financials  1 400  21 %    550 863   17 977 720     129 589      2 666 439                 101               4 339  
Technology     653  10 %    323 798     5 398 445      77 046      2 123 948                 770                  660  
All transactions  6 627  100 %    337 297   18 939 870      94 605      1 752 749      
Table 4 - Distribution of insider trades by firm industry and traded value 
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Nasdaq OMX Stockholm is, as mentioned in the introduction to the Swedish stock market, 
heavily weighted towards industrial and financials and 50% of the total insider trades are 
within these industries (Table 4). 
Price-to-Earnings 
P/E is our chosen ratio for identifying companies with growth opportunities. The ratio 
quantifies the relationship between the stock price and the earnings of a company and is 
given by the following formula:  
𝑃/𝐸 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
=
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
 
The P/E ratio can be negative (negative earnings per share). Negative P/E ratios are excluded 
from our analysis as it will not help us distinguish growth from value companies. Note that 
the P/E ratio does not take the capital structure of companies into consideration. 
We have P/E data on 6 209 out of 6 627 trades. 
Debt-to-Equity 
D/E is our chosen measure of financial leverage. This is a common and easily interpretable 
ratio used to assess a firm’s extent of debt as a source of financing. 
𝐷/𝐸 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
=
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
We use the market value of equity and debt. Using the book value is not as useful as the 
interpretation is difficult and the fact that it might be negative will make the ratio useless. 
We have D/E data on 3 759 out of 6 627 trades21. 
   
Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E)   
 
Debt-Equity Ratio (D/E) 
Firm Size # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % 
Small cap  2 069  33 %      18.1    30.4    11.2    29.6      232  6 %        1.7      1.8     1.1     2.4  
Mid cap  2 178  35 %      16.4    27.1    11.8    22.9   1 617  43 %        1.4      4.3     0.9     2.0  
Large cap  1 962  32 %      14.2    19.7    10.3    19.5   1 910  51 %        1.6      4.2     1.1     2.9  
All transactions  6 209  100 %      15.9    25.9    11.0    23.4   3 759  100 %        1.5      4.1     1.0     2.3  
Table 5 - P/E and D/E ratio for firm size 
                                                 
21 Due to an error when extracting D/E data, we lost D/E observations in many small cap firms. See Table 5. 
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As we would expect, small cap companies have the highest median P/E ratio (Table 5). This 
is most likely caused by the fact that small companies often are growth companies, and/or 
have more growth prospects than larger companies. This is also seen in the D/E ratio, were 
small cap companies has the highest leverage. These companies are often dependent on 
(risky) debt to finance expansions and investments more than larger companies.  
Note that the means are positively skewed by extreme outliers. 
   
Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E)   
 
Debt-Equity Ratio (D/E) 
Firm Industry # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % # % Median Mean 25 % 75 % 
Oil & Gas       24  0 %      26.9    26.0     7.1    38.6        13  0 %        1.7      1.6     1.5     1.7  
Basic Materials     263  4 %      16.0    33.8    11.0    27.8      190  5 %        1.5      1.7     1.0     2.4  
Industrials  1 804  29 %      15.5    26.1    11.4    21.8   1 001  27 %        1.8      2.0     1.4     2.7  
Consumer Goods     607  10 %      18.3    32.2    14.0    31.1      449  12 %        1.3      0.9     1.2     1.7  
Consumer Services     781  13 %      16.7    28.6    12.2    21.1      572  15 %        1.2      1.4     0.9     1.6  
Health Care     424  7 %      28.0    46.8    16.8    64.3      139  4 %        0.7      1.0     0.5     1.5  
Telecommunications     227  4 %      15.8    22.4    10.0    33.4      185  5 %        1.1      1.1     0.9     1.2  
Utilities       12  0 %      32.4    34.5    23.1    38.7        19  1 %        1.5      1.4     1.0     1.6  
Financials  1 459  23 %      11.1    14.2     7.0    16.5   1 055  28 %        2.1    10.6     0.7    21.4  
Technology     608  10 %      18.6    24.2    14.3    24.0      136  4 %        0.9      0.9     0.8     1.0  
All transactions  6 209  100 %      15.9    25.9    11.0    23.4   3 759  100 %        1.5      4.1     1.0     2.3  
Table 6 - P/E and D/E ratio for firm industry 
Looking at the P/E and D/E ratio for the different firm industries, excluding the industries 
with very few observations (Oil & Gas and Utilities), we can observe that health care and 
technology has the highest median P/E ratios in Table 6. Firms within these industries often 
have huge potential for future earnings represented by a price including these growth 
opportunities today. Earnings are often suppressed as the technology or drug (or other) are 
under development and not fully adopted by the market. This leads to a relatively large P/E 
ratio.  
Looking at the D/E ratio in Table 6, we can observe that financials stand out with the highest 
ratio, followed by industrials. Financial institutions typically borrow money to lend money, 
while capital-intensive industries utilizes debt as a common practice for financing their 
assets, leading to higher debt-to-equity than other industries. 
Note that the means are positively skewed by extreme outliers. 
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5. Method 
Having stated our hypotheses and prepared the dataset, the next step was to decide how to 
measure the effects, if any, resulting from publication of insider trades. This part of the thesis 
is an in-depth discussion and description of how we performed our analysis. 
5.1 Theoretical Framework 
To look at the ability of outside investors to gain abnormal returns by following insider trade 
signals, we need a method to measure the effect of these signals. Together with intensive-
trading criteria, event studies are suitable for determining the information level of insider 
trading for future returns. An event study attempts to measure the effect of a catalyst 
occurrence on a security, and is therefore appropriate when examining whether or not 
outsiders can earn abnormal returns. Events may be earnings announcements, a company 
filing for bankruptcy protection or the publication of an insider trade. Previous literature 
suggest delayed stock price reaction to events such as tender offers (Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen, 1990), dividend initiations (Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995) and mergers 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992), to mention some. An event 
study can reveal information on how a security reacts to an event, and help to predict how 
other securities will react to a similar event. The underlying assumption is the efficient 
market hypothesis (markets are at least semi-strong efficient) and the market should 
therefore process the (event) information in an efficient and unbiased way. 
Intensive-trading criteria methods focus on the abnormal returns to firms in relation to the 
intensity of insiders’ purchases and sales over well-defined periods (Jeng, Metrick, 
Zeckhauser, 2003). A security may for example be labeled an insider buy for a month if two 
insiders bought it and no insiders sold it, or a security being net bought by insiders in a given 
period. These are examples of “intensive-trading” rules. The criteria may vary, but two 
common features are shared: (1) Abnormal return analysis averages across firms and not 
trades after classification and (2) the classification of firm uses some filter rule defined over 
a fixed time period (e.g. 1-month, 6-month, 1-year) were the firms are only reclassified after 
each period. This means that immediate abnormal returns will not be included in the 
analysis. In contrast, event studies make it possible to examine short-term and immediate 
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abnormal returns following insider trades publication. This is the reason for choosing the 
event study methodology over the intensive-trading criteria method(s).  
Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) uses a portfolio-based approach by imagining that all 
insider purchases (or short sales) are placed in a portfolio and held for 6 month, starting the 
day after the insider trade taking place. The portfolio works like a shadow mutual fund, 
combining all insiders. The portfolio will be weighted in proportion to the values of the 
underlying insider trades and the returns on the portfolio will proxy for the value-weighted 
returns earned by insiders over the holding period. Unfortunately, this method makes it 
impossible to look at subsequent abnormal returns across trades. 
As the event study methodology has the strongest approach when it comes to the short-term 
window and allows running tests and measure abnormal returns on different data subsets, we 
decided to conduct an event-based study22. 
  
                                                 
22 As the other methodologies, the event study has drawbacks. These are discussed in 6.4 Research Critique. 
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5.2 Event Study 
There are many variations in the application of the event study methodology (e.g. Mitchell 
and Netter, 1994; MacKinlay, 1997). As there exists no unique structure for an event study, 
we decided to use the same structure as described by MacKinlay (1997). MacKinlay uses 
financial market data to measure the impact of a specific event (an earnings announcement) 
on the value of a firm (change in its stock price), similar to what we will do.  
MacKinlay suggests the following procedure: 
1. Event definition: What is the event of interest, and over which period will the 
security prices of the firms involved be examined? 
 
2. Selection criteria: What firms are included in the study? 
 
3. Normal and abnormal return measurement: How should we measure normal and 
abnormal returns? 
 
4. Definition of estimation window: Given the selection of a normal performance 
model, we need to define the estimation window of normal returns. 
 
5. Testing framework: Formulate the econometric design and aggregating the 
individual securities abnormal returns. 
 
6. Hypothesis testing: What are the empirical results and how can they be interpreted? 
 
In the following, this procedure is described in detail. 
  
 46 
5.2.1 Event Definition 
The event of interest is the publication of the insider trade. This is the day when the market 
is made aware of the insider trade. 
The security prices of the firms involved will be examined over more than one period. We 
will measure immediate abnormal returns, and abnormal returns 1-month, 2-months, 3-
months and 6-months following the publication of the insider trade23. The event window will 
therefore vary between 1, 20, 40, 60 and 120 trading days following this date. To measure 
the immediate effect, we will look for abnormal returns on the date following the publication 
of the insider trade as the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority updates its register 
(Insynsregisteret) every day after the stock market opening hours. 
5.2.2 Selection Criteria 
We have chosen to use all companies listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm for our analysis. 
The (Market)value-weighted NASDAQ OMX Stockholm All-Share Index will be used to 
represent the market when estimating normal returns using our chosen model(s). 
For more sample characteristics, we refer to 4. Data Description. 
5.2.3 Normal and Abnormal Return Measurement 
To be able to test for differences in returns caused by insider trades or other events, we need 
to model the normal return. Normal return is defined as the expected return a security would 
earn given the event not taking place. Several asset-pricing models (APM) exist. In the 
following, we will introduce the most known methods for modelling returns and then discuss 
and determine which model(s) to use. 
MacKinlay (1997) loosely groups the number of approaches available to calculate the 
normal return of a security into statistical and economic models. 
 
                                                 
23 Our analysis will measure abnormal returns for every trading day between 1 and 120 trading days following 
the event. 1-day, 1-month (20 trading days), 2-month (40 trading days), 3-month (60 trading days) and 6-month 
(120 trading days) is chosen for illustrational purposes only. 
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Statistical Models 
The statistical models follows from statistical assumptions concerning the behavior of asset 
return. It does not depend on any economic arguments. For these models, we assume that the 
securities returns are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) through time. 
MacKinlay (1997) states that this assumption does not impose any problems in practice as 
inferences from these models seem robust to deviations from this assumption. Further, he 
states that one can also modify the statistical framework to deal with serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity by using a generalized method-of-moments approach. 
The Constant Mean Return Model 
Assumes that the mean return of a security is constant over time and that asset returns are 
normally distributed and errors are i.i.d. 
The Market Model 
The market model24 is an application of simple linear regression to portfolio management. It 
is a practical and useful method as we have just two sources of risk; systematic risk 
(unanticipated macroeconomic events) and unsystematic risk. The model assumes that asset 
returns are normally distributed and errors are i.i.d.  
In the market model, the market portfolio is the macroeconomic factor and stocks are 
assumed to have varying degrees of sensitivity to this one factor. In addition, each stock’s 
return is uniquely affected by unsystematic (firm-specific) events uncorrelated across stocks 
and with the macroeconomic events. 
The market model predicts that the expected return on asset i depends on the expected return 
of the market portfolio, 𝐸(𝑅𝑀), the sensitivity of the returns on asset i to movements in the 
market, 𝛽𝑖, and the average return to asset i when the market return is zero, 𝛼𝑖. The variance 
of the returns on asset i consists of two components: a systematic component related to the 
asset’s beta, 𝛽𝑖
2𝜎𝑀
2 , and an unsystematic component related to firm-specific events, 𝜎𝜀
2. The 
covariance between any two stocks is calculated as the product of their betas and the 
                                                 
24 The market model is a version of the single-index model first suggested by Sharpe (1963). The single-index model 
propose that all the covariation of stock returns can be explained by one factor, namely “the index”. The market model uses 
a market index as the factor. 
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variance of the market portfolio. To estimate alpha, beta and the error variance, historical 
returns for a stock are regressed against corresponding returns for a market index. 
Multifactor Models 
The market model assumes that returns are explained only by the return on the market 
portfolio and can therefore be described as a single factor model. Multifactor models assume 
that asset returns are driven by more than one factor. We generally have three classifications 
of multifactor models: (1) macroeconomic factor models, (2) fundamental factor models and 
(3) statistical factor models. 
The macroeconomic factor models assume that returns are explained by shocks in 
macroeconomic risk factors, such as GDP, inflation and interest rates. Fundamental factor 
models assume that asset returns are explained by firm-specific factors, such as market 
capitalization, leverage ratio, earnings growth rate, P/E ratio, P/B ratio, while statistical 
factor models explain returns by using statistical methods. 
Macroeconomic and fundamental factor models differ when it comes to sensitivities, 
interpretation of factors, number of factors and the intercept term. Sensitivities in the 
fundamental factor model are not regression slope estimates, which is the case for 
macroeconomic factor models. The fundamental factors are rates of return associated with 
each factor while macroeconomic factors are surprises. The number of factors is often small 
in macroeconomic models, as they are intended to represent systematic risk factors. The 
intercept equals the stock’s expected return for macroeconomic factor models, while the 
intercept has no economic interpretation in fundamental factor models; it is the intercept 
necessary to make the unsystematic risk of the asset equal to zero. 
Economic Models 
The economic models rely on assumptions concerning investors’ behavior in addition to 
statistical assumptions. Using economic restrictions, we have the opportunity to more 
precisely calculate normal returns. 
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CAPM 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is one of the most renowned models in finance. 
The model describes the relationship we should expect to see between risk and return for 
individual assets. Specifically, the CAPM provides a way to calculate an asset’s expected 
return (or “required” return) based on its level of systematic risk, as measured by the asset’s 
beta. 
The model assumes that all assets are marketable and that the market is perfectly 
competitive. Investors are price takers and have the same expected return, variance and 
covariance forecast for all risky assets. There are no frictions to trading, such as transaction 
or tax related costs. Further, the model assumes that investors can lend and borrow at the 
risk-free rate (no spread) and that unlimited short-selling is allowed. To create optimal 
portfolios, investors only need to know expected returns, variances and covariances. 
These assumptions imply that all investors identify the same risky tangency portfolio (the 
market portfolio), and would want to combine this risky portfolio with the risk-free 
alternative when creating their optimal portfolios. Since all investors hold the same risky 
portfolio, each asset’s weight in the (risky) portfolio must be equal to its share of the total 
market value of all traded assets. The market does only price systematic risk, measured by 
beta. The relationship between expected return and systematic risk for all assets, both 
portfolios and individual assets, is shown by drawing the graph of the CAPM (the security 
market line). 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976) 
The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) describes the equilibrium relationship between 
expected returns for well-diversified portfolios and their sources of systematic risk. The 
CAPM can be seen as restrictive case of the APT in which there is only one risk factor; the 
systematic (market) risk factor. 
The APT assumes that (1) returns are derived from a multifactor model, (2) that 
unsystematic risk can be completely diversified away, implying that unsystematic risk has 
zero risk premium, and (3) that asset prices adjust immediately to their equilibrium values, 
eliminating the existence of arbitrage opportunities. A major weakness of the APT is the lack 
of clarity when it comes to which risk factors to include in the model.  Ross, Chen and Roll 
(1986) identified surprises in inflation, GNP (indicated by an industrial production index), 
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investor confidence (indicated by changes in default premiums in corporate bonds) and 
surprises in the yield curve (indicated by shifts) to be significant macroeconomic factors 
explaining security returns. 
APT eliminates some of the biases found in the CAPM (Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981), but 
it is also found to have a minimal advantage over the market model. 
APT and macroeconomic/fundamental multifactor models differs as the APT is a cross-
sectional equilibrium pricing model explaining the variation across assets expected return 
during a single time period. Multifactor models explain the variation over time. The APT 
assumes no arbitrage opportunities; multifactor model factors are identified empirically by 
looking for variables that best fit the data. The APT intercept is the risk-free rate, as opposed 
to the asset’s expected return in macroeconomic factor models. 
Choosing Model(s) 
How should we model normal returns in our analysis? 
The constant return model is a very simple model and Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) 
found, by looking at the variance of abnormal returns, that the model yield results similar to 
more sophisticated models as the variance is not much reduced. However, as the market 
model removes the portion of the return related to variation in the market’s return, it 
represents a potential improvement over the constant mean return model by reducing the 
variance of the abnormal return. 
Applying multifactor models often have limited gains. The reason is that the explanatory 
power of additional factors to the market factor is small. Hence, the variance of the abnormal 
return is not reduced significantly (MacKinlay, 1997). In cases were the sample securities 
have a common characteristic, such as firm industry or size, the variance reduction may still 
be significant, and the use of multifactor models warrants consideration. 
The CAPM has disputable assumptions (e.g. all assets are marketable and the market is 
perfectly competitive), but is simple and elegant. The model was commonly used in the 
1970s, but later discoveries have found deviations in the model (Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 
1981). The deviations have affected the validity of the models results, which have made 
room for the use of statistical (regression) models for modeling normal returns. APT 
(Arbitrage Pricing Theory) multifactor models eliminate some of the biases found in the 
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CAPM, but is also found to have limited value added over the market model (Brown and 
Weinstein, 1985). 
We have chosen to model the normal return using three different models: (1) The market 
model, (2) the constant mean return model and (3) a multifactor model. The market model 
and the constant mean return model are selected due to the combination of their practicality 
and findings suggesting that the advantage of using more sophisticated models are limited. 
To further validate our findings and increase the robustness of our results, we have decided 
to model returns using a multifactor model. All models’ estimation procedures are described 
in 5.2.5 Testing Framework. 
Measuring Abnormal Returns 
Appraisal of the event’s impact requires a measure of the abnormal return. Define the normal 
return as the expected return a security would earn without any event (i.e. publication of an 
insider trade) taking place, given the asset pricing model (APM) chosen. Abnormal return 
(AR) is then any return over (or under) the normal return, for a given time period, t. 
 
5.2.4 Definition of Estimation Window 
When defining the estimation window in which to measure the securities normal returns, it is 
necessary for the securities estimated volatility to be realistic when the event occurs. A too 
wide window will include the risk that structural changes in the market or the firm will give 
a biased estimate of volatility. Similarly, short-term effects such as abnormal market 
movements may bias a too short window. The estimation window should give a true and 
statistical picture of the relationship between returns to the securities and returns to the OMX 
Stockholm All-Share Index. MacKinlay (1997) is using both a 120 and a 250-day estimation 
window prior to the event when describing the event study methodology in his paper. 
Peterson (1989) states that typical lengths of the estimation window range from 100-300 
days.  
The most common choice is to use a period prior to the event window as the estimation 
window. In our study, we estimate the APM’s parameters over the 120 trading days (6 
months) prior to the event, consistent with the 120 days we look forward in the event 
window.  
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Before estimating the APM parameters, we dismiss 10 trading days prior to the publication 
date of the insider trade to control for confounding events that could lead to bias in the 
estimation of returns. Five trading days are dismissed to control for possible effects resulting 
from the time interval between the insider trade and the publication of the trade. Five more 
trading days are dismissed to control for possible effects resulting from other events such as 
the release of important firm or industry specific news, interim reports or other 
announcements leading insiders to trade. 
 
Figure 5 - Estimation and event window 
𝑡 refers to trading days. 𝑡 = 0 is the event date (the publication date). Length 𝐿1 is the 
estimation window, length 𝐿2 is the event date including - 10 control days, and length 𝐿3 is 
the post-event window, or the event window.  
The event itself is not included in the estimation period, as the event might influence the 
APM’s parameter estimates. When we have the parameter estimates from the APM’s, the 
abnormal returns can be calculated. 
5.2.5 Testing Framework 
In the following calculations, all return data are in logarithmic form. The logarithmic returns 
are calculated as follows: 
 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represents the security close price on time 𝑡  
Logarithmic form is beneficial for doing statistical analysis of returns as it yields a 
distribution that is more compatible with the normality assumptions. The returns are also 
additive. 
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Normal Returns 
The Market Model 
The market model is the regression model often used to estimate betas for common stocks: 
 
 
 
 
The market model makes three assumptions: 
1. The expected value of the error term is zero: 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 0). 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
2. The errors are uncorrelated with the market return 
3. The firm-specific surprises are uncorrelated across assets 
This simplifies the estimation procedures needed to conduct the mean-variance analysis. 
To estimate the parameters (alpha, beta and the error variance), historical returns for stocks 
are regressed against corresponding returns for the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm All-Share 
(market index). The period over which the parameters are estimated is the estimation 
window (𝐿1) 
The OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimators of the market model parameters (alpha, beta 
and the error variance) are: 
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where 
 
and 
 
 
The Constant Mean Return Model 
For each asset i, the constant mean return model assumes that returns are given by 
 
where 
and   
 
?̂?𝑖 is estimated by the arithmetic mean of the returns in the chosen estimation-window. 
 
  
Where 𝐿𝑖 represents the number of trading days in the estimation window (120 days). 
The Multifactor Model 
Our multifactor model is based on the works of Fama and French (1992, 1993). They find 
that market variations, firm size and book-to-market equity are factors that explain the cross-
sectional average returns in a satisfying manner. These factors will be accounted for by 
including SMB- and HML factors in addition to the market factor when estimating normal 
returns. 
First, the firms are assigned the label small or big (S and B), based on the median market 
capitalization. Next, the firms are split into three based on book-market equity. The firms are 
assigned the label high, medium or low (H, M and L) based on the three breakpoints. 
Applying the methodology described in Fama and French (1992) we construct six portfolios. 
The portfolio construction is illustrated in Table 7. 
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 B
/M
 
 Market capitalization 
 Small Big 
High Portfolio S/H Portfolio B/H 
Medium Portfolio S/M Portfolio B/M 
Low Portfolio S/L Portfolio B/L 
Table 7 - Multifactor portfolio construction 
For each portfolio the daily value-weighted returns are calculated. The daily SMB factor is 
found as the difference between the simple average of the three small cap portfolios (S/H, 
S/M and S/L) and the simple average of the three large cap portfolios (B/H, B/M and B/L). 
Similarly, the daily HML factor is found as the difference between the simple average of the 
two high book-to-equity portfolios (S/H and B/H) and the simple average of the two low 
book-to-equity portfolios (S/L and B/L).  
The multifactor model regress the returns on the three factors as: 
 
 
 
 
The expected value of the error term is zero, i.e. 𝐸(𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 0). 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
The additional (as compared to the market model) OLS estimators of the multifactor model 
parameters are: 
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Abnormal Returns 
Given the different model’s parameter estimates, one can measure and analyze the abnormal 
returns, 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, for each firms security in the event window, 𝐿3. 
 
For example, when using the market model to measure the normal return, the sample 
securities abnormal return is 
 
The abnormal returns is jointly normally distributed with a zero conditional mean and a 
conditional variance equal to 
  
 
The conditional variance has two components. The first is the disturbance variance, 𝜎𝜀,𝑖
2 . The 
second is additional variance due to the sampling error in 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖, which leads to serial 
correlation of the abnormal returns despite the fact that the true disturbances are independent 
through time. As the estimation window, 𝐿1, gets large, this component will go towards zero 
as the sampling errors of the parameters cause to disappear. As we use a large estimation 
window,  
1
𝐿1
[1 +
(𝑅𝑀,𝑡−?̂?𝑀)
2
?̂?𝑀
2 ] ~ 0 and the variance of the abnormal returns can therefore be 
expressed as: 
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Aggregating Abnormal Returns Across Events and Time 
Following MacKinlay’s approach, we can accumulate abnormal returns across time for an 
individual event by using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) measure: 
 
 
As 𝐿1 increases, the variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is 
 
We get the individual event sample aggregated abnormal returns for each event period, 𝑡 =
𝑡0 + 1, 𝑡0 + 20, … , 𝑡𝑜 + 120 using the following formula: 
 
 
Were N is the number of events. The variance (for large 𝐿1) is: 
 
 
The abnormal return for any event period can be analyzed using these estimates. 
We accumulate abnormal returns across time for all events by using the same approach as 
that used to calculate the CAR measure. For any interval, 𝑡, in the event window: 
 
 
The variance of average cumulative abnormal returns is found as 
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Statistical Testing and Inference 
By assuming that 
 
One can make inferences about the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and test the null hypothesis that the abnormal 
returns are zero. This hypothesis can be tested using MacKinlay’s version of the standard t-
test: 
 
 
To test for differences in cumulative abnormal returns for subsets 𝑋 and 𝑌 of the data, we 
will use Welch's unequal variances t-test for differences in means25. The test statistic can, 
using our notation, be expressed as: 
 
 
Variances are assumed unequal for subsets 𝑋 and 𝑌. 𝜇𝑋 and 𝜇𝑌 represent the expected 
cumulative abnormal returns (𝐸(𝜇𝑋) = 𝐸(𝜇𝑌) = 0). 𝑛 is the number of observations in each 
subset. The degrees of freedom are calculated using: 
 
 
 
 
Our test results are presented in 6. Results.  
                                                 
25 Welch's unequal variances t-test is chosen over Student's standard two-sided t-test for hypotheses were we apply a two-
sided test. Welch’s test is known to be more robust when the samples have unequal variances and unequal sample sizes. 
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6. Results 
This chapter presents the results from testing the postulated hypotheses. 
We have chosen to present result statistics for each hypothesis, supplemented with graphical 
illustrations. The results are then discussed and interpreted in relation to our initial 
assumptions and previous literature presented in Chapter 3. 
We will refer to the cumulative average abnormal return as highly significant (***) if it is 
significant on a 1% level, as significant (**) if it is significant on a 5% level and barely 
significant (*) if it is significant on a 10 % level.   
Note that we only present results from all our three return models on the market level 
hypotheses. When doing hypotheses on the firm and individual level, only results from the 
market model are presented.  Any deviations across the models will be commented. We 
kindly ask to consult Appendix E for complete statistics for all hypotheses. The appendix 
include the cumulative average abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), the standard deviation (σ) and the p-
value across our selected horizon and our three respective models. We also include statistics 
for differences in means.  
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6.1 Market level 
6.1.1 All Trades 
Hypothesis 1.1 - Insiders on the Stockholm Stock Exchange earn abnormal returns on 
all trades after 1 day and 1, 2, 3 and 6 months following the publication of insider 
trades 
 
All trades 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.17 %*** 0.028 % < 0.001 0.18 %*** 0.030 % < 0.001 0.18 %*** 0.028 % < 0.001 
1M 0.91 %*** 0.124 % < 0.001 0.83 %*** 0.134 % < 0.001 0.94 %*** 0.124 % < 0.001 
2M 1.71 %*** 0.175 % < 0.001 2.07 %*** 0.190 % < 0.001 1.62 %*** 0.176 % < 0.001 
3M 2.55 %*** 0.215 % < 0.001 2.81 %*** 0.233 % < 0.001 2.37 %*** 0.215 % < 0.001 
6M 4.21 %*** 0.304 % < 0.001 4.91 %*** 0.329 % < 0.001 3.79 %*** 0.305 % < 0.001 
n 6627 6627 6627 
Table 8 - Results, all trades. All models 
In this hypothesis, we apply our methods on all insider trades in our dataset, both purchases 
and sales26. The results show that the initial market reaction is a highly significant 1-day 
abnormal return of 0.17%. The 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  increases at a higher rate than the standard deviation 
over the horizon, resulting in highly significant returns over the entire event window. The 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is increasing at a slightly decreasing rate, indicating that the initial effect will diminish 
over time.  
The highly significant results over the horizon indicate that publicly available data on insider 
trades can predict abnormal returns. We reject the null hypothesis that the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is equal to 
zero on all trades for our event window. All our models support this. 
  
                                                 
26 Abnormal returns on sales are inverted before aggregating returns to assess the performance of all trades 
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6.1.2 Purchases 
Hypothesis 1.2 - Insiders on the Stockholm Stock Exchange earn abnormal returns on 
purchases after 1 day and 1, 2, 3 and 6 months following the publication of insider 
trades 
 
Purchases 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.18 %*** 0.034 % < 0.001 0.21 %*** 0.037 % < 0.001 0.19 %*** 0.034 % < 0.001 
1M 0.88 %*** 0.154 % < 0.001 0.62 %*** 0.167 % < 0.001 0.90 %*** 0.154 % < 0.001 
2M 1.67 %*** 0.217 % < 0.001 1.80 %*** 0.236 % < 0.001 1.58 %*** 0.217 % < 0.001 
3M 2.45 %*** 0.266 % < 0.001 2.28 %*** 0.290 % < 0.001 2.40 %*** 0.266 % < 0.001 
6M 3.85 %*** 0.375 % < 0.001 3.93 %*** 0.409 % < 0.001 3.49 %*** 0.377 % < 0.001 
n 4479 4479 4479 
Table 9 - Results, purchases. All models 
In this hypothesis, we analyze the markets overall reaction to reported insider purchases. The 
results show that the initial market reaction is a highly significant 1-day abnormal return of 
0.18%. The 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  increases at a higher rate than the standard deviation over the horizon, 
resulting in highly significant returns over the entire event window. 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is increasing at a 
higher decreasing rate than for all trades, indicating that the initial effect will diminish 
slightly faster for purchases alone.  
The highly significant results over the horizon and across models indicate that insider 
purchases signal abnormal returns. We reject the null hypothesis that the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is equal to 
zero on purchases over time. All our models support this. 
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6.1.3 Sales 
Hypothesis 1.3 - Insiders on the Stockholm Stock Exchange earn abnormal returns on 
sales after 1 day and 1, 2, 3 and 6 months following the publication of insider trades 
 
Sales 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D -0.15 %*** 0.047 % 0.002 -0.12 %** 0.050 % 0.016 0.16 %*** 0.047 % < 0.001 
1M -0.99 %*** 0.210 % < 0.001 -1.27 %*** 0.225 % < 0.001 1.01 %*** 0.211 % < 0.001 
2M -1.77 %*** 0.296 % < 0.001 -2.63 %*** 0.318 % < 0.001 1.71 %*** 0.298 % < 0.001 
3M -2.75 %*** 0.363 % < 0.001 -3.92 %*** 0.390 % < 0.001 2.31 %*** 0.365 % < 0.001 
6M -4.97 %*** 0.513 % < 0.001 -6.96 %*** 0.551 % < 0.001 4.42 %*** 0.517 % < 0.001 
n 2148 2148 2148 
Table 10 - Results, sales. All models 
In the final market level hypothesis, we analyze the markets overall reaction to reported 
insider sales. The results show that the initial market reaction is a highly significant 1-day 
abnormal return of -0.15%. The 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is decreasing at a high rate suggesting that the market 
reaction to negative events has a stronger impact on future returns over time than purchases. 
The standard deviation is higher than for purchases and increases more rapidly, which may 
be caused by fewer observations on sales or higher risk in the stocks sold. 
The highly significant results over the horizon and across models imply that insider sales can 
predict abnormal returns. We thereby reject the null hypothesis that the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is equal to zero 
on sales over time. All our models support this. 
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Result Discussion of Market Level Hypotheses 
Our results seem to support the initial assumption that insiders are better informed about the 
overall future performance of their company. Our results are in line with the findings from 
Sjöholm and Skoog (2006) on the Swedish stock market, as well as Engevik and Helleren 
(2009), Omsted and Olsen (2014) and Holen (2008) on the Norwegian stock market. 
As opposed to Jaffe (1974), our results does not display an initial overreaction followed by a 
reversion. Our results display a 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  increasing at a slightly decreasing rate over time, 
similar to the signs of stagnation found by Cohen, Malloy & Pomorski (2012). The evidence 
support that insider trades reveal information that has a permanent effect on the company’s 
value and that the information is not efficiently handled by the market, suggesting that 
markets are not semi-strong efficient. 
 
Figure 6 - Abnormal returns from insider trades 
By including 20 days prior to the event, we can see that the event changes the trend in modeled returns pre-
event. This strengthens the validity of our findings. 
As we can observe from Table 10 and Figure 6, insider sales seems to give higher abnormal 
returns than purchases. We performed a t-test for differences in means27, to test whether 
                                                 
27 Welch's unequal variances t-test is used to perform tests for differences in mean 
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sales provide a stronger signal of abnormal returns than purchases. Our findings suggest this 
is the case for all horizons except 1D. 
 
Sales vs purchases 
  P-value, |𝝁𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔| − 𝝁𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒔 > 𝟎 
1D 1.000 
1M*** < 0.001 
2M*** < 0.001 
3M*** < 0.001 
6M*** < 0.001 
Table 11 - Results, sales vs purchases 
Sjöholm and Skoog (2006), looking at purchases versus sales in the Swedish stock market 
between 1990 and 2004, get similar results. Still, these findings are contrary to most 
previous literature finding largest abnormal returns following insider purchases. We believe 
this finding can be a result of market differences between Swedish and other markets or that 
Swedish insiders, both when purchasing and selling, more often have a profit motive rather 
than a liquidity (or other) motive. 
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6.2 Firm Level 
6.2.1 Market Capitalization 
Hypothesis 2.1 – Insider trades in small cap companies provide a stronger signal of 
abnormal returns than mid and large cap companies 
In the first hypothesis on a firm level, we apply our methods on three subsets of our data; 
small cap, mid cap and large cap stocks. 
 
Small cap Mid cap Large cap 
 
Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.37 %*** 0.057 % < 0.001 0.05 % 0.048 % 0.280 0.08 %** 0.035 % 0.017 
1M 1.67 %*** 0.254 % < 0.001 0.34 % 0.213 % 0.113 0.72 %*** 0.156 % < 0.001 
2M 2.99 %*** 0.359 % < 0.001 1.18 %*** 0.302 % < 0.001 0.87 %*** 0.220 % < 0.001 
3M 3.96 %*** 0.440 % < 0.001 2.19 %*** 0.370 % < 0.001 1.40 %*** 0.270 % < 0.001 
6M 5.99 %*** 0.622 % < 0.001 3.76 %*** 0.522 % < 0.001 2.75 %*** 0.382 % < 0.001 
n 2275 2284 2068 
Table 12 - Results, small cap, mid cap and large cap. Market model 
The results show that the initial market reaction is a highly significant 1-day abnormal return 
for small cap companies with a 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of 0.37%. 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is positive and significant for small and 
large cap over all horizons, but the results are not significant for mid cap for 1D and 1M. The 
return is highest for small cap, but these companies also have the highest volatility, measured 
by the standard deviation of abnormal returns. 
In Figure 7, we can see how the abnormal returns are distributed among the different firm 
sizes for different horizons. 
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Figure 7 - Abnormal returns, firm size 
To test whether small cap delivers higher results than mid and large cap firms, a t-test for 
differences in means was performed. The test results are shown in Table 13 below. 
 
Small vs Large Small vs Mid 
  P-value, 𝝁𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍 − 𝝁𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆 > 𝟎 P-value, 𝝁𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍 − 𝝁𝒎𝒊𝒅 > 𝟎 
1D*** < 0.001 < 0.001 
1M*** < 0.001 < 0.001 
2M*** < 0.001 < 0.001 
3M*** < 0.001 < 0.001 
6M*** < 0.001 < 0.001 
Table 13 - Results, small cap vs mid and large cap 
The results are clear; small cap companies deliver a highly significant abnormal return over 
mid and large cap companies for all chosen horizons. We therefore reject the null hypothesis 
that small cap companies do not provide a stronger signal of abnormal returns than mid and 
large cap companies.  
Our findings are in line with previous literature and our initial assumptions. There seems to 
be a negative correlation between abnormal returns and market capitalization, hence insider 
trades in smaller companies signal stronger abnormal returns following the trade. This may 
support what we hypothesized, that more information asymmetry exist in small cap 
companies, creating greater advantages for informed traders.  
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6.2.2 Growth vs Value Firms 
Hypothesis 2.2 – Growth companies earn a significant higher abnormal return than 
value companies following the publication of insider trades 
We have segregated the firms into growth companies and value companies28. 
 
Growth companies Value companies 
 
Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.27 %*** 0.070 % < 0.001 0.14 %*** 0.049 % 0.005 
1M 1.22 %*** 0.315 % < 0.001 0.57 %*** 0.218 % 0.009 
2M 1.88 %*** 0.445 % < 0.001 1.65 %*** 0.309 % < 0.001 
3M 2.80 %*** 0.545 % < 0.001 2.70 %*** 0.378 % < 0.001 
6M 4.37 %*** 0.771 % < 0.001 3.62 %*** 0.535 % < 0.001 
n 1550 1556 
Table 14 - Results, growth vs value firms. Market model 
The results show that the initial market reaction is a highly significant 1-day abnormal return 
for both growth and value companies. With a 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of 0.27%, growth companies delivers 
almost double the 1-day return compared to value companies with a 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of 0.14%. The 
difference in abnormal returns varies over the horizon, but growth companies seem to deliver 
slightly higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for all horizons. Growth companies also have the highest standard 
deviation. In Figure 8, we can see how the abnormal returns are distributed among growth 
and value companies over the horizon. 
 
Figure 8 - Abnormal returns, growth vs value firms 
                                                 
28 Growth companies are companies with high P/E ratios (4th quartile) and value companies are those with low P/E (1st 
quartile). 
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We performed a t-test for differences in means, to test if growth companies earn a 
statistically higher abnormal return than value companies (Table 15).  
 
Growth vs Value 
  P-value, 𝝁𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉 − 𝝁𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 > 𝟎 
1D*** < 0.001 
1M*** < 0.001 
2M*** < 0.001 
3M*** < 0.001 
6M*** < 0.001 
Table 15 - Results, growth vs value firms 
Growth companies seem to deliver significant results over value companies for all tested 
horizons. We therefore reject the null hypothesis that growth companies does not earn a 
significant higher abnormal return than value companies following the publication of insider 
trades. 
Our findings are in line with previous literature and our initial assumptions, suggesting that 
the market does not efficiently incorporate the present value of growth opportunities. Insider 
trades in growth companies signal stronger abnormal return following the trade than in value 
companies. This supports our assumptions that insiders possess greater knowledge of their 
company’s growth opportunities and can take advantage of this information. In addition, the 
results show that the difference in abnormal returns between growth and value companies is 
initially high before converging after two months, indicating that the growth opportunities 
are momentarily incorporated. The results therefore seem to support our assumption that 
growth opportunities are first and best signaled by insiders. 
 
  
69 
6.2.3 Firm Leverage 
Hypothesis 2.3 – Insider trades in companies with high financial leverage earn 
significant higher abnormal returns than companies with low financial leverage 
following the publication of insider trades 
We have segregated the firms into highly leveraged firms and low leveraged firms29.  
 
High leverage Low leverage 
 
Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.03 % 0.048 % 0.523 0.21 %*** 0.069 % 0.003 
1M 0.45 %** 0.214 % 0.035 1.56 %*** 0.307 % < 0.001 
2M 0.95 %*** 0.303 % 0.002 2.60 %*** 0.434 % < 0.001 
3M 2.11 %*** 0.371 % < 0.001 3.69 %*** 0.531 % < 0.001 
6M 3.95 %*** 0.524 % < 0.001 5.26 %*** 0.751 % < 0.001 
n 934 957 
Table 16 - Results, companies with high and low leverage. Market model 
With the exception of 1-day 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for highly leveraged firms that is not significant and the 1-
month 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  that is significant at a 5% level, all 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are highly significant for other 
horizons. What is a little surprising is that the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s’ standard deviation is higher for low 
leveraged firms than for highly leveraged firms.  
In Figure 9, we can see how the abnormal returns are distributed over the horizon. 
 
Figure 9 - Abnormal returns, high vs low leveraged firms 
                                                 
29 Companies with D/E ratios in the 4th quartile will be classified as highly leveraged firms, and companies in the 1st quartile 
as firms with low leverage. 
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By looking at Figure 9, we can immediately see that we do not reject the null. We observe 
that insider trades in firms with low leverage earn higher abnormal returns than companies 
with high financial leverage following the trade, for all horizons. Insider trades in companies 
with high financial leverage does not earn significant higher abnormal returns than 
companies with low financial leverage following the publication of insider trades. 
We hypothesized that high leverage could create potential opportunities and incentives for 
moral hazard or adverse selection and magnify the outcome of a trade. In contrast to our 
expectations, low leveraged firms deliver a larger abnormal return than highly leveraged 
firms following the publication of insider trades. The results suggests that the information 
value and signaling powers of insiders in highly leveraged firms are relatively weaker than in 
low leveraged firms. Even though our initial assumptions were not validated, we find the 
results interesting, as they indicate that capital structure affect the information value of 
insider trades. 
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6.2.4 Firm Industry 
Hypothesis 2.4 – There is a difference in abnormal returns across industries 
 
Basic Materials Consumer Goods Consumer Services Financials Health Care 
 
Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ 
1D 0.28 %* 0.166 % 0.12 % 0.092 % 0.00 % 0.079 % 0.09 %** 0.037 % 0.37 %*** 0.137 % 
1M -0.35 % 0.741 % 0.41 % 0.411 % 0.80 %** 0.354 % 0.44 %*** 0.165 % 3.53 %*** 0.615 % 
2M 0.06 % 1.048 % 1.34 %** 0.581 % 1.20 %** 0.500 % 0.67 %*** 0.234 % 4.44 %*** 0.870 % 
3M -0.30 % 1.284 % 3.07 %*** 0.712 % 1.79 %*** 0.613 % 1.21 %*** 0.286 % 7.05 %*** 1.065 % 
6M 1.46 % 1.815 % 2.68 %*** 1.007 % 5.39 %*** 0.867 % 2.98 %*** 0.405 % 11.06 %*** 1.507 % 
n 352 651 789 1400 556 
      
 
Industrials Oil & Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
 
Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ CAR-bar σ 
1D 0.24 %*** 0.052 % 0.96 %* 0.553 % 0.19 %** 0.086 % -0.02 % 0.107 % -0.05 % 0.460 % 
1M 0.58 %*** 0.234 % 3.23 % 2.472 % 1.69 %*** 0.387 % 1.48 %*** 0.481 % 0.08 % 2.061 % 
2M 1.50 %*** 0.330 % 7.90 %** 3.496 % 3.64 %*** 0.547 % 2.13 %*** 0.680 % 1.07 % 2.915 % 
3M 2.22 %*** 0.405 % 15.39 %*** 4.282 % 4.36 %*** 0.670 % 1.87 %** 0.832 % -2.06 % 3.570 % 
6M 2.89 %*** 0.573 % 31.99 %*** 6.055 % 6.39 %*** 0.948 % 1.45 % 1.177 % 4.17 % 5.048 % 
n 1922 28 653 257 19 
Table 17 - Results, firm industry. Market model 
As expected, the distribution of 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s among industries vary a lot. Oil & Gas, although few 
observations, show an extremely large and highly significant abnormal return of 31.99% on 
the 6-month horizon. Telecommunications, together with Basic Materials, Financials and 
Industrials, seems to deliver low abnormal return compared to other industries. It is 
interesting to see that Health Care and Technology delivers significant and highly significant 
and large 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s over all the tested horizons.  
In Figure 10, we can see how the abnormal returns are distributed among some of the 
industries. Oil & Gas and Telecommunications were removed from the figure due to few 
observations and various degree of significance in the different models and for different 
horizons. Utilities had very few observations, and were together with basic materials not 
significant for any horizons. We were then left with Health Care, Technology, Consumer 
Service, Industrials and Consumer Goods. 
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Figure 10 - Abnormal returns, firm industry 
We tested all industries against each other30. The most important findings are that the health 
care industry’s 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are significantly higher than all other industries on a 1% level, with the 
exception of oil & gas. Following health care and oil & gas, the technology industry shows 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  higher than the other industries for all horizons at a 1% significance level, with an 
exception of 1-day returns against some industries. Our data indicates that there is a 
difference in abnormal returns across industries and we reject the null that there is no 
difference between industries when it comes to abnormal returns following the publication of 
insider trades. 
Similarly to Seyhun (1998) we find that by aggregating insider trading in different 
industries, one can strengthen the signal of the abnormal return. We find it corroborative that 
industries characterized by highly sensitive information, such as Health Care and 
Technology, displays the strongest abnormal returns. This supports our assumptions that 
information from complex industries may be difficult for outside investors to fully 
comprehend, thereby causing informational asymmetries. 
                                                 
30 Test results for all industries can be found in Appendix E – 2.4 Firm Industry. You will also find each single industry 
tested against each other using Welch's t-test. 
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6.2.5 Firm Reporting 
Hypothesis 2.5 – Trades adjacent to quarterly reports provide a weaker signal of 
abnormal returns than trades not adjacent to quarterly reports 
We have segregated the trades into trades adjacent to quarterly reports and trades not 
adjacent to quarterly reports growth31. 
 
Adjacent to quarterly reports Not adjacent to quarterly reports 
 
Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.12 %*** 0.040 % 0.003 0.21 %*** 0.038 % < 0.001 
1M 0.85 %*** 0.178 % < 0.001 0.96 %*** 0.171 % < 0.001 
2M 1.41 %*** 0.252 % < 0.001 1.93 %*** 0.242 % < 0.001 
3M 2.08 %*** 0.308 % < 0.001 2.91 %*** 0.297 % < 0.001 
6M 3.84 %*** 0.436 % < 0.001 4.49 %*** 0.420 % < 0.001 
n 2881 2284 
Table 18 - Results, firm reporting. Market model 
First of all, we notice that both data subsets 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s’ are highly significant for all tested 
horizons. From Table 18, we can also see that trades not adjacent to quarterly reports seem to 
deliver higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s’ following the trade than those adjacent to quarterly report. The 
distribution is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 - Abnormal returns, firm reporting 
                                                 
31 Trades adjacent to quarterly reports are all trades performed in the months following the quarterly reports. Trades not 
adjacent to quarterly reports are the other eight months. 
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The figure indicates what we expect, that trades adjacent to quarterly reports provide lower 
abnormal returns than trades not adjacent to quarterly reports – with some exceptions in the 
first 20 days following the event. To check the significance, we performed t-tests for 
differences in means (Table 19).  
 
Adjacent vs not adjacent to quarterly reports 
  P-value, 𝝁𝒂𝒅𝒋 − 𝝁𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒂𝒅𝒋 < 𝟎 
1D*** < 0.001 
1M*** < 0.001 
2M*** < 0.001 
3M*** < 0.001 
6M*** < 0.001 
Table 19 - Results, firm reporting 
For all tested horizons, trades adjacent to quarterly reports delivers lower abnormal returns 
on a 1% significance level. We therefore reject the null hypothesis that trades adjacent to 
quarterly reports provide a stronger signal of abnormal returns than trades not adjacent to 
quarterly reports 
These results are in line with our initial assumptions; the abnormal returns after insider 
trades are in general weaker in months adjacent to quarterly reports. As we argued in 
Chapter 3, we believe that quarterly reporting reveals information that contributes to a more 
efficient market. The consequence is that any superior information insiders may have had 
diminishes, narrowing the informational gap between insiders and outsiders. 
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6.2.6 Momentum 
Hypothesis 2.6 – Insider trades in companies with momentum earn a significant higher 
abnormal return following the trade than insider trades in companies without momentum 
We have segregated the trades into trades with momentum and trades without momentum32.  
 
Momentum No momentum 
 
Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.23 %*** 0.045 % < 0.001 0.11 %*** 0.033 % 0.001 
1M 1.16 %*** 0.201 % < 0.001 0.67 %*** 0.146 % < 0.001 
2M 2.50 %*** 0.284 % < 0.001 0.91 %*** 0.206 % < 0.001 
3M 3.64 %*** 0.348 % < 0.001 1.46 %*** 0.252 % < 0.001 
6M 6.66 %*** 0.492 % < 0.001 1.76 %*** 0.356 % < 0.001 
n 3313 3314 
Table 20 - Results, momentum. Market model 
As for the previous hypothesis, we notice that both data subsets 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are highly significant 
for all tested horizons. From the table, we can also see that insider trades in firms with 
momentum seem to deliver higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  following the trade than those in firms with no 
momentum. 
In Figure 12, we can see how the abnormal returns are distributed. 
 
Figure 12 - Abnormal returns, trade momentum 
                                                 
32 We ranked all the stocks by their return 120 trading days prior to the trade, and classified insider trades with momentum 
as insider trades done in the 4th quartile of returns (positive momentum) and insider trades in the 1st quartile (negative 
momentum). Trades in the 2nd and 3rd quartile were classified as trades without momentum. 
No momentum
Momentum
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
A
b
n
o
rm
a
l 
re
tu
rn
Trading days following event
 76 
The figure indicates what we expected. To check the significance, we performed t-tests for 
differences in means (Table 21).  
 
Momentum vs no momentum 
 P-value, 𝝁𝒎𝒐𝒎 − 𝝁𝒏𝒐_𝒎𝒐𝒎 > 𝟎 
1D*** < 0.001 
1M*** < 0.001 
2M*** < 0.001 
3M*** < 0.001 
6M*** < 0.001 
Table 21 - Results, momentum 
For all tested horizons, insider trades with momentum earn significantly higher returns than 
trades without moment on a 1% level. We therefore reject the null hypothesis that trades 
adjacent to quarterly reports provide a stronger signal of abnormal returns than trades not 
adjacent to quarterly reports 
Our results are consistent with previous literature and support our initial assumptions. There 
seems to occur a synergy effect when an insider trades in a company that has experienced 
momentum the preceding six months. Our results suggest that if an insider trades in a 
company with momentum, the following abnormal returns are stronger than for a company 
without momentum.  
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6.3 Individual level 
6.3.1 Insider Position 
Hypothesis 3.1 – There is a difference in abnormal returns across insiders with 
different firm positions 
 
Alternate and/or subsidiary bm Board member parent firm Large shareholder 
 
Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.03 % 0.237 % 0.903 0.20 %*** 0.056 % < 0.001 0.11 % 0.084 % 0.175 
1M 2.89 %*** 1.058 % 0.007 0.94 %*** 0.250 % < 0.001 -0.98 %*** 0.375 % 0.009 
2M 5.29 %*** 1.497 % < 0.001 1.75 %*** 0.354 % < 0.001 -0.74 % 0.531 % 0.164 
3M 6.47 %*** 1.833 % < 0.001 2.27 %*** 0.432 % < 0.001 -0.10 % 0.651 % 0.873 
6M 9.63 %*** 2.592 % < 0.001 4.69 %*** 0.612 % < 0.001 -3.84 %*** 0.920 % < 0.001 
n 148 2008 798 
 
Managing Director Other executive Other position 
 
Market MDL Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.39 %*** 0.090 % < 0.001 0.00 % 0.084 % 0.994 0.13 %*** 0.040 % < 0.001 
1M 1.89 %*** 0.401 % < 0.001 0.55 % 0.374 % 0.146 1.16 %*** 0.180 % < 0.001 
2M 4.07 %*** 0.567 % < 0.001 0.44 % 0.530 % 0.405 1.85 %*** 0.255 % < 0.001 
3M 6.27 %*** 0.695 % < 0.001 0.88 % 0.649 % 0.177 2.79 %*** 0.312 % < 0.001 
6M 10.86 %*** 0.982 % < 0.001 2.35 %** 0.918 % 0.011 4.76 %*** 0.440 % < 0.001 
n 662 475 2504 
Table 22 - Results, insider position. Market model 
As expected, the distribution of 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s’ following trades made by insiders in different 
positions vary a lot. In Figure 13, we can see how the abnormal returns are distributed 
among the different insider positions. 
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Figure 13 - Abnormal returns, insider position 
We tested all insider positions against each other33. The highest abnormal returns are gained 
by following insider trades made by Managing Directors and Alternate and/or subsidiary 
board members. 
The most important finding is that Managing Directors signal higher abnormal returns than 
all other insider position groups on a 1% level, with the exception of Alternate and/or 
subsidiary board members (1M, 2M and 3M). Alternate and/or subsidiary board members 
has the smallest number of observations, and the multifactor return model (please consult 
Appendix E – Insider Position) shows less significant results for 1M and 2M and no 
significant results for the other tested horizons. We should therefore be careful when 
interpreting the results from this insider group.  
Board member parent firm and Other position signals higher abnormal returns than Other 
executive do. Only Large shareholder seem to signal negative abnormal returns over the 
                                                 
33 Test results for all insider positions can be found in Appendix E – 3.1 Insider Position. You will also find each group of 
insiders tested against each other using Welch's t-test. 
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horizon, although the level of significance vary over the horizon and across the different 
return models (Please consult Appendix E – 3.1 Insider Position).  
Our data indicates that there is a difference in abnormal returns following insider trades 
performed by insiders in different positions within the firm. We therefore reject the null that 
there is no difference in abnormal returns across insiders with different firm positions. 
Contrary to previous literature, we do not succeed to reveal a distinction between low and 
high profile insiders. For example, Managing Director clearly outperforms Board member 
parent firm, even though both surely must be considered high profile. The results do 
however show obvious differences between our designated insider positions. Managing 
Director presents the strongest abnormal returns. This can indicate that insiders with a higher 
assumed overall knowledge of their firm exhibit the largest informational value. On the other 
hand, Large shareholder seems to underperform. We believe a possible explanation could be 
that trades made by large shareholders are more often motivated by diversification, liquidity 
and tax motives. 
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6.3.2 Trade Volume - Absolute 
Hypothesis 3.2 – Small absolute volume insider trades provide a stronger signal of 
abnormal returns than large absolute volume insider trades 
We have segregated the trades into small absolute volume and large absolute volume34.  
 
Small absolute volume Large absolute volume 
 
Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.17 %*** 0.064 % 0.008 0.11 %** 0.052 % 0.041 
1M 1.30 %*** 0.285 % < 0.001 0.28 % 0.231 % 0.227 
2M 2.51 %*** 0.402 % < 0.001 1.20 %*** 0.327 % < 0.001 
3M 3.44 %*** 0.494 % < 0.001 2.12 %*** 0.400 % < 0.001 
6M 5.51 %*** 0.698 % < 0.001 3.76 %*** 0.567 % < 0.001 
n 1622 1646 
Table 23 - Results, absolute volume. Market model 
The results show that the initial market reaction is a highly significant 1-day abnormal return 
of 0.17% for small absolute volume trades and a significant 1-day abnormal return of 0.11% 
for large absolute trade volumes. The difference in 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s’ varies over the horizon, but small 
absolute trade volumes seems to deliver higher returns following an insider trade overall, 
with a highly significant 6-month abnormal return of 5.51% versus 3.76% for large absolute 
volume trades. In Figure 14, we can see how the abnormal returns are distributed. 
 
Figure 14 - Abnormal returns, absolute volume 
                                                 
34 We have classified small absolute volume insider trades as trades with an absolute volume in the 1st quartile of all traded 
volumes. Large absolute volume insider trades are those in the 4th quartile. 
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The figure indicates what we expect, that small absolute volume insider trades provide a 
stronger signal of abnormal returns than large absolute volume insider trades. To check the 
significance, we performed t-tests for differences in means (Table 24).  
 
Small absolute volume vs large absolute volume 
 
P-value, 𝝁𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍_𝒂𝒃𝒔 − 𝝁𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆_𝒂𝒃𝒔 > 𝟎 
1D*** < 0.001 
1M*** < 0.001 
2M*** < 0.001 
3M*** < 0.001 
6M*** < 0.001 
Table 24 - Results, absolute volume 
For all tested horizons, small absolute volume insider trades provide a stronger signal of 
abnormal returns than large absolute volume insider trades on a 1% significance level. We 
therefore reject the null. 
The results are in line with our reasoning. Contrary to Seyhun (1986) and Omsted and Olsen 
(2014), we find that small absolute volume trades display the strongest abnormal returns. As 
we argued in Chapter 3, we believe that small absolute volume trades are more often 
motivated by profit than large absolute volume trades are, which may help explain our 
results.  
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6.3.3 Trade Volume - Relative 
Hypothesis 3.3 – Large relative volume insider trades provide a stronger signal of 
abnormal returns than small relative volume insider trades 
We have segregated the trades into small relative volume and large relative volume35. 
 
Large relative volume Small relative volume 
 
Market MDL Market MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.24 %*** 0.058 % < 0.001 0.26 %*** 0.057 % < 0.001 
1M 1.50 %*** 0.257 % < 0.001 0.33 % 0.257 % 0.193 
2M 2.60 %*** 0.363 % < 0.001 1.04 %*** 0.363 % 0.004 
3M 3.46 %*** 0.446 % < 0.001 1.56 %*** 0.445 % < 0.001 
6M 5.65 %*** 0.630 % < 0.001 2.07 %*** 0.629 % 0.001 
n 1646 1648 
Table 25 - Results, relative volume. Market model 
The results show that the initial market reaction is a highly significant 1-day abnormal return 
of 0.24% for large relative volume trades and 0.26% for small relative trade volumes. With 
the exception of the 1-day return, large relative volume trades seem to signal higher 
abnormal returns following an insider trade than small relative volume trades. The 
distribution of the abnormal returns is found in Figure 15 below. 
 
Figure 15 - Abnormal returns, relative volume 
                                                 
35 Small relative volume insider trades are trades with a relative volume in the 1st quartile of all traded relative volumes. 
Large relative volume insider trades are those in the 4th quartile 
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The figure indicates what we expect; large relative volume insider trades provide a stronger 
signal of abnormal returns than small relative volume insider trades. To check the 
significance, we performed t-tests for differences in means (Table 26).  
 
Large relative volume vs small relative volume 
  P-value, 𝝁𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆_𝒓𝒆𝒍 − 𝝁𝒔𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒍_𝒓𝒆𝒍 > 𝟎 
1D 1.000 
1M*** < 0.001 
2M*** < 0.001 
3M*** < 0.001 
6M*** < 0.001 
Table 26 - Results, relative volume 
For all tested horizons, with the exception of 1-day, large relative volume insider trades 
provide a stronger signal of abnormal returns than small relative volume insider trades on a 
1% significance level. We therefore reject the null. 
The results support our initial reasoning. Large relative volume trades outperform small 
relative volume trades. We believe the relative volume signals the confidence the insider has 
to his information and firm specific knowledge. Our results support this logic, displaying 
higher abnormal return following the trade for higher relative trade volume. 
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6.4 Research Critique 
Statistical difficulties with measurement of abnormal returns may be the result of 
survivorship bias, bias in the estimation of normal returns, confounding events, clustering of 
events or thin trading. Most of these biases increase with the length of the event study, and 
short-term event studies can be said to be more reliable than longer-term event studies.  
Survivorship Bias 
Missing return data in the 120 trading days prior to the event taking place (estimation 
window) or in the 120 trading days following the event taking place (event window) leads to 
the exclusion of some firms. This can lead to survivorship bias, inflating the estimates of 
abnormal returns as a few firms with extremely low return (default) are excluded. The 
inflated estimates will be more frequent in data subsets with higher probabilities of default 
(e.g. small cap firms and firms with very high leverage). 
Estimation of Normal Returns 
From 2010 until 2014, the Swedish stock market was a bull market. The exception was 
during the multi-year European debt crisis peaking in 2011, caused by the selective default 
on Greek and other Eurozone member states governmental debt. The NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm All-Share Index fell 28% from its top the 3rd of January 2011 to the bottom the 
4th of October 2011. One could see this drop as an “unusual” return, which would affect the 
estimation of normal returns in the period and inflate abnormal returns in the following 
period. On the other hand, abnormal returns with an event window during the market drop 
will be understated when the normal return is estimated from the bull market before the drop.   
Confounding Events 
Events other than the publication of insider trades either in the estimation window or in the 
event window can have huge impact on the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s. In the estimation window (the 120 days 
prior to the event taking place) firm-specific news with a huge share price impact would 
greatly influence our estimation of the firms normal return, leading to either increasing or 
decreasing our estimate of abnormal returns following the event. In the event window (the 
120 trading days following the event), there is a high probability of other firm-specific 
events occurring. Both internal events, such as the firm signing a huge contract, and external 
events, such as advantageous amendments of laws and regulation, can have a significant 
share price impact. This will affect the estimation of abnormal returns. 
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We argue that due to a large amount of observations and that the mentioned events can affect 
either the estimation of normal returns (estimation window) or the estimation of abnormal 
returns (event window) both positively and negatively, the bias will most likely be small on 
average. 
Event Clustering 
We have not dealt with event clustering. This causes event windows of included securities to 
overlap, potentially causing covariance in abnormal returns across securities. For example 
can a macroeconomic event affecting the overall market, such as the Standard & Poor's 
Ratings Service downgrade of Greek short-term sovereign credit ratings to “SD” (selective 
default) the 27th of February 2011, influence the abnormal returns of all securities that have 
the date of the macroeconomic event in their event window. This will be in violation of the 
independence assumption for abnormal returns. The problem increases with the length of the 
event window. 
As long as the events are randomly distributed in our research period, the average bias in 
estimated 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ s will be neglectable. A bigger issue relates to the fact that event clustering 
lead to less variability in abnormal returns across firms, resulting in a downward bias of the 
standard deviation estimate. This will affect test statistics and we could falsely reject the null 
hypothesis (Type I error). On the positive side, our securities are rather heterogeneous and 
the events are distributed fairly well over the research period making this issue less serious. 
On the negative side, our data subsets are often more homogenous, potentially leading to 
falsely rejecting the null hypotheses when testing on a firm and individual level. 
Using the multifactor model to estimate normal returns will reduce issues related to event 
clustering. Kothari and Warner (2006) state that adjusting for clustering is critical first when 
the event window span over a year. 
Liquidity 
Some events are in stocks with little liquidity. Thin trading can bias the calculation of the 
beta in the market model and thus the normal and abnormal returns. As referred to by 
Mackinlay (1997, p. 36), Scholes and Williams (1977) found that the beta of securities with 
little trading were underestimated, meaning that normal returns in the market model will be 
underestimated for such stocks. This will inflate abnormal returns. As we look at securities 
noted on the main index for the Swedish Stock Market, we believe thin trading does not pose 
a significant threat to our results.  
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7. Optimal Insider Portfolio 
The purpose of the hypotheses testing was to provide a statistical foundation for a real life 
trading strategy based on the signal sent by the publication of insider trades. To support that 
purpose we will make use of our findings on the market, firm and individual level to create 
three “optimal” insider portfolios by including securities with a high likelihood of abnormal 
returns following the insider trade. 
In this chapter, we will present our testing methodology, test results and assessment of our 
insider portfolios. At the end of the chapter, we will look at drawbacks of our approach.  
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7.1 Method 
First, we define the criteria for selecting the securities to be included in our portfolios. Then 
we describe the portfolios composition parameters and the methodology applied to test them. 
7.1.1 Selection Criteria 
We have chosen three portfolios for further testing. As a certain amount of valid insider 
signals to make portfolios with a reasonable amount of stocks is needed, we choose only two 
criteria per portfolio. 
Portfolio #1 Portfolio #2 Portfolio #3 
Small and mid cap companies Small and mid cap companies All companies 
Large relative volume trades Small absolute volume trades Managing Director 
Table 27 - Optimal Insider Portfolios 
In portfolio #1, a valid insider signal is when an insider trade is done with a large relative 
trade volume in a small or mid cap company. 
In portfolio #2, a valid insider signal is when an insider trade is done with a small absolute 
trade volume in a small or mid cap company. 
In portfolio #3, a valid insider signal is when a trade is done by a Managing Director. 
The portfolios are long-only. Insider sales are not valid signals because we, as outsiders, 
would have to short-sell the securities. As we would need someone to lend us their shares for 
short-selling, it is not always possible. The more difficult it is to find someone willing to 
lend us their shares for short-selling, the more expensive it is. For practical reasons, we 
therefore exclude these signals. 
7.1.2 Portfolio Composition 
Using our selection criteria we are left with a limited investment universe, which statistically 
has proven to amplify abnormal returns from reported insider trades. To start composing 
portfolios we need to define certain parameters. 
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Inclusion Date 
Stocks are included the day after the valid insider signal at the security's opening price. 
Holding Period (HP) 
As event-studies are less robust for longer time-periods36, we have chosen to test our three 
optimal insider portfolios for holding periods of both 1-month and 2-months, giving us a 
total of 6 portfolios. After a valid signal for the given portfolio, the security will be bought 
and held for 1-month or 2-months. 
Subsequent Trades 
If subsequent insider trades occur in a security already included in our portfolio, this is 
considered as a new signal for abnormal returns. Instead of purchasing the security more 
than once, the holding period of that security will be extended accordingly. It does not need 
to be the same insider trading for this to be true. 
Weighting 
Considering the weighting of the portfolios, two methods are commonly used. 
Equal weight is the simplest method of determining the weight of each security in a 
portfolio. This method applies the same weight to all securities. For example, if you have 
four stocks in your portfolio, each stock has a weight of 25 % (1/4).  The advantage of an 
equally weighted portfolio is that all stocks are allowed to perform and contribute on the 
same level. This is especially useful for portfolios containing companies with different 
market capitalization; small and large capitalized stocks are then weighted equally. The 
drawback is that the disproportionate increase in small cap stocks may increase the overall 
risk of the portfolio. The weight, 𝑤𝑖,𝑡, is given by: 
 
 
The alternative is cap-weighting. The objective of a cap-weighted portfolio is to assign the 
weighting based on the market capitalization of the company. The larger market 
capitalization as a percentage of the total market capitalization of the portfolio (or market), 
                                                 
36 See 6.4 – Research Critique 
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the larger the share in the portfolio. The advantage of such a weighing method is that the 
portfolio weights become representative for the actual relation between the stocks 
themselves and the relation to the benchmark, both in risk and in return. The drawback of 
cap-weighted portfolios is usually connected to choosing a frequency of rebalancing. The 
weight, 𝑤𝑖, is given by: 
 
 
Where 𝐶𝑖 is the market capitalization of the stock. 
We have chosen to weight the portfolios by using equal weights. As we find the strongest 
signal of abnormal returns in small cap companies, we believe our portfolios would benefit 
from equal weights as the weighting increases the relative proportion of small cap companies 
to mid and large cap companies. 
Rebalancing 
Our portfolios are rebalanced whenever there are new valid insider signals. At each trading 
day, the stocks with insider signals are included with equal weights. If there is no valid 
signal a given day, the weights of the stocks in the portfolio will fluctuate over time with the 
return of the stock. At the next rebalancing, any excess returns will be reinvested, keeping 
the total weights at 100% at all times. No capital gains or losses will be realized before the 
holding period expire. Daily rebalancing creates a high turnover ratio, and thus high 
transaction costs. The allowance of weights to fluctuate in periods with no valid signals, are 
an attempt to reduce the frequency of rebalancing and thereby transaction costs.  
 
Figure 16 - Illustration of portfolio construction  
At each publication of a valid signal, the stock will be included with equal weight the following day. 
The stocks respective weight will fluctuate with the return, unless a new signal arises which will 
require rebalancing. The holding period for each stock will be 1 or 2 months, as defined by the 
portfolio. Without any prolonging signals, the stock will be excluded at the end of it´s holding period.  
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7.1.3 Portfolio Performance 
To meaningfully evaluate the risk-adjusted performance of the portfolios we need to define 
how to measure risk and return. 
Risk 
Risk can be thought of as the uncertainty of the expected return. It is measured by standard 
deviation (volatility) or beta. For a portfolio, we generally divide the total risk into two sub-
categories: systematic risk and unsystematic risk.  
Systematic risk (Also known as market- or non diversifiable risk) is the risk of events 
affecting the overall market, not just a particular investment or industry. Events affecting the 
overall market are caused by changes in macroeconomic factors such as economic output, 
unemployment, inflation, savings and investments, or by situations affecting the 
macroeconomic environment such as recessions or wars. It is possible to mitigate some 
systematic risk by hedging against systematic risk factors; however, this comes at a price 
(premium). 
Unsystematic risk (Also known as firm-specific-, diversifiable- or unique risk) is the risk of 
events affecting a particular stock (investment) or industry. Examples of events affecting a 
particular stock or industry are labor strikes, mismanagement, plummeting sales, collapse in 
output prices or increase in input prices, natural disasters, new competitors or regulatory 
changes. By diversifying, we can reduce our exposure to this type of risk. A well-diversified 
portfolio consists of different types of securities from different industries, and unsystematic 
risk factors will offset each other. As shown by Statman (1987), portfolio (unsystematic) risk 
does fall by selecting stocks at random as a function of stocks in the portfolio, but the ability 
of diversification to reduce risk is limited by systematic sources of risk. 
Beta is based on the statistical property of covariance and measures the systematic risk. It is 
used as the risk measure when we are holding not only the portfolio, ie. the portfolio is one 
among many assets. A beta of 1 indicates that the returns of a security will move with the 
returns of the market, a beta > 1 indicates that the returns will move more than the returns of 
the market, a beta < 1 indicates that the returns will move less than the returns of the market 
while a beta < 0 indicates that a security moves in the opposite way of the market. 
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Standard deviation (volatility) is a statistical measure of dispersion around a central tendency 
and is used as the risk measure when holding only the portfolio, i.e. the portfolio is our only 
asset. Standard deviation is assessing performance by total risk and does not categorize by 
systematic- or unsystematic risk. We use the standard deviation to measure risk37, calculated 
as: 
 
Return 
A single securities return is calculated daily in logarithmic terms. To calculate the daily 
portfolio return we aggregate the weighted daily returns of each security. 
 
 
The total return for the portfolio will then be the aggregated daily returns. 
 
 
For performance measurement, we use the arithmetic return. 
 
 
                                                 
37 There are other sources of risk not accounted for using the measures mentioned above, such as shortfall risk or 
drawdown. Behavioral finance addresses these types of risk. 
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Performance Measurement 
We will assess our optimal insider portfolios using the following performance 
measurements: 
Sharpe’s Measure (𝑆𝑃) 
 
Measures reward to volatility trade-off by dividing the sample period arithmetic average 
portfolio excess return by the standard deviation of the portfolio returns. Sharpe’s measure is 
an absolute performance measurement, where the benchmark is a risk-free placement 
alternative. A higher ratio indicates better risk-adjusted return. 
Modigliani-Squared (M2) 
 
While we can use Sharpe’s measure to rank portfolios performance, it is not easy to interpret 
the values. M2 is an equivalent representation of Sharpe’s measure and focuses on total 
volatility as a measure of risk, but it has an easier interpretation: The M2 is the differential 
return relative to the benchmark index (the market) and lets us quantify the increase in 
Sharpe in units of percent return. 
Jensen’s Measure (𝐽𝑃) 
 
Measures portfolio return above the return predicted by the CAPM given the portfolio’s beta 
and average market return. Jensen’s measure is the portfolio’s alpha value. A higher alpha 
indicates better risk-adjusted return. 
Treynor’s Measure (𝑇𝑃) 
 
Measures reward to systematic risk trade-off by dividing the sample period arithmetic 
average portfolio excess return by the beta of the portfolio returns. A higher ratio indicates 
better risk-adjusted return. 
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Adjusted Treynor (𝑇𝑃
∗) 
 
One can obtain the adjusted Treynor by subtracting the markets excess return. This measures 
how the alpha (Jensen’s measure) relates to the portfolios systematic risk (beta). 
Appraisal Ratio (𝐴𝑅𝑃) 
            
where:    
Dividing the alpha by the unsystematic risk component (residual risk) of the portfolio yields 
the appraisal ratio. It measures abnormal returns per unit of risk that could be diversified 
away by holding the market portfolio. A higher ratio indicates better risk-adjusted return. 
Information Ratio (𝐼𝑅𝑃) 
 
where  
Dividing the excess return of a portfolio by the standard deviation of the differences between 
returns of the portfolio and the returns of the benchmark (tracking error) yields the 
information ratio. A higher ratio indicates better risk-adjusted return and can be achieved by 
having a high return in the portfolio, a low return of the benchmark and a low σp−bm.  
Risk-Free Rate 
A risk-free rate is needed to calculate performance measurements. As the risk-free rate, 𝑟𝑓, 
we will use the rate of a 3-month government treasury bill issued by the Swedish National 
Debt Office. An investment in a short-term Swedish governmental debt instrument can be 
seen as a safe and liquid investment. To get to the rate, we downloaded daily interest data 
from 01.01.2010 until 31.12.201338 and averaged it over the period.  
The annualized risk-free rate is 𝟏. 𝟎𝟖𝟓% 
                                                 
38 Source: Thomson Reuters     
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Benchmark 
To properly assess the performance of a portfolio, it is crucial to select a comparable 
benchmark. The benchmark should be easy to identify, possible to invest in and be as similar 
as possible in its risk profile and investment universe to the portfolio we want to measure it 
against. The benchmark should always be identified before starting to measure relative 
performance to avoid cherry picking. 
We compare our portfolios against NASDAQ OMX All-Share Index, consisting of all the 
shares noted on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm Stock Market. This index will be used in 
calculating the performance measurements and represents both our benchmark and the 
market. In addition, when presenting annualized return and risk, we include comparisons 
against NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 30 Index that consists of the 30 most actively traded 
stocks in the Swedish stock market. 
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7.2 Portfolio Testing & Performance 
Following the method described above, we constructed our optimal insider portfolios and 
back-tested them. In this section, we present our test results and the performance of the 
portfolios compared to our benchmark.  
7.2.1 Portfolio #1 
A valid insider signal is when an insider trade is done with a large relative trade volume in a 
small or mid cap company. We observed 831 valid signals in 164 different companies 
between 2010-2014. 
 
Descriptive statistics - Portfolio #1 
 
1-month holding period 2-month holding period 
  Average Min Max Average Min Max 
#of shares 12 1 30 23 1 41 
Table 28 - Descriptive statistics portfolio #1 
Table 28 shows the distribution of shares in the 1-month and 2-month HP portfolios. For the 
1-month holding period portfolio, the average number of shares in the portfolio is 12 and the 
maximum number of shares is 30. For the 2-month holding period portfolio, the average 
number of shares increases to 23, while the maximum number of shares increases to 41. 
 
Risk and return - Portfolio #1 
  1 month HP portfolio 2 month HP portfolio OMX ALL OMX 30 
RA 17.91 % 9.13 % 10.36 % 9.58 % 
RG 14.46 % 8.09 % 9.06 % 8.45 % 
σ 19.88 % 20.75 % 19.32 % 20.22 % 
rf 1.085% 1.085% 1.085% 1.085% 
Table 29 - Risk and return, portfolio #1 
The annualized return of Portfolio #1 is 17.91% when the holding period of shares is one 
month and 9.13% when the holding period is two months. The returns of the OMX All-Share 
Index is 10.36% and the OMX 30 Index is 9.58%. The annualized standard deviation of 
Portfolio #1 is 19.88% for a holding period of one month, while it increases to 20.75% when 
the holding period is two months. The risks, as measured by the standard deviation, are 
almost the same for the portfolios and the benchmarks. 
In Figure 17 below we can see that the one-month holding period outperforms the 
benchmark during 2010-2014, while the two-month holding period underperforms.  
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Figure 17 - Portfolio #1 test results 
The performance measurements for these portfolios are presented in Table 30. 
 
Performance measurement - Portfolio #1 
 
1 month HP portfolio 2 month HP portfolio OMX ALL 
Sharpe ratio 0.85 0.39 0.48 
M2 7.08 % -1.79 % - 
β 0.86 0.93 1.00 
Treynor 19.56 % 8.61 % 9.28 % 
Adjusted Treynor 10.28 % -0.66 % - 
Jensen’s α 8.85 % -0.62 % - 
AR 0.81 -0.06 - 
σεp 10.90 % 10.27 % - 
IR 0.67 -0.12 - 
σp-bm 11.23 % 10.35 % - 
Adj R2 0.70 0.76 - 
Table 30 - Performance measurements, portfolio #1 
1-month HP Portfolio 
With a Sharpe ratio of 0.85, the 1-month portfolio indicate better risk-adjusted return than 
the benchmark, with a ratio of 0.48. The Sharpe ratios cannot be compared directly, thus to 
relate the Sharpe ratios of the portfolio and the benchmark, we turn to M2. Measuring the 
difference in Sharpe ratios on the same level of total risk, the M2 is easier to interpret as it 
enables us to quantify the difference in Sharpe. According to M2, our portfolio would have 
outperformed the OMX All-Share with 7% annually. 
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However, neither the Sharpe ratio nor M2 incorporates that our portfolios are undiversified 
and more exposed to unsystematic risk.  The portfolio has a beta of 0.86, implying that for a 
market return of 1%, the portfolio would have a return of 0.86%. To quantify the relationship 
between the portfolio return and its beta value, we calculate the Treynor ratio. The portfolio 
shows a Treynor of 19.56%, meaning that for each additional unit of market risk the 
portfolio gains 19.56% in excess return above the risk-free rate. Adjusting the Treynor ratio, 
we find that the portfolio outperforms the market by 10.28% for each unit of market risk. 
Calculating Jensen’s alpha let us investigate the risk and return of the portfolio beyond the 
market level. We find the alpha of the portfolio to be 8.85%. The positive alpha value 
implies that our portfolio has earned a return above the expected return of the CAPM. To 
further decompose the composition of risk in our portfolio, we calculate the Appraisal Ratio 
and Information Ratio that incorporates the residual risk and tracking error.  
We find an IR of 0.67, indicating that our portfolio obtained a positive active return for the 
active risk it took compared to the benchmark. The Appraisal Ratio adjusts the Information 
Ratio to a level where beta is equal to one. Our portfolio has an AR of 0.81, meaning that our 
portfolio earns an alpha of 0.81% for each additional unit of active risk. This means that by 
actively investing, the portfolio gained 0.81% compared to the benchmark.  
The adjusted R2 is a statistical measure of how active a portfolio is. In simple terms, it 
quantifies how much of the variability in the returns of our portfolio is explained by the 
variability in the returns of the benchmark. An R2 of 70% shows that our portfolio has 
similar variations as the benchmark, indicating that our choice of benchmark is appropriate. 
Even though, when we measure AR and IR, we find residual risk (σϵp) and tracking error 
(σp−bm) of around 11%. This indicates that the active risk in our portfolio constitutes a large 
share of total risk. 
2-month HP Portfolio 
With a Sharpe ratio of 0.39, the 2-month portfolio indicate worse risk-adjusted return than 
the benchmark. From the M2 we can see that our portfolio would have underperformed the 
OMX All-Share Index with 1.79% annually.  
The portfolio has a beta of 0.93, implying that for a market return of 1%, the portfolio would 
have a return of 0.93%. The portfolio shows a Treynor ratio of 8.61%, meaning that for each 
additional unit of market risk the portfolio gains 8.61% in excess return above the risk free 
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rate. Adjusting the Treynor ratio, we find that the portfolio underperforms the market by 
0.66% for each unit of market risk. We find the alpha of the portfolio to be -0.62%. The 
negative alpha value implies that our portfolio has earned a return below the expected return 
of the CAPM. We calculate an IR of -0.12, indicating that our portfolio obtained a negative 
active return for the active risk it took compared to the benchmark. Our portfolio has an AR 
of -0.06, meaning that our portfolio looses an alpha of 0.06% for each additional unit of 
active risk. This means that by actively investing, the portfolio lost 0.06% compared to the 
benchmark.  
An R2 of 76% shows that our portfolio has similar variations as the benchmark, indicating 
that our choice of benchmark is appropriate. Even though, when we measure AR and IR, we 
find residual risk (σϵp) and tracking error (σp−bm) of around 10%, indicating that the active 
risk in our portfolio constitutes a large share of total risk. 
7.2.2 Portfolio #2  
A valid insider signal is when an insider trade is done with a small absolute trade volume in 
a small or mid cap company. In total we observed 244 valid signals in 93 different 
companies. 
 
Descriptive statistics - Portfolio #2 
 
1-month holding period 2-month holding period 
 
Average Min Max Average Min Max 
# of shares 4 1 10 7 1 15 
Table 31 - Descriptive statistics portfolio #2 
 
Risk and return - Portfolio #2 
 
1 month HP portfolio 2 month HP portfolio OMX ALL OMX 30 
RA 12.98 % 8.90 % 10.36 % 9.58 % 
RG 11.02 % 7.91 % 9.06 % 8.45 % 
σ 38.82 % 34.05 % 19.32 % 20.22 % 
rf 1.085% 1.085% 1.085% 1.085% 
Table 32 - Risk and return, portfolio #2 
The annualized return of Portfolio #1 is 12.98% when the holding period of shares is one 
month. When the holding period is increased to two months, the annualized return decreases 
to 8.90%. The annualized standard deviation of Portfolio #1 is 38.82% for a holding period 
of one month, while it decreases to 34.05% when the holding period increases to two 
months.  
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In Figure 18 we can see that the 1-month holding period portfolio outperforms the 
benchmark during 2010-2014, although underperforming for nearly the first three years. The 
2-month holding period portfolio underperforms.  
 
Figure 18 - Portfolio #2 test results 
The performance measurements for these portfolios are presented in Table 33. 
 
Performance measurement - Portfolio #2 
 
1 month HP portfolio 2 month HP portfolio OMX ALL 
Sharpe ratio 0.31 0.23 0.48 
M2 -3.36 % -4.85 % - 
β 1.67 1.20 1.00 
Treynor 7.14 % 6.49 % 9.28 % 
Adjusted Treynor -2.14 % -2.79 % - 
Jensen's α -3.57 % -3.35 % - 
AR -2.00 -1.94 - 
σεp 21.70 % 24.88 % - 
IR 0.10 -0.06 - 
σp-bm 25.23 % 25.22 % - 
Adj R2 0.69 0.47 - 
Table 33 - Performance measurements, portfolio #2 
1-month HP Portfolio 
Due to high standard deviation in the portfolio, we get a Sharpe ratio of 0.31, below the 
Sharpe ratio of the benchmark. From the M2 we can see that our portfolio would have 
underperformed the OMX All-Share with 3.36% annually. The portfolio has a beta of 1.67, 
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implying that for a market return of 1%, the portfolio would have a return of 1.67%. The 
portfolio shows a Treynor ratio of 7.14%. Adjusting the Treynor ratio, we find that the 
portfolio underperforms the market by 2.14% for each unit of market risk.  
We find the alpha of the portfolio to be -3.57%. The negative alpha value implies that our 
portfolio has earned a return below the expected return of the CAPM. We calculate an IR of 
0.10, indicating that our portfolio obtained a positive active return for the active risk it took 
compared to the benchmark. Our portfolio has an AR of -2.00, meaning that our portfolio 
looses an alpha of 2.00% for each additional unit of active risk taken. 
An R2 of 69% shows that our portfolio has similar variations as the benchmark, indicating 
that our choice of benchmark is appropriate. Still, by measuring AR and IR, we find residual 
risk (σϵp) and tracking error (σp−bm) of 22% and 25% indicating that the active risk in our 
portfolio constitutes a large share of total risk. 
2-month HP Portfolio 
Shows a Sharpe ratio of 0.23, below the benchmark. M2 shows that our portfolio would have 
underperformed the OMX All-Share with 4.85% annually. The portfolio has a beta of 1.20, 
implying that for a market return of 1%, the portfolio would have a return of 1.20%. The 
portfolio shows a Treynor ratio of 6.49%. Adjusting the Treynor ratio, we find that the 
portfolio underperforms the market by 2,79% for each unit of market risk.  
We find the alpha of the portfolio to be -3,35%. The negative alpha value implies that our 
portfolio has earned a return below the expected return of the CAPM. We calculate an IR of 
-0.06, indicating that our portfolio obtained a negative active return for the active risk it took 
compared to the benchmark. Our portfolio has an AR of -1.94, meaning that our portfolio 
looses an alpha of 1.94% for each additional unit of active risk.  
An R2 of 47% shows that our portfolio does not display similar variations as the benchmark, 
indicating a poor choice of benchmark. When we measure AR and IR, we find residual risk 
(σϵp) and tracking error (σp−bm) of approximately 25% indicating that the active risk in our 
portfolio constitutes a large share of total risk. 
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7.2.3 Portfolio #3  
A valid insider signal is when a trade is done by a Managing Director. In total we observed 
527 valid signals in 145 different companies over the period. 
 
Descriptive statistics - Portfolio #3 
 
1-month holding period 2-month holding period 
 
Average Min Max Average Min Max 
# of shares 8 1 19 15 1 29 
Table 34 - Descriptive statistics portfolio #3 
 
Risk and return - Portfolio #3 
 
1 month HP portfolio 2 month HP portfolio OMX ALL OMX 30 
RA 10.80 % 18.63 % 10.36 % 9.58 % 
RG 9.39 % 14.94 % 9.06 % 8.45 % 
σ 24.27 % 19.40 % 19.32 % 20.22 % 
rf 1.085% 1.085% 1.085% 1.085% 
Table 35 - Risk and return, portfolio #3 
The annualized return of Portfolio #3 is 10.80% when the holding period of shares is one 
month. When the holding period is increased to two months, the annualized return increases 
to 18.63%. The annualized standard deviation of Portfolio #1 is 24.27% for a holding period 
of one month, while it decreases to 19.40% when the holding period increases to two 
months. From Figure 19 below, we can see that the both portfolios outperform the 
benchmark over the period. 
 
Figure 19 - Portfolio #3 test results 
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The performance measurements for these portfolios are presented in Table 36. 
 
Performance measurement - Portfolio #3 
 
1 month HP portfolio 2 month HP portfolio OMX ALL 
Sharpe ratio 0.40 0.90 0.48 
M2 -1.54 % 8.20 % - 
β 0.86 0.94 1.00 
Treynor 11.33 % 18.69 % 9.28 % 
Adjusted Treynor 2.05 % 9.41 % - 
Jensen's α 1.76 % 8.84 % - 
AR 6.44 2.12 - 
σεp 17.74 % 6.89 % - 
IR 0.02 1.18 - 
σp-bm 17.95 % 7.00 % - 
Adj R2 0.47 0.87 - 
Table 36 - Performance measurements, portfolio #3 
1-month HP Portfolio 
With a Sharpe ratio of 0.40, the 1-month portfolio indicate worse risk-adjusted return than 
the benchmark. From the M2 we can see that our portfolio would have underperformed the 
OMX All-Share with 1.54% annually.  
The portfolio has a beta of 0.86, implying that for a market return of 1%, the portfolio would 
have a return of 0.86%. The portfolio shows a Treynor ratio of 11.33%. Adjusting the 
Treynor ratio, we find that the portfolio outperforms the market by 2.05% for each unit of 
market risk. 
We find the alpha of the portfolio to be 2%. The positive alpha value implies that our 
portfolio has earned a return above the expected return of the CAPM. We calculate an IR of 
0.02, indicating that our portfolio obtained a positive active return for the active risk it took 
compared to the benchmark. Our portfolio has an AR of 6.44, meaning that our portfolio 
earns an alpha of 6.44% for each additional unit of active risk. 
An R2 of 47% shows that our portfolio does not display similar variations as the benchmark, 
indicating a poor choice of benchmark. AR and IR shows a residual risk (σϵp) and tracking 
error (σp−bm) of approximately 18%, indicating that the active risk in our portfolio 
constitutes a large share of total risk. 
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2-month HP Portfolio 
With a Sharpe ratio of 0.90, the 2-month portfolio indicate greater risk-adjusted return than 
the benchmark. From the M2 we can see that our portfolio would have outperformed the 
OMX All-Share with 8% annually. 
The portfolio has a beta of 0.94, implying that for a market return of 1%, the portfolio would 
have a return of 0.94%. The portfolio shows a Treynor ratio of 18.69%. Adjusting the 
Treynor ratio, we find that the portfolio outperforms the market by 9.41% for each unit of 
market risk.  
We find the alpha of the portfolio to be 8.84%. The positive alpha value implies that our 
portfolio has earned a return above the expected return of the CAPM. We calculate an IR of 
1.18, indicating that our portfolio obtained a positive active return for the active risk it took 
compared to the benchmark. Our portfolio has an AR of 2.12. By actively investing, the 
portfolio earned 2.12% compared to the benchmark.  
An R2 of 87% shows that our portfolio has similar variations as the benchmark, indicating 
that our choice of benchmark is good in terms of variation. Also, when we measure AR and 
IR, we find residual risk (σϵp) and tracking error (σp−bm) of around 7%. This indicates, as 
opposed to for other portfolios, that the active risk does not constitute a very large share of 
total risk. 
7.2.4 Discussion of Portfolio Performance 
Taking into consideration all the performance measurements, not all portfolios performed as 
we expected.  
Portfolio #1 outperformed the benchmark and exhibits positive performance measurements 
when the holding period is 1 month. This supports our assumption that insider trades can 
predict future stock returns. Even though, the relatively high residual risk leads us to believe 
that these results may be exaggerated and does not represent the realistic risk level of such a 
portfolio. When measuring the performance of Portfolio #1 with a holding period of two 
months we find that the portfolio underperforms compared to the benchmark. As the holding 
period increases and the average number of stocks in the portfolio increase, the portfolio 
becomes more diversified and one should expect the risk to decrease. This is not the case 
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here. The performance measurements show that the IR becomes negative, implying that the 
active stock selection of the portfolio generates negative returns compared to the risk taken. 
Portfolio #2 performed poorly for both holding periods. Even though the portfolio with a 
holding period of one month generated higher cumulative returns than the benchmark, the 
performance measurements paint a different picture. Using M2, both portfolios 
underperformed the benchmark when adjusting to the benchmarks risk level. We find that 
they both have very high standard deviations, tracking errors and residual risk. We believe 
this can be explained by a low average number of shares in both portfolios, caused by few 
valid insider signals. Also, the R2 indicates that the benchmark makes a poor comparison. 
Portfolio #3 displays better qualities. With the exception of a negative M2 for the portfolio 
with a 1-month holding period, all performance measurements are positive. We find the 
portfolio with a 2-month holding period to perform exceptionally good. For each unit of risk 
it outperforms the market by 8%, represented by M2. In addition, the Information Ratio is 
exceptionally high. This indicates that the portfolio generates highly positive returns for each 
unit of active risk taken, supported by the fact that the tracking error is small. In addition this 
portfolio exhibits signs of relatively good diversification. The average number of shares is 
high, resulting in both a beta and R2 close to 1. We see this as an indication that Managing 
Directors can signal future abnormal returns of their company’s stock. 
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7.3 Result Critique 
The drawbacks of our portfolios relate to the weighting method and the frequency of 
rebalancing the portfolio, as well as the choice of benchmark and the performance 
measurements used. 
Transaction Costs 
Creating realistic portfolios means considering transaction costs. The transaction costs does 
not only include brokerage commission, but also account expenses and the spread between 
the bid and ask price. Including transaction costs in our calculations will completely 
eliminate the return of all the six portfolios as our rebalancing mechanism requires a lot of 
trading. By adding a transaction cost of 0.4% of the traded value, all our portfolios show 
worse risk-adjusted returns than the benchmark39. 
Taking into account bid-ask spreads and transaction costs, Seyhun (1986) show that insider 
trades does not provide significant abnormal returns. Seyhun concludes that outside 
investors cannot use reported insider trades to earn abnormal profits. Gelband (2005) proved 
otherwise and showed that deducting transaction costs did not alter the significance of 
abnormal returns following insider trades. 
Benchmark 
Although our benchmark contains securities in the same investment universe and seems to 
vary fairly well with the benchmark40 represented by a high R2, the benchmark is very well-
diversified compared to our insider portfolios. The diversification in our insider portfolios 
are weak and contains a lot more unsystematic risk than the impression made by the standard 
deviation of these portfolios. The comparison is therefore not optimal. 
Performance Measurement 
Although most of our performance measurements are widely used they still need a long 
history of return data together with a steady level of performance to be reliable. The 
measurements do not necessarily provide consistent assessments of performance as risk 
measures to adjust returns differ.  
                                                 
39 In fact, all portfolios show negative returns over the period. 
40 With the exception of  portfolio 2.2 and portfolio 3.1, 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
The objective of our study was to empirically analyze if publicly available information on 
insider trading could give us any insights into where stock prices would head in the future 
and if outside investors could earn abnormal returns by creating portfolios based on this 
information. To do so, we performed an event study on 6 627 insider trades on the 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm between 2010 and 2014 and on different subsets of this data.  
Our results indicate that insiders are better informed about the overall future performance of 
their company, in line with most previous literature. The evidence support that insider trades 
reveal information that has a permanent effect on the company’s value and that the 
information is not efficiently handled by the market, suggesting that markets are not semi-
strong efficient. Insider sales seem to signal higher abnormal returns than purchases 
following the insider trade. 
When performing our analysis on different data subsets on a firm level, we revealed that 
there is a negative correlation between abnormal returns and market capitalization. We also 
find that the market does not efficiently incorporate the present value of growth 
opportunities and therefore growth companies seem to deliver abnormal returns over value 
companies. We find, contrary to what we hypothesized, that insider trades in firms with low 
leverage earn higher abnormal returns than companies with high financial leverage. Further, 
industries characterized by highly sensitive information such as Health Care and Technology 
delivers significantly higher abnormal returns than other industries. Insider trade signals are 
in general weaker in months adjacent to quarterly reports than in months not adjacent to 
quarterly reports and companies that have experienced momentum the preceding six months 
have higher abnormal returns than companies that have not.  
On the individual level, we find that Managing Directors give the most significant signal, 
while large shareholders give the least significant. Trades with a small absolute volume 
provide a stronger signal of abnormal returns than large absolute volume insider trades. 
Trades with a large relative volume outperform small relative volume trades. 
Based on our findings we created three insider portfolios with two different holding periods 
to see whether these portfolios were able to deliver risk-adjusted returns over the market. We 
showed that some portfolios were able to gain risk-adjusted returns above the market, 
although the return vanished when adding transaction costs. We can therefore not conclude 
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that it is possible for outside investors to profit from following insider-based portfolio 
strategies. 
Further Research 
Building on our studies, it would be interesting to look at the abnormal returns of more data 
subsets. For example looking at the returns following the initial trade of an individual insider 
versus recurrent trades, or insider trades with a “routine” character (insider trades that are 
repeated with a regular interval) versus insider trades with a more “opportunistic” character. 
Combinations of data subsets could also be interesting, e.g. Managing Directors in small cap 
companies, growth companies with momentum or Technology firms with low leverage. 
Looking at intraday abnormal returns could be of interest for doing in-depth analysis of how 
the market responds to and incorporates the publication effect of insider trades. Lastly, it 
would be of interest to perform similar studies on markets in different countries for 
comparison. 
An extension of our study could incorporate employees without reporting obligations. 
Employees may possess knowledge about the general state of the company and may be 
superior in comprehending the value of new information, or they may hold inside 
information. Even though, only certain employees are obligated to report their transaction. 
By incorporating both reported insider trades and employee trading (private information), 
one could get a deeper understanding of the information value resulting from insider trading 
and one could put strong form market efficiency to the test.  
As for the practical approach, there are unlimited possibilities. We find the most important 
improvement to be the reduction of transaction costs. An alternative could be to assign 
minimum and maximum weights to the portfolio, in combination with reduced rebalancing. 
This would dramatically reduce the number of transactions, thus transaction costs. The 
drawback of such an approach is that not all valid insider signals could be accounted for and 
lead to portfolio inclusion. As we wanted to perform a general test and incorporate for as 
many signals as possible, we did not enforce such restrictions. 
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Appendix A 
Excerpt from raw dataset of reported insider trades 
  Date Publication date Company Ticker Innsynsperson Position Holder Transaction Security Amount Total Price Value %  change
19.12.2012 02.01.2013 AKTIEBOLAGET ELECTROLUX (PUBL) ELUX.B.ST Davis, Lorna Board member Own Purchase Share  B 2000 2000 415.91 831828.6 100.00 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 WALLENSTAM AB (PUBL) WALL.B.ST Gullmarstrand, Anna Other position Own Purchase Share  B 1000 4000 112.59 112588.3 25.00 %
21.12.2012 02.01.2013 RATOS AB (PUBL) RATO.B.ST Sšderberg, Jan Board member, Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share  B 100000 100000 181.91 18191200 100.00 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 GUNNEBO AKTIEBOLAG (PUBL) GUNN.ST SVALSTEDT, MARTIN Board member Own Purchase Share 10000 120000 35.31 353116 8.33 %
27.12.2012 02.01.2013 MIDSONA AB (PUBL) MSON.B.ST •sberg, Peter MD Own Purchase Share  B 4485 56637 14.27 63996.465 7.92 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 MIDSONA AB (PUBL) MSON.B.ST •sberg, Peter MD Own Purchase Share  B 1505 58142 14.49 21800.226 2.59 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 MICRONIC MYDATA AB (PUBL) MICR.ST BONDE, KATARINA Board member Own Purchase Share 2000 2000 10.25 20500 100.00 %
20.12.2012 02.01.2013 ODD MOLLY INTERNATIONAL AB (PUBL) ODD.ST Arnhult, Rutger Other position, Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share 32571 32571 34.73 1131291.8 100.00 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 ODD MOLLY INTERNATIONAL AB (PUBL) ODD.ST Arnhult, Mia Board member, Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share 2315 919065 33.60 77775.666 0.25 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 ODD MOLLY INTERNATIONAL AB (PUBL) ODD.ST Arnhult, Rutger Other position, Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share 2315 919065 33.60 77775.666 0.25 %
27.12.2012 02.01.2013 KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB KDEV.ST Sundstršm, Michael Other position Own Purchase Share  B 4600 4600 14.65 67390 100.00 %
27.12.2012 02.01.2013 KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB KDEV.ST Kalland, Terje Deputy MD Own Purchase Share  B 20000 20000 14.65 293000 100.00 %
27.12.2012 02.01.2013 KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB KDEV.ST Ekstršm, Gunilla Other position Own Purchase Share  B 3550 3650 14.65 52007.5 97.26 %
27.12.2012 02.01.2013 KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB KDEV.ST SternŒs, Ann-Sofie Other position Own Purchase Share  B 4600 4600 14.65 67390 100.00 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB KDEV.ST Bjerke, Torbjšrn MD Own Purchase Share  B 30000 41375 15.30 459000 72.51 %
20.12.2012 02.01.2013 HEXAGON AKTIEBOLAG (PUBL) HEXA.B.ST Gervide, Anders Other position Own Sale Share  B -50000 50000 7260.54 363027220 50.00 %
28.12.2012 02.01.2013 ADDTECH AB (PUBL) ADDT.B.ST HAGSTEN, G…RAN Other position subsidiary Own Sale Share  B -2094 11300 294.60 616902.6606 15.63 %
27.12.2012 02.01.2013 EWORK SCANDINAVIA AB (PUBL) EWRK.ST CARLING, JIMMIE Other position Own Sale Share -7021 8320 42.99 301812.4291 45.77 %
27.12.2012 02.01.2013 KAROLINSKA DEVELOPMENT AB KDEV.ST Sundstršm, Michael Other position Own Sale Share  B -2000 0 14.65 29300 100.00 %
19.12.2012 03.01.2013 ROTTNEROS AB (PUBL) RROS.ST Onstad, Thomas Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share 129321 60504490 3.53 456658.3152 0.21 %
20.12.2012 03.01.2013 AB SAGAX (PUBL) SAGA.A.ST Arnhult, Rutger Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share  A 70542 86638 20.24 1427600.779 81.42 %
03.01.2013 03.01.2013 ARISE WINDPOWER AB (PUBL) AWP.ST Nygren, Peter Board member, MD Own Purchase Share 1369 15369 26.00 35594 8.91 %
21.12.2012 03.01.2013 PHONERA AB (PUBL) PHON.ST …jfelth, Robert MD, Board member subsidiary Own Sale Share -1500 23607 44.49 66736.95 5.97 %
27.12.2012 03.01.2013 PHONERA AB (PUBL) PHON.ST …jfelth, Robert MD, Board member subsidiary Own Sale Share -500 23107 43.86 21927.85 2.12 %
27.12.2012 04.01.2013 SKISTAR AKTIEBOLAG (PUBL) SKIS.B.ST Paulsson, Mats Board member, Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share  B 14058 5490288 148.45 2086867.926 0.26 %
28.12.2012 04.01.2013 BIOTAGE AB (PUBL) BIOT.ST Bjšrk, Nils-Olof Board member Own Purchase Share 1210 17230 9.33 11294.987 7.02 %
27.12.2012 04.01.2013 FINGERPRINT CARDS AB (PUBL) FING.B.ST CARLSTR…M, JOHAN MD, Larger shareholder Own Purchase Share  B 40937 303437 12.75 521946.75 13.49 %
28.12.2012 04.01.2013 FINGERPRINT CARDS AB (PUBL) FING.B.ST CARLSTR…M, JOHAN MD, Larger shareholder Own Purchase Share  B 70750 374187 12.35 873762.5 18.91 %
27.12.2012 04.01.2013 LAMMHULTS DESIGN GROUP AB (PUBL) LAMM.B.ST JOHANSSON ST•HL, ULRIKA Other position Spouse Purchase Share  B 1800 70464 27.73 49916.52 2.55 %
28.12.2012 04.01.2013 PA RESOURCES AKTIEBOLAG (PUBL) PAR.ST Bouabbane, Slimane Other position Own Purchase Share  A 30000 39000 55.10 1653000 76.92 %
02.01.2013 04.01.2013 ODD MOLLY INTERNATIONAL AB (PUBL) ODD.ST Arnhult, Rutger Other position, Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share 10000 929065 34.73 347331 1.08 %
02.01.2013 04.01.2013 ODD MOLLY INTERNATIONAL AB (PUBL) ODD.ST Arnhult, Mia Board member, Larger shareholder Legal person Purchase Share 10000 929065 34.73 347331 1.08 %
Raw data reported insider trades
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Appendix B 
Excerpt from raw dataset of total return 
 
 
 
  
Ticker ABB.ST ACTI.ST AF-B.ST ASSA-B.ST ATCO-A.ST ATCO-B.ST ALIV-SDB.ST BEIJ-B.ST BBTO-B.ST BURE.ST
Comp. ABB Ltd, SEK Active Biotech AB, SEK ÅF AB Series B, SEK Assa Abloy AB Series B, SEK Atlas Copco AB Series A, SEK Atlas Copco AB Series B, SEK Autoliv Inc. SDS, SEK Beijer Ref AB, SEK B&B Tools AB, SEK Bure Equity AB, SEK
01.11.2013 387.62 77.80 123.01 437.73 289.80 266.59 821.07 325.22 175.31 40.42
04.11.2013 389.28 76.99 122.71 434.46 294.20 270.62 829.60 332.39 176.32 39.77
05.11.2013 387.86 76.72 126.04 431.60 292.40 269.11 838.12 337.17 176.32 39.77
06.11.2013 391.18 76.99 126.65 437.46 297.78 273.64 840.96 339.56 181.89 39.77
07.11.2013 391.65 77.26 129.37 446.72 298.27 274.14 831.73 337.17 190.00 40.42
08.11.2013 391.65 77.26 129.68 445.63 296.64 272.13 844.51 341.36 200.13 40.26
11.11.2013 392.12 76.99 130.28 447.13 297.46 273.14 842.38 341.96 217.36 40.26
12.11.2013 394.26 76.45 131.50 444.00 294.69 270.12 843.09 340.76 216.85 40.74
13.11.2013 393.07 74.82 131.50 441.14 295.34 270.45 844.51 315.65 216.85 40.74
14.11.2013 398.05 76.17 133.31 449.31 301.04 276.66 850.19 336.58 219.39 40.58
15.11.2013 397.81 75.90 135.74 450.54 301.86 276.99 855.17 334.18 219.39 41.70
18.11.2013 399.95 74.82 135.74 451.76 304.79 280.18 857.72 338.37 223.44 42.03
19.11.2013 397.34 74.82 134.53 448.63 302.18 276.99 852.00 334.78 221.41 41.70
20.11.2013 394.73 73.73 133.62 450.13 302.02 277.67 849.15 338.37 222.93 41.70
21.11.2013 394.26 73.73 130.59 446.86 300.23 276.32 861.29 333.59 226.48 41.06
22.11.2013 396.39 73.46 129.68 448.90 302.67 280.01 863.43 336.58 226.99 41.70
25.11.2013 396.39 72.65 130.28 451.08 303.98 282.53 867.00 331.20 226.99 41.06
26.11.2013 396.63 75.09 129.68 450.95 302.02 282.03 873.43 333.59 234.08 40.58
27.11.2013 399.24 75.90 129.68 456.12 302.02 282.87 878.43 337.17 233.07 40.90
28.11.2013 397.58 78.34 130.28 452.85 303.00 283.20 874.86 335.98 231.04 41.54
29.11.2013 398.29 80.24 130.59 452.17 297.78 277.83 868.43 339.56 230.03 41.87
02.12.2013 394.97 86.20 130.59 452.99 295.50 276.49 867.71 340.76 233.07 41.87
03.12.2013 385.25 85.39 129.98 443.86 287.68 266.93 852.00 337.17 231.55 41.54
04.12.2013 383.59 81.05 129.37 442.50 286.70 267.77 843.43 341.96 232.05 41.70
05.12.2013 384.30 84.31 129.07 438.55 285.72 267.26 843.43 343.75 233.07 41.22
06.12.2013 390.23 83.76 130.59 439.09 285.40 266.93 850.57 344.35 233.07 41.54
09.12.2013 393.07 82.68 129.68 441.41 286.54 267.60 856.29 330.00 229.01 41.38
10.12.2013 389.28 82.14 129.68 436.10 283.60 264.58 854.86 338.37 226.99 41.38
11.12.2013 388.81 80.78 130.89 438.55 280.99 263.07 844.86 337.77 228.51 41.38
12.12.2013 383.59 77.80 130.28 433.23 278.39 261.06 839.86 334.78 226.48 41.22
13.12.2013 383.35 78.34 129.07 436.10 279.53 262.57 839.86 334.78 233.57 41.22
16.12.2013 388.81 77.26 129.07 447.40 284.09 267.10 843.43 322.83 232.05 41.38
17.12.2013 386.20 75.90 129.98 436.37 277.90 260.72 839.86 319.24 234.08 40.90
18.12.2013 390.94 77.80 129.37 439.50 279.53 261.73 837.00 330.00 234.08 41.06
19.12.2013 398.53 79.16 127.25 450.54 286.86 270.95 842.72 330.00 233.57 41.22
20.12.2013 400.66 75.09 131.50 456.26 286.54 271.12 844.15 318.04 234.08 41.22
Raw data total return
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Appendix C 
Excerpt from cleaned and treated data 
 
  
Date Publication date Ticker Position Transaction Shares traded Shares holding Price
Trade value 
absolute
Trade value 
relative
Publication price Market cap Firm size Industry DE ratio PE ratio PB ratio
03.01.2012 02.01.2012 ATEL A Large shareholder Purchase 415753 3159293 15.15 26.39 56006721.00 SMALL Telecommunications 62.87 2.46
03.01.2012 02.01.2012 HUSQ B Large shareholder Purchase 200000 460000 34.93 6986040 76.92 36.75 1760000000.00 LARGE Consumer Goods 1.86 18.33 1.47
03.01.2012 02.01.2012 KAHL Other position Sale -100000 400000 33.86 3386030 20 24.28 216000000.00 MID Consumer Services 2.71 11.59 0.41
03.01.2012 02.01.2012 LIAB Other position Purchase 10000 20000 41.43 414307 100 42.54 339000000.00 MID Industrials 1.46 30.96 1.04
03.01.2012 02.01.2012 LUND B Other executive Purchase 80 125 354.94 28395 177.78 374.81 1770000000.00 LARGE Financials 0.64 4.93 0.81
03.01.2012 02.01.2012 SAND Board member parent firm Purchase 200000 27500000 170.8 34159780 0.73 173.68 13200000000.00 LARGE Industrials 1.83 18.2 3.08
04.01.2012 03.01.2012 CEVI Board member parent firm Purchase 20275 278000 13 263575 7.87 13.5 34721056.00 SMALL Health Care 21.6 2.51
04.01.2012 03.01.2012 HUSQ B Large shareholder Purchase 30000 490000 35.21 1056234 6.52 37.75 1730000000.00 LARGE Consumer Goods 1.86 18.33 1.47
04.01.2012 03.01.2012 MQ Board member parent firm Sale -10000 0 21.42 214206 100 21.63 81874489.00 SMALL Consumer Services 0.98 10.75 0.86
04.01.2012 03.01.2012 ORES Board member parent firm Purchase 20000 310310 249.96 4999250 6.89 240.74 197000000.00 MID Financials 0.01 22.75 1.56
04.01.2012 03.01.2012 PACT Board member parent firm Sale -10000 856607 176.88 1768844 1.15 175.2 164000000.00 MID Technology 60.26 7.19
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 ANOD B Board member parent firm Sale -18000 30000 36.63 659308 37.5 36.44 94622689.00 SMALL Technology 7.43 1.04
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 PACT Other position Purchase 300 400 175.21 52562 300 174.08 163000000.00 MID Technology 60.26 7.19
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 SKIS B Large shareholder Purchase 45000 291025 130.38 5867231 18.29 142.51 379000000.00 MID Consumer Services 2.37 18.26 2.64
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 SKIS B Board member parent firm Purchase 285000 5476230 130.38 37159127 5.49 142.51 379000000.00 MID Consumer Services 2.37 18.26 2.64
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 SKIS B Board member parent firm Purchase 375000 6608281 130.38 48893588 6.02 142.51 379000000.00 MID Consumer Services 2.37 18.26 2.64
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 SKIS B Large shareholder Purchase 45000 320225 130.38 5867231 16.35 142.51 379000000.00 MID Consumer Services 2.37 18.26 2.64
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 SOBI Other position Purchase 1076 3913 14.7 15817 37.93 15.5 483000000.00 MID Health Care 0.33 144.45 0.81
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 SOBI Other position Purchase 993 3543 14.7 14597 38.94 15.5 483000000.00 MID Health Care 0.33 144.45 0.81
05.01.2012 04.01.2012 SWEC B Other position Purchase 1013 2703 83.04 84120 59.94 84.78 549000000.00 MID Industrials 1.81 14 3.46
06.01.2012 05.01.2012 ECEX Other position Purchase 10786 7000 53.56 577725 60.64 53.76 180000000.00 MID Financials 0.03 12.27 0.69
06.01.2012 05.01.2012 ORES Board member parent firm Purchase 40000 350310 254.73 10189384 12.89 240.09 198000000.00 MID Financials 0.01 22.75 1.56
10.01.2012 09.01.2012 FING B Managing Director Sale -301000 260000 9.68 2914683 53.65 8.15 52748944.00 SMALL Industrials 120.27 3.82
10.01.2012 09.01.2012 KAHL Other position Sale -52000 400000 35.27 1834217 11.5 25.07 225000000.00 MID Consumer Services 2.71 11.59 0.41
10.01.2012 09.01.2012 NSP B Large shareholder Purchase 35793 64337 8.58 306925 125.4 8.7 12111882.00 SMALL Consumer Services 45.42 0.76
10.01.2012 09.01.2012 PACT Managing Director Sale -20105 138685 174.09 3499991 12.66 176.32 166000000.00 MID Technology 60.26 7.19
10.01.2012 09.01.2012 PART Other position Purchase 3000 6200 23.46 70393 93.75 23.03 30562693.00 SMALL Industrials 50.58 0.5
10.01.2012 09.01.2012 SKA B Other position Sale -836 1717 248.49 207737 32.75 252.06 5300000000.00 LARGE Industrials 2.97 6.19 2.42
11.01.2012 10.01.2012 FING B Board member parent firm Sale -30000 0 8.15 244500 100 7.85 50953246.00 SMALL Industrials 120.27 3.82
11.01.2012 10.01.2012 REJL B Board member parent firm Sale -1040 599960 76.98 80063 0.17 76.39 82955061.00 SMALL Industrials 10.8 2.22
11.01.2012 10.01.2012 SWEC B Large shareholder Purchase 20000 5027941 85.24 1704898 0.4 87.76 548000000.00 MID Industrials 1.81 14 3.46
11.01.2012 10.01.2012 SWEC B Large shareholder Purchase 20000 5027941 85.24 1704898 0.4 87.76 548000000.00 MID Industrials 1.81 14 3.46
Cleaned and treated data
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Appendix D 
Primary insider categories 
We have categorized our primary  
insiders into the following six categories:  
 
(1) Managing Director 
(2) Board member parent firm 
(3) Alternate and/or subsidiary board member 
(4) Large shareholder 
(5) Other executive  
(6) Other position.  
The number indicate the priority of which 
category the insider is put in. 
The insider types under each category is how 
the insider type was presented in the raw data 
before we assigned them to the mentioned 
categories. 
  
Managing Director Board member parent firm 
Alt.  board member parent firm, MD Board member
Alt.  board member parent firm, MD, MD subsidiary Board member parent firm
Board member parent firm, MD parent firm Board member, Board member parent firm
Board member, Board member parent firm, MD parent firm Board member, Board member subsidiary
Board member, Larger shareholder, Board member parent firm, MD parent firm Board member, Board member subsidiary, Alt.  board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Board member, MD Board member, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Board member, MD parent firm Board member, Deputy MD, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Board member, MD, Board member parent firm, MD parent firm Board member, Deputy MD, Larger shareholder, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Board member, MD, Board member subsidiary Board member, Larger shareholder
Board member, MD, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary Board member, Larger shareholder, Board member parent firm
Board member, MD, Larger shareholder Board member, Larger shareholder, Board member parent firm, Deputy MD parent firm
Board member, MD, Larger shareholder, Board member subsidiary Board member, Larger shareholder, Board member subsidiary
Board member, MD, Larger shareholder, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary Board member, Larger shareholder, Larger shareholder
Board member, MD, Other position Board member, Larger shareholder, MD subsidiary
Board member, MD, Other position, Larger shareholder Board member, MD subsidiary
Larger shareholder, Board member parent firm, MD parent firm Board member, Other position
MD Board member, Other position parent firm
MD, Board member subsidiary Board member, Other position, Larger shareholder
MD, Board member subsidiary, Alt.  board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary Larger shareholder, Board member parent firm
MD, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
MD, Larger shareholder
MD, Larger shareholder, Board member subsidiary
MD, MD subsidiary
MD, Other position
MD, Other position, Board member subsidiary
Other executive Alternate and/or subsidiary board member 
Larger shareholder, MD subsidiary Alt.  board member parent firm
Other position, Larger shareholder, MD subsidiary Alt.  board member parent firm, Deputy MD
Deputy MD Alt.  board member parent firm, Larger shareholder
Deputy MD subsidiary Alt.  board member subsidiary
Deputy MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary Alt.  board member subsidiary, Deputy MD subsidiary
Deputy MD, Deputy MD subsidiary Alt.  board member subsidiary, Other position subsidiary
Deputy MD, Deputy MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary Alternate board member
Deputy MD, MD subsidiary Other position, Alt.  board member subsidiary
Deputy MD, MD subsidiary, Deputy MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary Other position, Board member subsidiary
Deputy MD, Other position Other position, Board member subsidiary, Alt.  board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Deputy MD, Other position subsidiary Other position, Board member subsidiary, Deputy MD subsidiary
MD subsidiary Other position, Board member subsidiary, Deputy MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary
MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary Other position, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Other position, MD subsidiary Other position, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary
Other position, MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary Other position, Board member subsidiary, Other position subsidiary
Board member subsidiary
Large shareholder Board member subsidiary, Deputy MD subsidiary
Larger shareholder Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Larger shareholder, Other position subsidiary Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary, Other position subsidiary
Other position, Larger shareholder Board member subsidiary, Other position subsidiary
Other position, Larger shareholder, Other position subsidiary Board member subsidiary, Other position subsidiary, Other position subsidiary
Larger shareholder, Board member subsidiary
Other positions Deputy MD, Board member subsidiary
Other position parent firm Deputy MD, Board member subsidiary, Deputy MD subsidiary
Other position subsidiary Deputy MD, Board member subsidiary, MD subsidiary
Other position subsidiary, Other position subsidiary Deputy MD, Other position, Board member subsidiary
Other position, Other position subsidiary
Other position
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Appendix E 
Statistics from hypotheses testing: This appendix will include the cumulative average abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), the standard deviation (σ) and the 
p-value across our selected horizon and our three respective models for all our hypotheses. We also include statistics for differences in means. 
Hypothesis 1.1-1.3 – Market Level 
 
All trades 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Sales > purchases 
 CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
 t df P-value 
1D 0.17 %*** 0.028 % < 0.001 0.18 %*** 0.030 % < 0.001 0.18 %*** 0.028 % < 0.001 
 
1D -25.28 3289 1.000 
1M 0.91 %*** 0.124 % < 0.001 0.83 %*** 0.134 % < 0.001 0.94 %*** 0.124 % < 0.001 
 
1M*** 21.43 3292 < 0.001 
2M 1.71 %*** 0.175 % < 0.001 2.07 %*** 0.190 % < 0.001 1.62 %*** 0.176 % < 0.001 
 
2M*** 14.19 3289 < 0.001 
3M 2.55 %*** 0.215 % < 0.001 2.81 %*** 0.233 % < 0.001 2.37 %*** 0.215 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 34.21 3288 < 0.001 
6M 4.21 %*** 0.304 % < 0.001 4.91 %*** 0.329 % < 0.001 3.79 %*** 0.305 % < 0.001 
 
6M*** 90.62 3289 < 0.001 
n 6627 6627 6627 
     
 
Purchases 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
 
    CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
  
 
  1D 0.18 %*** 0.034 % < 0.001 0.21 %*** 0.037 % < 0.001 0.19 %*** 0.034 % < 0.001 
     1M 0.88 %*** 0.154 % < 0.001 0.62 %*** 0.167 % < 0.001 0.90 %*** 0.154 % < 0.001 
     2M 1.67 %*** 0.217 % < 0.001 1.80 %*** 0.236 % < 0.001 1.58 %*** 0.217 % < 0.001 
     3M 2.45 %*** 0.266 % < 0.001 2.28 %*** 0.290 % < 0.001 2.40 %*** 0.266 % < 0.001 
     6M 3.85 %*** 0.375 % < 0.001 3.93 %*** 0.409 % < 0.001 3.49 %*** 0.377 % < 0.001 
     n 4479 4479 4479 
     
 
Sales 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
       CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D -0.15 %*** 0.047 % 0.002 -0.12 %** 0.050 % 0.016 0.16 %*** 0.047 % < 0.001 
     1M -0.99 %*** 0.210 % < 0.001 -1.27 %*** 0.225 % < 0.001 1.01 %*** 0.211 % < 0.001 
     2M -1.77 %*** 0.296 % < 0.001 -2.63 %*** 0.318 % < 0.001 1.71 %*** 0.298 % < 0.001 
     3M -2.75 %*** 0.363 % < 0.001 -3.92 %*** 0.390 % < 0.001 2.31 %*** 0.365 % < 0.001 
     6M -4.97 %*** 0.513 % < 0.001 -6.96 %*** 0.551 % < 0.001 4.42 %*** 0.517 % < 0.001 
     n 2148 2148 2148 
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Hypothesis 2.1 – Market Capitalization 
 
 
Large cap 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Small > Large 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
  t df P-value 
1D 0.08 %** 0.035 % 0.017 0.09 %** 0.045 % 0.047 0.07 %** 0.035 % 0.043 
 
1D*** 199.58 3821 < 0.001 
1M 0.72 %*** 0.156 % < 0.001 0.16 % 0.203 % 0.441 0.68 %*** 0.156 % < 0.001 
 
1M*** 149.40 3825 < 0.001 
2M 0.87 %*** 0.220 % < 0.001 1.14 %*** 0.287 % < 0.001 0.84 %*** 0.221 % < 0.001 
 
2M*** 237.33 3826 < 0.001 
3M 1.40 %*** 0.270 % < 0.001 0.88 %** 0.352 % 0.013 1.31 %*** 0.271 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 233.03 3824 < 0.001 
6M 2.75 %*** 0.382 % < 0.001 2.36 %*** 0.498 % < 0.001 2.50 %*** 0.383 % < 0.001 
 
6M*** 208.81 3828 < 0.001 
n 2068 2068 2068 
     
 
                  
     
 
Mid cap 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Small > Mid 
 CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
 t df P-value 
1D 0.05 % 0.048 % 0.280 0.08 % 0.051 % 0.133 0.08 %* 0.048 % 0.088 
 
1D*** 202.02 4420 < 0.001 
1M 0.34 % 0.213 % 0.113 0.50 %** 0.228 % 0.029 0.34 % 0.214 % 0.118 
 
1M*** 191.05 4418 < 0.001 
2M 1.18 %*** 0.302 % < 0.001 1.62 %*** 0.322 % < 0.001 1.10 %*** 0.303 % < 0.001 
 
2M*** 184.70 4419 < 0.001 
3M 2.19 %*** 0.370 % < 0.001 2.84 %*** 0.394 % < 0.001 2.12 %*** 0.371 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 147.10 4420 < 0.001 
6M 3.76 %*** 0.522 % < 0.001 4.75 %*** 0.558 % < 0.001 3.47 %*** 0.525 % < 0.001 
 
6M*** 130.52 4419 < 0.001 
n 2284 2284 2284 
     
 
                  
     
 
Small cap 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.37 %*** 0.057 % < 0.001 0.37 %*** 0.058 % < 0.001 0.38 %*** 0.057 % < 0.001 
     1M 1.67 %*** 0.254 % < 0.001 1.77 %*** 0.259 % < 0.001 1.77 %*** 0.255 % < 0.001 
     2M 2.99 %*** 0.359 % < 0.001 3.36 %*** 0.366 % < 0.001 2.86 %*** 0.360 % < 0.001 
     3M 3.96 %*** 0.440 % < 0.001 4.54 %*** 0.449 % < 0.001 3.59 %*** 0.441 % < 0.001 
     6M 5.99 %*** 0.622 % < 0.001 7.39 %*** 0.634 % < 0.001 5.29 %*** 0.624 % < 0.001 
     n 2275 2275 2275 
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Hypothesis 2.2 – Growth vs value firms 
 
 
First quartile - P/E ratio - Value companies 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Fourth (Growth) > First (Value) 
 CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
 t df P-value 
1D 0.14 %*** 0.049 % 0.005 0.15 %*** 0.054 % 0.005 0.15 %*** 0.049 % 0.002 
 
1D*** 61.29 2758 < 0.001 
1M 0.57 %*** 0.218 % 0.009 0.31 % 0.243 % 0.198 0.66 %*** 0.219 % 0.003 
 
1M*** 66.60 2759 < 0.001 
2M 1.65 %*** 0.309 % < 0.001 1.88 %*** 0.344 % < 0.001 1.49 %*** 0.310 % < 0.001 
 
2M*** 16.37 2759 < 0.001 
3M 2.70 %*** 0.378 % < 0.001 2.80 %*** 0.422 % < 0.001 2.31 %*** 0.379 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 6.12 2759 < 0.001 
6M 3.62 %*** 0.535 % < 0.001 4.66 %*** 0.596 % < 0.001 2.97 %*** 0.536 % < 0.001 
 
6M*** 31.37 2758 < 0.001 
n 1556 1556 1556 
     
 
Second quartile - P/E ratio 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
       CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.11 %** 0.046 % 0.013 0.08 % 0.052 % 0.124 0.11 %** 0.046 % 0.017 
     1M 0.60 %*** 0.204 % 0.003 0.39 %* 0.232 % 0.091 0.58 %*** 0.204 % 0.005 
     2M 1.28 %*** 0.289 % < 0.001 1.87 %*** 0.329 % < 0.001 1.01 %*** 0.289 % < 0.001 
     3M 2.19 %*** 0.354 % < 0.001 2.88 %*** 0.402 % < 0.001 1.61 %*** 0.354 % < 0.001 
     6M 4.19 %*** 0.500 % < 0.001 5.17 %*** 0.569 % < 0.001 2.96 %*** 0.501 % < 0.001 
     n 1549 1549 1549 
     
 
Third quartile - P/E ratio 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.05 % 0.050 % 0.288 0.10 %* 0.055 % 0.065 0.06 % 0.050 % 0.195 
     1M 0.39 %* 0.223 % 0.082 0.39 % 0.248 % 0.112 0.41 %* 0.223 % 0.065 
     2M 0.67 %** 0.315 % 0.034 0.79 %** 0.351 % 0.024 0.76 %** 0.315 % 0.016 
     3M 1.02 %*** 0.386 % 0.008 0.89 %** 0.430 % 0.039 1.16 %*** 0.385 % 0.003 
     6M 2.67 %*** 0.545 % < 0.001 3.07 %*** 0.607 % < 0.001 2.60 %*** 0.545 % < 0.001 
     n 1554 1554 1554 
     
 
Fourth quartile - P/E ratio - Growth companies 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.27 %*** 0.070 % < 0.001 0.31 %*** 0.074 % < 0.001 0.30 %*** 0.071 % < 0.001 
     1M 1.22 %*** 0.315 % < 0.001 1.37 %*** 0.332 % < 0.001 1.29 %*** 0.316 % < 0.001 
     2M 1.88 %*** 0.445 % < 0.001 2.56 %*** 0.469 % < 0.001 1.87 %*** 0.447 % < 0.001 
     3M 2.80 %*** 0.545 % < 0.001 3.42 %*** 0.574 % < 0.001 2.81 %*** 0.547 % < 0.001 
     6M 4.37 %*** 0.771 % < 0.001 5.16 %*** 0.812 % < 0.001 4.51 %*** 0.774 % < 0.001 
     n 1550 1550 1550 
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Hypothesis 2.3 – Firm Leverage 
 
 
First quartile - D/E ratio - Low leverage 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Fourth (High leverage) > First (Low leverage) 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
  t df P-value 
1D 0.21 %*** 0.069 % 0.003 0.2 %*** 0.075 % 0.001 0.20 %*** 0.069 % 0.004 
 
1D -65.22 1712 1.000 
1M 1.56 %*** 0.307 % < 0.001 1.7 %*** 0.336 % < 0.001 1.40 %*** 0.307 % < 0.001 
 
1M -91.50 1713 1.000 
2M 2.60 %*** 0.434 % < 0.001 3.3 %*** 0.475 % < 0.001 2.44 %*** 0.434 % < 0.001 
 
2M -96.06 1713 1.000 
3M 3.69 %*** 0.531 % < 0.001 4.2 %*** 0.582 % < 0.001 3.33 %*** 0.531 % < 0.001 
 
3M -75.23 1714 1.000 
6M 5.26 %*** 0.751 % < 0.001 5.9 %*** 0.824 % < 0.001 4.30 %*** 0.751 % < 0.001 
 
6M -43.95 1712 1.000 
n 957 957 957 
     
 
Second quartile - D/E ratio 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.04 % 0.059 % 0.541 0.03 % 0.070 % 0.693 0.05 % 0.059 % 0.421 
     1M 0.48 %* 0.262 % 0.069 0.02 % 0.314 % 0.951 0.61 %** 0.263 % 0.020 
     2M 0.35 % 0.371 % 0.347 0.63 % 0.443 % 0.157 0.73 %* 0.372 % 0.051 
     3M 0.63 % 0.455 % 0.168 0.23 % 0.543 % 0.674 1.15 %** 0.456 % 0.012 
     6M 3.13 %*** 0.643 % < 0.001 3.02 %*** 0.768 % < 0.001 3.77 %*** 0.644 % < 0.001 
     n 956 956 956 
     
 
Third quartile - D/E ratio 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D -0.02 % 0.058 % 0.700 0.00 % 0.069 % 0.962 0.01 % 0.059 % 0.914 
     1M 0.14 % 0.261 % 0.579 -0.11 % 0.310 % 0.718 0.26 % 0.265 % 0.336 
     2M 1.28 %*** 0.369 % < 0.001 1.45 %*** 0.439 % 0.001 1.46 %*** 0.375 % < 0.001 
     3M 2.07 %*** 0.452 % < 0.001 2.00 %*** 0.537 % < 0.001 2.40 %*** 0.459 % < 0.001 
     6M 2.77 %*** 0.639 % < 0.001 2.02 %*** 0.760 % 0.008 3.70 %*** 0.650 % < 0.001 
     n 912 912 912 
     
 
Fourth quartile - D/E ratio - High leverage 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.03 % 0.048 % 0.523 0.08 % 0.064 % 0.238 0.03 % 0.048 % 0.598 
     1M 0.45 %** 0.214 % 0.035 0.44 % 0.287 % 0.122 0.30 % 0.213 % 0.161 
     2M 0.95 %*** 0.303 % 0.002 2.03 %*** 0.405 % < 0.001 0.46 % 0.302 % 0.126 
     3M 2.11 %*** 0.371 % < 0.001 3.13 %*** 0.497 % < 0.001 1.18 %*** 0.369 % < 0.001 
     6M 3.95 %*** 0.524 % < 0.001 6.14 %*** 0.702 % < 0.001 2.27 %*** 0.523 % < 0.001 
     N 934 934 934 
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Hypothesis 2.4 – Firm Industry 
 
 
Basic Materials 
 
Consumer Goods 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.28 %* 0.166 % 0.087 0.36 %** 0.180 % 0.047 0.28 %* 0.167 % 0.092 
 
0.12 % 0.092 % 0.198 0.19 %* 0.101 % 0.056 0.12 % 0.093 % 0.210 
1M -0.35 % 0.741 % 0.633 -0.52 % 0.804 % 0.517 -0.57 % 0.745 % 0.446 
 
0.41 % 0.411 % 0.314 0.10 % 0.450 % 0.825 0.23 % 0.414 % 0.575 
2M 0.06 % 1.048 % 0.954 0.00 % 1.138 % 0.997 -0.49 % 1.054 % 0.641 
 
1.34 %** 0.581 % 0.021 1.24 %* 0.637 % 0.052 1.18 %** 0.586 % 0.045 
3M -0.30 % 1.284 % 0.813 -0.61 % 1.393 % 0.661 -0.67 % 1.291 % 0.603 
 
3.07 %*** 0.712 % < 0.001 2.63 %*** 0.780 % 0.001 2.95 %*** 0.718 % < 0.001 
6M 1.46 % 1.815 % 0.423 1.92 % 1.970 % 0.330 0.53 % 1.825 % 0.772 
 
2.68 %*** 1.007 % 0.008 1.92 %* 1.103 % 0.082 2.79 %*** 1.015 % 0.006 
n 352 352 352 
 
651 651 651 
 
Consumer Services 
 
Health Care 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.00 % 0.079 % 0.992 -0.02 % 0.086 % 0.854 0.03 % 0.080 % 0.695 
 
0.37 %*** 0.137 % 0.007 0.35 %** 0.140 % 0.013 0.40 %** 0.139 % 0.005 
1M 0.80 %** 0.354 % 0.024 0.72 %* 0.384 % 0.062 1.12 %*** 0.358 % 0.002 
 
3.53 %*** 0.615 % < 0.001 3.67 %*** 0.624 % < 0.001 3.08 %*** 0.621 % < 0.001 
2M 1.20 %** 0.500 % 0.016 1.48 %*** 0.544 % 0.007 1.26 %** 0.506 % 0.013 
 
4.44 %*** 0.870 % < 0.001 4.98 %*** 0.883 % < 0.001 3.56 %*** 0.878 % < 0.001 
3M 1.79 %*** 0.613 % 0.004 1.59 %** 0.666 % 0.017 1.74 %*** 0.620 % 0.005 
 
7.05 %*** 1.065 % < 0.001 7.63 %*** 1.081 % < 0.001 6.20 %*** 1.075 % < 0.001 
6M 5.39 %*** 0.867 % < 0.001 5.83 %*** 0.942 % < 0.001 5.17 %*** 0.877 % < 0.001 
 
11.06 %*** 1.507 % < 0.001 12.37 %*** 1.529 % < 0.001 9.79 %*** 1.520 % < 0.001 
n 789 789 789 
 
556 556 556 
 
Financials 
 
Industrials 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.09 %** 0.037 % 0.011 0.10 %** 0.046 % 0.024 0.08 %** 0.037 % 0.039 
 
0.24 %*** 0.052 % < 0.001 0.28 %*** 0.057 % < 0.001 0.27 %*** 0.052 % < 0.001 
1M 0.44 %*** 0.165 % 0.008 0.38 %* 0.207 % 0.067 0.17 % 0.164 % 0.289 
 
0.58 %** 0.234 % 0.013 0.50 %* 0.254 % 0.051 1.00 %*** 0.234 % < 0.001 
2M 0.67 %*** 0.234 % 0.004 1.36 %*** 0.292 % < 0.001 0.25 % 0.232 % 0.282 
 
1.50 %*** 0.330 % < 0.001 1.88 %*** 0.360 % < 0.001 2.09 %*** 0.331 % < 0.001 
3M 1.21 %*** 0.286 % < 0.001 1.66 %*** 0.358 % < 0.001 0.51 %* 0.284 % 0.075 
 
2.22 %*** 0.405 % < 0.001 2.63 %*** 0.441 % < 0.001 2.86 %*** 0.405 % < 0.001 
6M 2.98 %*** 0.405 % < 0.001 3.55 %*** 0.506 % < 0.001 1.51 %*** 0.402 % < 0.001 
 
2.89 %*** 0.573 % < 0.001 3.87 %*** 0.623 % < 0.001 4.03 %*** 0.573 % < 0.001 
n 1400 1400 1400 
 
1922 1922 1922 
 
Oil & Gas 
 
Technology 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.96 %* 0.553 % 0.093 0.91 % 0.581 % 0.128 1.04 %* 0.547 % 0.067 
 
0.19 %** 0.086 % 0.030 0.12 % 0.089 % 0.164 0.20 %** 0.086 % 0.020 
1M 3.23 % 2.472 % 0.202 3.56 % 2.596 % 0.182 4.78 %* 2.445 % 0.061 
 
1.69 %*** 0.387 % < 0.001 1.68 %*** 0.398 % < 0.001 1.53 %*** 0.384 % < 0.001 
2M 7.90 %** 3.496 % 0.032 7.25 %* 3.672 % 0.059 10.02 %*** 3.458 % 0.007 
 
3.64 %*** 0.547 % < 0.001 3.74 %*** 0.564 % < 0.001 3.08 %*** 0.543 % < 0.001 
3M 15.39 %*** 4.282 % 0.001 13.87 %*** 4.497 % 0.005 20.09 %*** 4.235 % < 0.001 
 
4.36 %*** 0.670 % < 0.001 5.00 %*** 0.690 % < 0.001 3.18 %*** 0.665 % < 0.001 
6M 31.99 %*** 6.055 % < 0.001 31.08 %*** 6.360 % < 0.001 38.92 %*** 5.989 % < 0.001 
 
6.39 %*** 0.948 % < 0.001 7.59 %*** 0.976 % < 0.001 3.87 %*** 0.941 % < 0.001 
n 28 28 28 
 
653 653 653 
 
Telecommunications 
 
Utilities 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D -0.02 % 0.107 % 0.865 -0.04 % 0.118 % 0.719 0.00 % 0.108 % 0.965 
 
-0.05 % 0.460 % 0.913 0.00 % 0.488 % 0.997 -0.34 % 0.447 % 0.455 
1M 1.48 %*** 0.481 % 0.002 1.20 %** 0.527 % 0.023 1.52 %*** 0.485 % 0.002 
 
0.08 % 2.061 % 0.970 -0.09 % 2.181 % 0.967 -1.37 % 1.998 % 0.501 
2M 2.13 %*** 0.680 % 0.002 3.12 %*** 0.746 % < 0.001 2.19 %*** 0.686 % 0.002 
 
1.07 % 2.915 % 0.718 1.41 % 3.084 % 0.653 -1.78 % 2.826 % 0.536 
3M 1.87 %** 0.832 % 0.025 2.44 %*** 0.913 % 0.008 1.87 %** 0.840 % 0.027 
 
-2.06 % 3.570 % 0.571 -1.36 % 3.777 % 0.723 -6.67 %* 3.461 % 0.070 
6M 1.45 % 1.177 % 0.218 3.01 %** 1.291 % 0.020 1.17 % 1.187 % 0.325 
 
4.17 % 5.048 % 0.419 7.86 % 5.341 % 0.158 -8.91 %* 4.895 % 0.085 
n 257 257 257 
 
19 19 19 
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Consumer Goods Consumer Services Financials Health care Industrials Oil & Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
>   t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value 
B
a
si
c 
M
a
te
ri
a
ls
 1D 17.36 470 < 0.001 30.71 424 < 0.001 21.40 360 < 0.001 -8.57 646 1.000 4.95 364 < 0.001 -6.47 27 1.000 10.09 456 < 0.001 27.28 599 < 0.001 3.16 18 0.003 
1M -18.01 471 1.000 -27.91 424 1.000 -19.88 360 1.000 -82.06 646 1.000 -23.53 364 1.000 -7.65 27 1.000 -48.37 457 1.000 -36.90 599 1.000 -0.91 18 0.813 
2M -21.24 471 1.000 -19.50 424 1.000 -10.80 360 1.000 -65.44 646 1.000 -25.61 364 1.000 -11.82 27 1.000 -59.85 456 1.000 -29.53 599 1.000 -1.51 18 0.925 
3M -45.62 470 1.000 -29.17 424 1.000 -21.93 360 1.000 -89.68 646 1.000 -36.60 364 1.000 -19.32 27 1.000 -63.69 456 1.000 -25.34 599 1.000 2.14 18 0.023 
6M -11.66 470 1.000 -38.70 424 1.000 -15.61 360 1.000 -82.86 646 1.000 -14.65 364 1.000 -26.59 27 1.000 -47.65 456 1.000 0.04 599 0.484 -2.34 18 0.984 
C
o
n
su
m
e
r 
G
o
o
d
s 1D       26.06 1290 < 0.001 6.60 749 < 0.001 -37.42 942 1.000 -32.03 797 1.000 -8.07 27 1.000 -14.21 1297 1.000 17.98 412 < 0.001 1.60 18 0.063 
1M       -19.02 1289 1.000 -1.33 749 0.908 -101.65 942 1.000 -9.99 797 1.000 -6.03 27 1.000 -57.78 1297 1.000 -31.20 412 1.000 0.71 18 0.244 
2M       4.79 1289 < 0.001 28.56 749 < 0.001 -71.46 942 1.000 -6.75 797 1.000 -9.92 27 1.000 -73.52 1297 1.000 -16.40 412 1.000 0.41 18 0.345 
3M       36.02 1290 < 0.001 64.32 749 < 0.001 -74.98 942 1.000 28.71 797 < 0.001 -15.22 27 1.000 -33.84 1297 1.000 20.26 412 < 0.001 6.26 18 0.000 
6M       -54.13 1290 1.000 -7.35 749 1.000 -111.71 942 1.000 -5.09 797 1.000 -25.60 27 1.000 -68.67 1297 1.000 14.68 412 < 0.001 -1.29 18 0.894 
C
o
n
su
m
e
r 
S
e
rv
ic
e
s 
1D             -31.68 984 1.000 -58.01 813 1.000 -78.70 1081 1.000 -9.21 27 1.000 -43.01 1337 1.000 2.41 351 0.008 0.47 18 0.321 
1M             27.49 986 < 0.001 -94.18 813 1.000 16.03 1082 < 0.001 -5.20 27 1.000 -45.14 1336 1.000 -20.70 351 1.000 1.81 18 0.044 
2M             28.43 986 < 0.001 -79.02 812 1.000 -15.54 1081 1.000 -10.13 27 1.000 -87.54 1337 1.000 -20.17 351 1.000 1.87 18 0.039 
3M             25.29 985 < 0.001 -104.79 813 1.000 -18.22 1081 1.000 -16.80 27 1.000 -75.38 1337 1.000 -1.45 351 0.926 2.25 18 0.019 
6M             73.74 985 < 0.001 -80.02 813 1.000 74.62 1082 < 0.001 -23.24 27 1.000 -20.87 1337 1.000 49.41 351 < 0.001 4.69 18 0.000 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
 
1D                   -47.54 587 1.000 -155.14 3317 < 0.001 -8.31 27 1.000 -26.91 765 1.000 16.56 267 < 0.001 1.37 18 0.094 
1M                   -116.97 587 1.000 -21.29 3317 1.000 -5.99 27 1.000 -79.56 765 1.000 -34.31 267 1.000 0.75 18 0.230 
2M                   -100.83 587 1.000 -85.51 3317 1.000 -10.95 27 1.000 -133.36 765 1.000 -34.16 267 1.000 -0.60 18 0.723 
3M                   -127.51 587 1.000 -84.81 3317 1.000 -17.52 27 1.000 -115.57 765 1.000 -12.70 267 1.000 3.99 18 < 0.001 
6M                   -124.81 587 1.000 5.26 3317 < 0.001 -25.36 27 1.000 -88.47 765 1.000 20.54 267 < 0.001 -1.03 18 0.842 
H
e
a
lt
h
 C
a
re
 1D                         22.67 602 < 0.001 -5.62 27 1.000 27.62 905 < 0.001 44.30 626 < 0.001 4.02 18 < 0.001 
1M                         110.69 602 < 0.001 -18.01 27 1.000 60.92 905 < 0.001 51.69 625 < 0.001 7.29 18 < 0.001 
2M                         77.99 602 < 0.001 -21.24 27 1.000 18.77 904 < 0.001 41.09 625 < 0.001 5.03 18 < 0.001 
3M                         104.65 602 < 0.001 -45.62 27 1.000 51.42 904 < 0.001 75.20 625 < 0.001 11.11 18 < 0.001 
6M                         125.39 602 < 0.001 -11.66 27 1.000 63.22 904 < 0.001 98.77 625 < 0.001 5.94 18 < 0.001 
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
 
1D                               -6.91 27 1.000 14.30 819 < 0.001 38.00 272 < 0.001 2.75 18 0.007 
1M                               -5.67 27 1.000 -68.99 819 1.000 -29.30 272 1.000 1.07 18 0.150 
2M                               -9.68 27 1.000 -94.17 819 1.000 -14.57 272 1.000 0.65 18 0.263 
3M                               -16.27 27 1.000 -76.97 820 1.000 6.65 272 < 0.001 5.23 18 0.000 
6M                               -25.43 27 1.000 -89.20 820 1.000 19.24 272 < 0.001 -1.11 18 0.859 
O
il
 &
 G
a
s 
1D                                     7.40 27 < 0.001 9.37 27 < 0.001 6.82 43 < 0.001 
1M                                     3.30 27 0.001 3.75 27 < 0.001 4.74 43 < 0.001 
2M                                     6.45 27 < 0.001 8.71 27 < 0.001 7.27 43 < 0.001 
3M                                     13.62 27 < 0.001 16.67 27 < 0.001 15.16 43 < 0.001 
6M                                     22.36 27 < 0.001 26.63 27 < 0.001 17.09 43 < 0.001 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y 
1D                                           27.59 394 < 0.001 2.27 18 0.018 
1M                                           6.44 393 < 0.001 3.41 18 0.002 
2M                                           31.77 393 < 0.001 3.84 18 0.001 
3M                                           42.81 393 < 0.001 7.84 18 < 0.001 
6M                                           60.09 393 < 0.001 1.92 18 0.036 
T
e
le
co
m
 
1D                                                 0.31 18 0.381 
1M                                                 2.95 18 0.004 
2M                                                 1.58 18 0.065 
3M                                                 4.79 18 < 0.001 
6M                                                 -2.34 18 0.985 
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Hypothesis 2.5 – Firm Reporting 
 
Adjacent to quarterly reports 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Not adjacent to quarterly reports > Adjacent 
 CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
 t df P-value 
1D 0.12 %*** 0.040 % 0.003 0.13 %*** 0.044 % 0.003 0.14 %*** 0.040 % < 0.001 
 
1D*** 81.48 4970 < 0.001 
1M 0.85 %*** 0.178 % < 0.001 0.66 %*** 0.197 % 0.001 0.96 %*** 0.178 % < 0.001 
 
1M*** 23.61 4973 < 0.001 
2M 1.41 %*** 0.252 % < 0.001 1.95 %*** 0.279 % < 0.001 1.50 %*** 0.252 % < 0.001 
 
2M*** 75.52 4972 < 0.001 
3M 2.08 %*** 0.308 % < 0.001 2.68 %*** 0.342 % < 0.001 2.00 %*** 0.309 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 98.79 4972 < 0.001 
6M 3.84 %*** 0.436 % < 0.001 4.80 %*** 0.484 % < 0.001 3.44 %*** 0.437 % < 0.001 
 
6M*** 54.47 4975 < 0.001 
n 2881 2881 2881 
     
 
Not adjacent to quarterly reports 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.21 %*** 0.038 % < 0.001 0.22 %*** 0.041 % < 0.001 0.21 %*** 0.038 % < 0.001 
     1M 0.96 %*** 0.171 % < 0.001 0.95 %*** 0.183 % < 0.001 0.92 %*** 0.172 % < 0.001 
     2M 1.93 %*** 0.242 % < 0.001 2.17 %*** 0.259 % < 0.001 1.71 %*** 0.243 % < 0.001 
     3M 2.91 %*** 0.297 % < 0.001 2.91 %*** 0.317 % < 0.001 2.65 %*** 0.298 % < 0.001 
     6M 4.49 %*** 0.420 % < 0.001 5.00 %*** 0.449 % < 0.001 4.07 %*** 0.422 % < 0.001 
     n 2284 2284 2284 
     
 
 
Hypothesis 2.6 – Momentum 
 
Momentum 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Momentum > No momentum 
 CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
 t df P-value 
1D 0.23 %*** 0.045 % < 0.001 0.22 %*** 0.047 % < 0.001 0.24 %*** 0.045 % < 0.001 
 
1D*** 122.23 6037 < 0.001 
1M 1.16 %*** 0.201 % < 0.001 1.10 %*** 0.210 % < 0.001 1.14 %*** 0.202 % < 0.001 
 
1M*** 114.65 6041 < 0.001 
2M 2.50 %*** 0.284 % < 0.001 2.35 %*** 0.297 % < 0.001 2.12 %*** 0.286 % < 0.001 
 
2M*** 261.62 6039 < 0.001 
3M 3.64 %*** 0.348 % < 0.001 3.17 %*** 0.364 % < 0.001 2.93 %*** 0.350 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 291.79 6040 < 0.001 
6M 6.66 %*** 0.492 % < 0.001 5.62 %*** 0.514 % < 0.001 5.04 %*** 0.495 % < 0.001 
 
6M*** 464.76 6038 < 0.001 
n 3313 3313 3313 
     
 
No momentum 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.11 %*** 0.033 % 0.001 0.15 %*** 0.038 % < 0.001 0.12 %*** 0.032 % < 0.001 
     1M 0.67 %*** 0.146 % < 0.001 0.55 %*** 0.168 % 0.001 0.74 %*** 0.145 % < 0.001 
     2M 0.91 %*** 0.206 % < 0.001 1.79 %*** 0.238 % < 0.001 1.13 %*** 0.205 % < 0.001 
     3M 1.46 %*** 0.252 % < 0.001 2.45 %*** 0.291 % < 0.001 1.81 %*** 0.251 % < 0.001 
     6M 1.76 %*** 0.356 % < 0.001 4.21 %*** 0.412 % < 0.001 2.55 %*** 0.355 % < 0.001 
     n 3314 3314 3314 
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Hypothesis 3.1 – Insider Position 
 
 
Alternate and/or subsidiary board member 
 
Managing Director 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.03 % 0.237 % 0.903 0.09 % 0.248 % 0.715 0.05 % 0.238 % 0.846 
 
0.39 %*** 0.090 % < 0.001 0.38 %*** 0.096 % < 0.001 0.39 %*** 0.090 % < 0.001 
1M 2.89 %*** 1.058 % 0.007 3.50 %*** 1.107 % 0.002 2.65 %** 1.066 % 0.014 
 
1.89 %*** 0.401 % < 0.001 1.81 %*** 0.431 % < 0.001 2.02 %*** 0.402 % < 0.001 
2M 5.29 %*** 1.497 % < 0.001 6.38 %*** 1.565 % < 0.001 2.62 %* 1.508 % 0.084 
 
4.07 %*** 0.567 % < 0.001 4.15 %*** 0.609 % < 0.001 4.02 %*** 0.568 % < 0.001 
3M 6.47 %*** 1.833 % < 0.001 7.56 %*** 1.917 % < 0.001 2.53 % 1.847 % 0.173 
 
6.27 %*** 0.695 % < 0.001 6.25 %*** 0.746 % < 0.001 6.04 %*** 0.695 % < 0.001 
6M 9.63 %*** 2.592 % < 0.001 11.08 %*** 2.711 % < 0.001 4.23 % 2.612 % 0.108 
 
10.86 %*** 0.982 % < 0.001 11.57 %*** 1.055 % < 0.001 9.92 %*** 0.984 % < 0.001 
n 148 148 148 
 
662 662 662 
                    
 
Board member parent firm 
 
Other executive 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.20 %*** 0.056 % < 0.001 0.24 %*** 0.059 % < 0.001 0.22 %*** 0.056 % < 0.001 
 
0.00 % 0.084 % 0.994 -0.01 % 0.094 % 0.914 0.07 % 0.085 % 0.443 
1M 0.94 %*** 0.250 % < 0.001 0.95 %*** 0.265 % < 0.001 1.04 %*** 0.251 % < 0.001 
 
0.55 % 0.374 % 0.146 0.42 % 0.420 % 0.317 0.73 %* 0.379 % 0.055 
2M 1.75 %*** 0.354 % < 0.001 2.05 %*** 0.375 % < 0.001 1.93 %*** 0.355 % < 0.001 
 
0.44 % 0.530 % 0.405 0.54 % 0.594 % 0.365 0.61 % 0.536 % 0.259 
3M 2.27 %*** 0.432 % < 0.001 2.76 %*** 0.459 % < 0.001 2.49 %*** 0.435 % < 0.001 
 
0.88 % 0.649 % 0.177 1.27 %* 0.728 % 0.082 1.14 %* 0.657 % 0.084 
6M 4.69 %*** 0.612 % < 0.001 5.52 %*** 0.650 % < 0.001 4.71 %*** 0.615 % < 0.001 
 
2.35 %** 0.918 % 0.011 3.13 %*** 1.029 % 0.003 2.36 %** 0.929 % 0.011 
n 2008 2008 2008 
 
475 475 475 
                    
 
Large shareholder 
 
Other position 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
1D 0.11 % 0.084 % 0.175 0.20 %** 0.089 % 0.028 0.12 % 0.084 % 0.159 
 
0.13 %*** 0.040 % < 0.001 0.12 %** 0.045 % 0.011 0.14 %*** 0.040 % 0.001 
1M -0.98 %*** 0.375 % 0.009 -0.35 % 0.397 % 0.376 -1.12 %*** 0.375 % 0.003 
 
1.16 %*** 0.180 % < 0.001 0.74 %*** 0.203 % < 0.001 1.14 %*** 0.180 % < 0.001 
2M -0.74 % 0.531 % 0.164 0.35 % 0.561 % 0.533 -1.26 %** 0.530 % 0.018 
 
1.85 %*** 0.255 % < 0.001 2.13 %*** 0.287 % < 0.001 1.80 %*** 0.255 % < 0.001 
3M -0.10 % 0.651 % 0.873 1.27 %* 0.688 % 0.065 -1.13 %* 0.650 % 0.082 
 
2.79 %*** 0.312 % < 0.001 2.54 %*** 0.351 % < 0.001 2.72 %*** 0.312 % < 0.001 
6M -3.84 %*** 0.920 % < 0.001 -1.00 % 0.973 % 0.303 -5.01 %*** 0.919 % < 0.001 
 
4.76 %*** 0.440 % < 0.001 4.63 %*** 0.497 % < 0.001 4.60 %*** 0.442 % < 0.001 
n 798 798 798 
 
2504 2504 2504 
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Board member parent firm Large shareholder Managing Director Other Executive Other Position 
>   t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value t df P-value 
A
lt
er
n
a
te
/ 
su
b
si
d
ia
ry
 b
o
a
rd
 
m
em
b
er
 
1D -8.98 148 1.000 -4.34 154 1.000 -18.12 157 1.000 1.48 159 0.070 -5.36 148 1.000 
1M 22.32 148 < 0.001 43.99 154 < 0.001 11.36 157 < 0.001 26.44 159 < 0.001 19.85 148 < 0.001 
2M 28.72 148 < 0.001 48.42 154 < 0.001 9.74 157 < 0.001 38.63 159 < 0.001 27.89 148 < 0.001 
3M 27.79 148 < 0.001 43.12 154 < 0.001 1.29 157 0.100 36.41 159 < 0.001 24.40 148 < 0.001 
6M 23.13 148 < 0.001 62.50 154 < 0.001 -5.67 157 1.000 33.51 159 < 0.001 22.82 148 < 0.001 
B
o
a
rd
 m
em
b
er
 
p
a
re
n
t 
fi
rm
 1D       27.79 1088 < 0.001 -49.48 836 1.000 50.62 578 < 0.001 47.63 3535 < 0.001 
1M       133.56 1089 < 0.001 -56.90 836 1.000 22.06 578 < 0.001 -32.85 3535 1.000 
2M       121.94 1089 < 0.001 -99.17 837 1.000 51.03 577 < 0.001 -11.24 3533 1.000 
3M       95.14 1088 < 0.001 -139.42 836 1.000 44.60 577 < 0.001 -45.00 3536 1.000 
6M       241.57 1089 < 0.001 -152.05 837 1.000 52.88 578 < 0.001 -4.47 3530 1.000 
L
a
rg
e 
sh
a
re
h
o
ld
er
 
1D             -59.53 1371 1.000 23.63 999 < 0.001 -6.15 916 1.000 
1M             -139.94 1370 1.000 -70.33 999 1.000 -155.63 916 1.000 
2M             -165.95 1370 1.000 -38.43 998 1.000 -133.07 916 1.000 
3M             -179.57 1371 1.000 -26.07 999 1.000 -121.21 916 1.000 
6M             -292.89 1371 1.000 -116.35 999 1.000 -255.05 916 1.000 
M
a
n
a
g
in
g
 D
ir
ec
to
r 
1D                   74.72 1060 < 0.001 70.96 733 < 0.001 
1M                   57.80 1061 < 0.001 45.27 733 < 0.001 
2M                   110.49 1060 < 0.001 97.97 733 < 0.001 
3M                   134.20 1060 < 0.001 125.61 733 < 0.001 
6M                   149.67 1060 < 0.001 155.51 733 < 0.001 
O
th
er
 E
x
ec
u
ti
ve
 
1D                         -34.08 516 < 0.001 
1M                         -35.12 516 1.000 
2M                         -56.75 516 1.000 
3M                         -62.88 516 1.000 
6M                         -56.11 516 1.000 
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Hypothesis 3.2 – Trade Volume, absolute 
 
 
First quartile absolute volume - Small absolute volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Small absolute > Large absolute 
  CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
  t df P-value 
1D 0.17 %*** 0.064 % 0.008 0.17 %** 0.067 % 0.010 0.20 %*** 0.064 % 0.002 
 
1D*** 30.58 3195 < 0.001 
1M 1.30 %*** 0.285 % < 0.001 1.17 %*** 0.299 % < 0.001 1.29 %*** 0.286 % < 0.001 
 
1M*** 172.28 3195 < 0.001 
2M 2.51 %*** 0.402 % < 0.001 2.86 %*** 0.423 % < 0.001 1.98 %*** 0.405 % < 0.001 
 
2M*** 159.84 3198 < 0.001 
3M 3.44 %*** 0.494 % < 0.001 3.66 %*** 0.518 % < 0.001 2.81 %*** 0.496 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 131.55 3194 < 0.001 
6M 5.51 %*** 0.698 % < 0.001 6.15 %*** 0.732 % < 0.001 4.42 %*** 0.701 % < 0.001 
 
6M*** 124.61 3196 < 0.001 
n 1622 1622 1622 
     
 
Second quartile absolute volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.22 %*** 0.056 % < 0.001 0.24 %*** 0.061 % < 0.001 0.24 %*** 0.057 % < 0.001 
     1M 1.27 %*** 0.253 % < 0.001 0.99 %*** 0.274 % < 0.001 1.39 %*** 0.253 % < 0.001 
     2M 2.09 %*** 0.358 % < 0.001 2.18 %*** 0.387 % < 0.001 2.44 %*** 0.358 % < 0.001 
     3M 3.11 %*** 0.437 % < 0.001 2.81 %*** 0.474 % < 0.001 3.42 %*** 0.439 % < 0.001 
     6M 4.13 %*** 0.619 % < 0.001 3.94 %*** 0.671 % < 0.001 4.92 %*** 0.621 % < 0.001 
     n 1621 1621 1621 
     
 
Third quartile absolute volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.17 %*** 0.051 % < 0.001 0.18 %*** 0.057 % 0.001 0.17 %*** 0.051 % 0.001 
     1M 0.90 %*** 0.227 % < 0.001 0.50 %* 0.255 % 0.051 0.92 %*** 0.227 % < 0.001 
     2M 1.11 %*** 0.321 % < 0.001 1.28 %*** 0.360 % < 0.001 1.18 %*** 0.322 % < 0.001 
     3M 1.70 %*** 0.392 % < 0.001 1.62 %*** 0.441 % < 0.001 1.65 %*** 0.394 % < 0.001 
     6M 3.60 %*** 0.556 % < 0.001 3.80 %*** 0.624 % < 0.001 3.47 %*** 0.557 % < 0.001 
     n 1621 1621 1621 
     
 
Fourth quartile absolute volume - Large absolute volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.11 %** 0.052 % 0.041 0.11 %* 0.057 % 0.056 0.09 %* 0.052 % 0.070 
     1M 0.28 % 0.231 % 0.227 0.67 %*** 0.256 % 0.009 0.23 % 0.232 % 0.312 
     2M 1.20 %*** 0.327 % < 0.001 2.02 %*** 0.362 % < 0.001 0.93 %*** 0.327 % 0.005 
     3M 2.12 %*** 0.400 % < 0.001 3.23 %*** 0.443 % < 0.001 1.74 %*** 0.401 % < 0.001 
     6M 3.76 %*** 0.567 % < 0.001 5.75 %*** 0.626 % < 0.001 2.55 %*** 0.567 % < 0.001 
     n 1646 1646 1646 
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Hypothesis 3.3 – Trade Volume, relative 
 
 
First quartile relative volume - Small relative volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
  
Large relative > Small relative 
 CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
 
 t df P-value 
1D 0.26 %*** 0.057 % < 0.001 0.28 %*** 0.061 % < 0.001 0.27 %*** 0.058 % < 0.001 
 
1D -10.19 3278 1.000 
1M 0.33 % 0.257 % 0.193 0.51 %* 0.273 % 0.060 0.56 %** 0.257 % 0.031 
 
1M*** 129.76 3278 < 0.001 
2M 1.04 %*** 0.363 % 0.004 1.51 %*** 0.386 % < 0.001 1.27 %*** 0.364 % 0.001 
 
2M*** 122.54 3279 < 0.001 
3M 1.56 %*** 0.445 % < 0.001 2.01 %*** 0.472 % < 0.001 1.63 %*** 0.446 % < 0.001 
 
3M*** 122.47 3279 < 0.001 
6M 2.07 %*** 0.629 % 0.001 3.31 %*** 0.668 % < 0.001 2.08 %*** 0.630 % 0.001 
 
6M*** 163.35 3279 < 0.001 
n 1648 1648 1648 
     
 
Second quartile relative volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.06 % 0.053 % 0.298 0.12 %** 0.058 % 0.048 0.08 % 0.053 % 0.135 
     1M 0.34 % 0.238 % 0.152 0.45 %* 0.261 % 0.087 0.35 % 0.239 % 0.140 
     2M 0.91 %*** 0.338 % 0.007 1.43 %*** 0.369 % < 0.001 0.77 %** 0.338 % 0.022 
     3M 1.64 %*** 0.414 % < 0.001 2.14 %*** 0.452 % < 0.001 1.49 %*** 0.414 % < 0.001 
     6M 2.87 %*** 0.584 % < 0.001 3.93 %*** 0.639 % < 0.001 2.53 %*** 0.585 % < 0.001 
     n 1652 1652 1652 
     
 
Third quartile relative volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.13 %** 0.054 % 0.015 0.11 %* 0.060 % 0.077 0.15 %*** 0.055 % 0.007 
     1M 1.48 %*** 0.243 % < 0.001 1.16 %*** 0.267 % < 0.001 1.46 %*** 0.245 % < 0.001 
     2M 2.28 %*** 0.344 % < 0.001 2.64 %*** 0.378 % < 0.001 2.06 %*** 0.346 % < 0.001 
     3M 3.55 %*** 0.421 % < 0.001 3.74 %*** 0.463 % < 0.001 3.08 %*** 0.424 % < 0.001 
     6M 6.17 %*** 0.594 % < 0.001 6.92 %*** 0.655 % < 0.001 5.24 %*** 0.599 % < 0.001 
     n 1640 1640 1640 
     
 
Fourth quartile relative volume - Large relative volume 
     
 
Market MDL Constant Mean Return MDL Multifactor MDL 
      CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value CAR-bar σ P-value 
     1D 0.24 %*** 0.058 % < 0.001 0.24 %*** 0.062 % < 0.001 0.23 %*** 0.058 % < 0.001 
     1M 1.50 %*** 0.257 % < 0.001 1.17 %*** 0.278 % < 0.001 1.38 %*** 0.257 % < 0.001 
     2M 2.60 %*** 0.363 % < 0.001 2.73 %*** 0.394 % < 0.001 2.40 %*** 0.364 % < 0.001 
     3M 3.46 %*** 0.446 % < 0.001 3.34 %*** 0.482 % < 0.001 3.30 %*** 0.446 % < 0.001 
     6M 5.65 %*** 0.630 % < 0.001 5.42 %*** 0.682 % < 0.001 5.33 %*** 0.630 % < 0.001 
     n 1646 1646 1646 
      
